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Our paper investigates the impact of government spending shocks on relative sector
size and contrasts the effects across countries. Using a panel of sixteen OECD coun-
tries over the period 1970-2007, our VAR evidence shows that a rise in government
consumption i) increases the share of non tradables in labor and real GDP while low-
ering the share of tradables, and ii) causes a significant increase in non traded wages
relative to traded wages. While the first finding reveals that the non traded sector is
more intensive in the government spending shock and experiences a labor inflow that
increases its relative size, the second finding suggests the presence of labor mobility
costs preventing wage equalization across sectors. These labor mobility costs appear
to play a key role in determining changes in relative sector size across time and space.
Whilst the responses of intersectoral labor reallocation and sectoral shares are found
empirically to decline over time, the share of non tradables increases more in countries
where the degree of labor mobility across sectors is higher. To account for our evidence,
we develop an open economy version of the neoclassical model with tradables and non
tradables. Our quantitative analysis shows that the open economy model is successful
in replicating the responses of sectoral output shares to a fiscal shock, as long as we
allow for a difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors along with adjustment costs to
capital accumulation. Finally, calibrating the model to country-specific data, we are
able to generate a cross-country relationship between the degree of labor mobility and
the responses of sectoral output shares which is similar to that in the data.
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1 Introduction
Does a government spending shock affect the production sectors in an open economy uni-
formly? If not, how can we explain the heterogeneity in the sectoral effects of a rise in
government consumption? Does the magnitude of the sectoral effects vary across time and
across countries and what factors cause such variations? Our paper provides an attempt to
answer these questions by exploring the sectoral effects of a government spending shock em-
pirically and calibrating an open economy version of the neoclassical model with tradables
and non tradables.
The motivation for the analysis of the sectoral effects of a rise in government consump-
tion is based on our panel VAR evidence for 16 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007.
First, our evidence reveals that a government spending shock has a strong expansionary
effect on hours worked and output in the non traded sector relative to the traded sector.
Such a finding suggests that the rise in government consumption is biased toward non
traded goods. Second, we also find empirically that a government spending shock leads to
a shift of labor toward the non traded sector, increasing its relative size. Such a reallo-
cation of labor toward the non traded sector is costly, however, as we detect empirically
a significant increase in non traded wages relative to traded wages. Third, when we turn
to cross-country differences, these labor mobility costs are found to play a pivotal role in
explaining international differences in the sectoral impact of fiscal policy. More precisely,
we find that both the increase in the share of non tradables and the decline in the share
of tradables are more pronounced in countries where the degree of labor mobility across
sectors is higher.
Estimates of the responses of sectoral output shares to a government spending shock
allow us to evaluate the contribution of the reallocation of resources to sectoral fiscal multi-
pliers empirically. More specifically, our evidence reveals that a rise in government spending
by one percentage point of GDP increases non traded output by 0.7% of GDP on impact
while the output share of non tradables rises initially by 0.35% of GDP. Since the latter
result indicates that non traded output would increase by 0.35% if GDP remained constant,
the reallocation of resources toward the non traded sector thus contributes to 50% of non
traded output growth. The rise in the share of non tradables in real GDP also suggests
that the non traded sector receives a disproportionate share of the shock to government
spending. In this regard, our estimates show that government consumption of non tradables
contributes 90% on average to increases in government spending.
While government spending shocks are biased toward non tradables and generate a
substantial reallocation of resources which significantly affects the relative size of sectors,
our evidence suggests some difficulty in reallocating labor between sectors. By hampering
the shift of hours worked between sectors, the presence of labor mobility costs should
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mitigate the changes in relative size of sectors following a rise in government consumption.
A first way to gauge the role of labor mobility costs is to investigate how impact responses
of relative sector size vary over time and whether their movements are positively related
to labor reallocation following our identified government spending shock. Our estimates
reveal that the responses of sectoral shares are reduced over time by about 40% and that
this reduction is concomitant and highly correlated with the decline in the rate of workers
shifting from one sector to another. While changes in relative sector size vary over time,
our estimates also reveal large variations across space. Importantly, we empirically detect
a positive cross-country relationship between the change in relative sector size following a
government spending shock and the degree of labor mobility, the latter being measured by
estimating the elasticity of labor supply across sectors.
To account for our evidence on fiscal transmission, we put forward an open economy
version of the neoclassical model with tradables and non tradables. In calibrating the
model to a representative OECD economy, we allow for the fraction of higher government
consumption expenditure on non tradables to be larger than the share of non tradables in
real GDP, in line with our evidence, so that the government shock is biased toward non
tradables. Our quantitative results show that the model is successful in replicating the
sectoral effects of government spending shocks as long as we allow for imperfect mobility
of labor across sectors and capital adjustment costs.1 With these two features, the model
produces a rise in the share of non tradables by 0.38 percentage point of GDP, close to our
empirical findings.2 If we remove both or either one of these ingredients, the model fails to
account quantitatively for our evidence on fiscal transmission, in particular the responses
of sectoral output shares which we estimate empirically. Intuitively, if we do not allow for
capital adjustment costs, a government spending shock leads to a dramatic fall in investment
which offsets the rise in government consumption. As a result, the excess demand in the
non traded goods market is low or even nil. Due to low incentives to shift resources toward
the non traded sector, the open economy experiences a trade balance surplus resulting in
the model substantially understating the rise in the share of non tradables. Conversely, if
we allow for capital adjustment costs, the decline in investment is mitigated, which leads to
significant excess demand in the non traded goods market. However, if we impose perfect
mobility of labor across sectors, high incentives to shift resources toward the non traded
sector result in a large trade balance deficit which leads the model to overstate the rise in
the share of non tradables considerably.
1To generate imperfect mobility of labor, we consider limited substitutability in hours worked across
sectors along the lines of Horvath [2000]. See e.g., Bouakez et al. [2011], Cardi and Restout [2015] who
assume that sectoral hours worked are aggregated by means of a CES function in order to account for the
evidence related to monetary policy shocks or the long-run effects of productivity shocks biased toward the
traded sector.
2Whereas our study differs greatly from that by Phelan and Trejos [2000] in terms of both objective and
modelling strategy, like the authors, we show that the combined effect of sectoral intensity in the government
spending shock and imperfect mobility of labor across sectors matter for fiscal transmission.
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The final exercise we perform is to investigate whether the model can account for cross-
country differences in the responses of sectoral output shares to a fiscal shock. We thus
calibrate the model to match data from the 16 OECD countries regarding dimensions such as
the non tradable content of labor, consumption, investment, government spending, and the
elasticity of labor supply across sectors capturing the degree of labor mobility. In line with
the evidence, the decline in the output share of tradables and the rise in the output share
of non tradables are more pronounced in countries with a higher degree of labor mobility.
We find quantitatively that impact responses of sectoral output shares to a government
spending shock are sensitive to the degree of labor mobility, as they vary between 0.26%
and 0.49% of GDP for non tradables when we move from the lowest to the highest value of
elasticity of labor supply across sectors. Although the model tends to understate changes
in the relative size of sectors, it is able to generate a cross-country relationship between the
responses of sectoral output shares and the degree of labor mobility that is similar to that
in the data.
We contribute to the extensive literature investigating fiscal transmission both empiri-
cally and theoretically by focusing on the reallocation effect of government spending shocks.
Like Ramey and Shapiro [1998], we emphasize the importance of the composition of gov-
ernment spending in understanding the sectoral effects of a fiscal shock. Whilst the authors
consider three episodes of expansionary defense spending in the United States driven by
foreign policy, we identify exogenous increases in government consumption by assuming
that discretionary government spending is subject to certain decision and/or implementa-
tion lags, as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002]. Putting aside the advantages and
disadvantages inherent to the narrative and SVAR approaches, the identification scheme
does matter, as the identified government spending shock can be intensive either in trad-
ables or non tradables.3 While the Ramey-Shapiro narrative approach suggests that mil-
itary shocks, which are heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, are intensive in
traded goods, our study reveals that government spending shocks, identified on the basis
of Blanchard-Perotti assumption, lead to a sharp increase in non traded output relative to
traded output.
This finding is in line with estimates documented by Monacelli and Perotti [2008] and
Benetrix and Lane [2010], which show that an increase in government spending dispro-
portionately benefits the non traded sector. In contrast to the authors who restrict their
attention to sectoral output effects, we highlight the changes in sectoral shares in labor
and real GDP. In this regard, one major finding is that the share of non tradables in em-
ployment and real GDP increases significantly, while the share of tradables declines. These
3To deal with the potential endogeneity problem inherent to the SVAR approach, in a robustness exercise,
we augmented each VAR model with the ’spending-based’ events variable constructed by Guajardo, Leigh,
and Pescatori [2014]. Overall, our results show low sensitivity to the identifying assumption. We thank one
referee for having drawn our attention to this dataset.
4
findings reveal that government spending shocks are strongly biased toward non tradables
and generate a reallocation of labor across sectors that affects their relative size.4 Like
Perotti [2008], we find that the sector which is relatively more intensive in the government
spending shock experiences an increase in real wages. In contrast to Perotti who considers
Ramey-Shapiro episodes (i.e., Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan buildup) and finds em-
pirically higher increases in the real wage in industries that are defense related, we detect
empirically a significant increase in wages paid by non traded industries which are relatively
more intensive in government spending shocks identified by adopting the SVAR approach.
One additional key finding with respect to the papers mentioned above is that interna-
tional differences in workers’ costs of switching sectors can account for the cross-country
dispersion in the responses of sectoral shares, as we uncover a positive cross-country rela-
tionship between the degree of labor mobility and the changes in relative sector size. In
this regard, our study can be viewed as complementary to three papers which contrast the
effects of fiscal policy on output across a number of country characteristics. In particular,
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh [2013] perform a split-sample analysis on the basis of the level
of development, the level of public debt, trade openness, and exchange rate regimes, Born,
Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013] further explore the implications of exchange rate regimes by in-
vestigating the role of anticipations, and Brinca et al. [2016] document a strong positive
relationship across countries between the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and wealth inequal-
ity. While these papers focus mainly on the aggregate fiscal multiplier, we explore the size
of sectoral fiscal multipliers resulting from the reallocation of resources across sectors. Our
key result is that a high intensity of the government spending shock in non tradables can
rationalize the increase in the share of non tradables, while the cross-country dispersion in
the sectoral share responses is the result of international differences in the degree of labor
mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we investigate em-
pirically the effects of a government spending shock on relative sector size and establish
evidence suggesting that its variation across time and space is positively related to the
degree of labor mobility across sectors. In section 3, we develop an open economy version
of the neoclassical model with a difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors. In section
4, we abstract from physical capital accumulation in order to derive a number of analyti-
cal results and build up intuition on fiscal transmission with imperfect mobility of labor.
In section 5, we report the results of our numerical simulations and assess the ability of
the model to account for the evidence. In section 6, we summarize our main results and
present our conclusions. The online appendix contains all the robustness checks, proofs and
derivations, as well as several extensions.
4More precisely, all else being equal, for the share of non tradables in real GDP to increase, the fraction of
the rise in government consumption spent on non tradables must be higher than the share of non tradables
in real GDP.
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2 Stylized Facts on Fiscal Transmission
In this section, we revisit the time-series evidence on fiscal transmission by differentiating
the effects between the traded and non traded sectors. We first estimate sectoral fiscal
multipliers and the responses of sectoral shares to a government spending shock. Then we
document evidence which aims to explain the rise in the share of non tradables along with
its variation across time and space. We denote below the level of the variable in upper case,
the logarithm in lower case, and the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a
hat.
2.1 VAR Model and Identification
In order to shed some light on fiscal transmission and guide our quantitative analysis, we
estimate the VAR model in panel format on annual data. We consider a structural model




BkZi,t−k + ²i,t, (1)
where subscripts i and t denote the country and the year, respectively, Zi,t is the vector
of endogenous variables, A is a matrix that describes the contemporaneous relation among
the variables collected in vector Zi,t, Bk is a matrix of lag specific own- and cross-effects of
variables on current observations, and the vector ²i,t contains the structural disturbances
which are uncorrelated with each other.
Because the VAR model cannot be estimated in its structural form, we pre-multiply (1)




A−1BkZi,t−k + ei,t, (2)
where A−1Bk and eit = A−1²it are estimated by using a panel OLS regression with country
fixed effects and country specific linear trends. To identify the VAR model and recover the
government spending shocks, we need assumptions on the matrix A as the reduced form of
the VAR model that we estimate contains fewer parameters than the structural VAR model
shown in eq. (1). Like Blanchard and Perotti [2002], we base the identification scheme on
the assumption that discretionary government spending is subject to certain decision and
implementation lags that prevent government spending from responding to current output
developments. Since there are some delays inherent to the legislative system, this is a
natural assumption when using quarterly data. However, this argument may not necessarily
be true when using annual data since some adjustment could be possible. To address the
potential endogeneity issue, we ran a number of robustness checks which confirm that our
identifying strategy is not altered by the use of annual data.5 An additional obstacle is to
5To support our identifying assumption, we performed several robustness exercises detailed in the online
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identify unexpected fiscal events. We conducted an investigation of the potential presence
of anticipation effects by using a dataset constructed by Born, Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013]
which contains one year-ahead OECD forecasts for government spending.6 It turns out that
differences are rather moderate when we control for the anticipation effects and that our
main results are not affected by the inclusion of forecasts for government spending growth.7
2.2 Data Construction
Before presenting the VARmodel, we briefly discuss the dataset we use. Our sample consists
of a panel of 16 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007 (except for Japan: 1974-2007)
and contains annual observations.8 All quantities are logged, expressed in real terms and
scaled by the working age population. Government final consumption expenditure (Git) in
volume is taken from OECD Economic outlook. We describe below how we construct time
series at a sectoral level.
We use the EU KLEMS [2011] and OECD STAN [2011] database which provides do-
mestic currency series of value added in current and constant prices, labor compensation
and employment (number of hours worked) for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries. To
split these eleven industries into traded and non traded sectors, we follow the classification
suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994] that we updated by following Jensen and Kletzer
[2006].9
Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, series for sectoral value
added in current (constant) prices are constructed by adding value added in current (con-

















k,it where the bar indicates that prices P
j are those at the base year), from which
we compute price indices (or sectoral value added deflators), P jit. Normalizing base year
price indices P¯ j to 1, the relative price of non tradables, Pit, is defined as the ratio of the
non traded value added deflator to the traded value added deflator (i.e., Pit = PNit /P
T
it ).





compensation in the traded and the non traded sectors which allow us to construct sectoral
wages, W jit. The relative wage, Ωit, is computed as the ratio of the non traded wage to
the traded wage (i.e., Ωit = WNit /W
T
it ). The real consumption wage in sector j, W
j
C,it, is
Appendix E. In particular, we investigate whether our main conclusions hold when adopting a narrative
approach which has the advantage of identifying fiscal policy changes that are exogenous to current economic
developments. We use narratively-identified government spending shocks from the dataset constructed by
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014] whose dataset contains 173 fiscal policy changes for 17 OECD countries
over the period 1978-2009. The main conclusions reached in this paper are robust to the identification
approach.
6We use an alternative dataset constructed by Fioramanti et al. [2016] which contains one year-ahead
forecasts for the budget balance-GDP ratio performed by the European Commission and do not find any
evidence of anticipation effects.
7Details about our empirical strategy and data construction can be found in the online Appendix E.
8Details of data construction and the source of variables used in our estimate are given in Appendix A.
9In contrast to De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat ’Financial intermediation’ as non tradable, we classify
this industry as tradable in line with the evidence documented by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] on U.S. data.
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defined as the sectoral nominal wage, W jit, divided by the consumption price index, PC,it.
As detailed below, we also construct labor and value added shares (at constant prices),
denoted by νL,jit and ν
Y,j
it .
2.3 Good-Biased Government Spending Shock: Preliminary Definitions
Before moving forward, it is useful to clarify our objective and some definitions.10 We
consider an open economy which produces a traded and a non traded good, denoted by the
superscripts T and N , respectively. The traded good is the numeraire and its price, P T ,
is normalized to 1. We start with a simple equality which states that the aggregate fiscal
multiplier is equal to the sum of sectoral fiscal multipliers expressed in GDP units:
YˆR(t) = νY,N Yˆ N (t) + νY,T Yˆ T (t), (3)
where YˆR(t) is real GDP growth following a rise in government spending by one percentage
point of GDP and νY,j = P¯ jY j/YR is the share of sector j in real GDP. If we subtract the
share of real GDP growth received by each sector from their sectoral fiscal multiplier, we
obtain the change in relative sector size which measures the contribution of the reallocation
of resources across sectors to valued added growth in GDP units:11
dνY,j(t) = νY,j Yˆ j(t)− νY,j YˆR(t). (4)
The growth differential in GDP units on the RHS of eq. (4) can be viewed as the sectoral
fiscal multiplier if real GDP remained fixed and thus reflects sectoral value added growth
resulting from the reallocation of resources. Our first objective is to estimate empirically
the change in relative sector size following a rise in government spending.12
Our second objective is to uncover the factors determining the changes in relative sector
size. To bring out these determinants in a simple way, we use the equality between value
added and its final use, i.e., Y j = Ej+Gj where Gj stands for government purchases of good
j whilst Ej is private demand consisting of consumption (Cj), private fixed investment (J j),
and net exports (when considering the traded goods market). Denoting by ωGj the share
of good j in government consumption, we have G(t) = ωGNG(t) + ωGTG(t); differentiating
while assuming that ωGj is constant over time, a rise in government spending is split into
10Appendix C provides more details about the results discussed below.
11While in the main text we define the fiscal multiplier as the output growth following a rise in government
spending for simplicity purposes, it should be mentioned in the interest of clarity that referring to νY,j Yˆ j(t)
as the sectoral fiscal multiplier is an abuse of language as the latter should be computed as the ratio of
the present value of the cumulative change in output to the present value of the cumulative change in
government consumption. Since we base most of our analysis on impact effects such a simplification does
not pose a problem.
12Whilst the same logic applies to the labor share, dνL,j(t) measures the growth differential between




where αL,j is the
labor compensation share of sector j.
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non tradables and tradables in accordance with their respective shares:13
dG(t) = ωGNdG(t) + ωGT dG(t). (5)
Differentiating Y j = Ej + Gj while keeping private demand fixed and making use of (5),
we find that the fiscal multiplier of sector j increases with the intensity of this sector in the
government spending shock, i.e., νY,j Yˆ j(t) = ωGj (dG(t)/Y ). Using the latter relationship,
non traded output increases relative to traded output when the fraction of the rise in
government consumption spent on non tradables is higher than that on tradables, i.e.,
ωGN > ωGT . Formally, we have:
νY,N Yˆ N (t)− νY,T Yˆ T (t) = (ωGN − ωGT ) (dG(t)/Y ) . (6)
According to (6), the definition of a government shock biased toward non tradables is based
on the comparison of sectoral fiscal multipliers.14
The problem with the above definition is that it does not take into account that the
share of non tradables in real GDP is about 63% in OECD countries and thus the increase
in non traded output relative to traded output may not be large enough to raise the share
of non tradables in real GDP. Since we are interested in the reallocation effects of an
expansionary budget policy leading to changes in relative sector size, we thus adopt an
alternative definition which states that a government spending shock is biased toward non
tradables if the non tradable content of the government spending shock is higher than
the share of non tradables in real GDP so that the relative size of the non traded sector





(dG(t)/Y ) . (7)
Whilst the relative intensity of the non traded sector in the government spending shock,
i.e., ωGN − νY,N , determines whether its relative size increases or declines, the reallocation
of resources influences the magnitude of this variation. The lower the mobility costs, the
more resources are reallocated toward the non traded sector and the more its relative size
should increase. Below, we present evidence pointing to the presence of imperfect mobility
of labor and revealing that the degree of labor mobility matters in determining changes in
relative sector size following a government spending shock.
2.4 VAR Specification
In order to investigate the size of sectoral fiscal multipliers, along with the contribution of
the reallocation of resources to sectoral value added growth, we consider three alternative
13Based on our evidence documented later, we do not make the distinction between the share of good j
in government spending and the intensity of the government spending shock in this good j, since the two
cannot be differentiated.
14This definition corresponds to that implicitly adopted by Monacelli and Perotti [2008] and Benetrix and
Lane [2010].
15To derive the second definition, we use the fact that Yˆ (t) = dG(t)/Y (by keeping private demand fixed)
along with (4) and νY,j Yˆ j(t) = ωGj (dG(t)/Y ).
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VAR specifications in which the choice of variables is motivated by the variables discussed
in the quantitative analysis. To alleviate notations, price indices at the base year are
normalized to 1, i.e., P¯ ji = 1, so that (logged) value added at constant prices is reduced to
yjit and yit stands for (logged) real GDP when this causes no confusion.
• To investigate the magnitude of the sectoral fiscal multiplier, we consider a VARmodel
that includes value added at constant prices in sector j, yjit, hours worked in sector
j, ljit, and the real consumption wage in sector j, w
j
C,it. Our vector of endogenous










with j = T,N .
• To estimate the change in the relative size of sector j, we consider a VAR model
where we divide sectoral value added at constant prices (sectoral labor) by real GDP
(total labor) in order to filter the change in sectoral output (sectoral labor) aris-
ing from real GDP (total labor) growth, which allows us to isolate the ‘pure’ real-
location effect and thus gauge the importance of the shift of resources across sec-





it − yit, ljit − lit, wjC,it
]
.
• Finally, to gain further insight into fiscal transmission, we estimate empirically the
effects of a government spending shock on the relative price (p) and relative wage
(ω), and thus consider a VAR model where we replace sectoral quantities with the
ratio of sectoral quantities for both the product and the labor market. Our vector of










it − lNit , ωit
]
.
Whilst in the main text we concentrate on the sectoral effects, in a longer version of the
paper, we also document evidence on the aggregate effects of a government spending shock
by estimating a VAR model which includes government final consumption expenditure,
real GDP, total hours worked, private investment, and the real consumption wage, i.e.,
zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it].16 We take this model as the baseline to calibrate the government
spending shock in the quantitative analysis.17
2.5 Effects of Government Spending Shocks: VAR Evidence
We generated impulse response functions which summarize the responses of variables to
an increase in government spending by 1 percentage point (henceforth ppt) of GDP. As
displayed in the solid blue line in the left panel of Fig. 1, the response of government
16Aggregate effects of a government spending shock are displayed and discussed in Appendix D.1.
17As pointed out by a referee, because we consider alternative VAR models, the fact that identified
government spending shocks display substantial differences across VAR specifications might be a concern.
To address this issue, we ran a number of robustness checks by augmenting each VAR model with the same
identified spending shock, ordered first. Because we take zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it] as our benchmark
model in the quantitative analysis to calibrate the government spending shock, we augment each VAR
model with the spending shock identified for this benchmark specification on annual or quarterly data.
Results reveal that the discrepancy in the estimated effects is quite moderate, see Appendix E.3.
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consumption is hump-shaped, peaking after one year and then gradually declining; it shows
a high level of persistence over time as it is about 8 years before the shock dies out.18
In Fig. 2, we report results for our three VAR models.19 The blue and thick black lines
show impulse response functions following an exogenous government spending shock by one
ppt of GDP. The horizontal axis measures time after the shock in years and the vertical
axis measures percentage deviations from trend.20 In each case, the solid line represents
the point estimate, while the shaded area indicates the 90% confidence bounds obtained by
bootstrap sampling. The first column displays fiscal multipliers for output. We find that
a rise in government consumption has a strong expansionary effect on non traded output
which increases significantly on impact by 0.70 ppt of GDP. During the first four years
after the shock, the non traded output multiplier of government spending averages out at
about 0.47 ppt of GDP. In contrast, the traded sector displays a negative fiscal multiplier
over this period as the government spending shock gives rise to a contraction in traded
output which remains below trend. Henceforth, our evidence shown in Fig. 2 reveals that
the government spending shock is biased toward non tradable goods as it benefits
the non traded sector at the expense of the traded sector. Furthermore, as shown in the
second column of Fig. 2, higher non traded output is associated with a sharp increase in
hours worked on impact, while the traded sector experiences a gradual decline in labor for
the first five years.
The third column of Fig. 2 enables us to gauge the contribution of the reallocation
of inputs, labor especially, to the expansion of the relative size of the non traded sector.
The second row shows that the labor share of tradables declines by 0.27 ppt of total labor
(see the blue line) while the reverse is true for non tradables (see the thick black line).
Since non traded hours worked increase by 0.55 ppt of total employment, 50% of non
traded employment growth is the result of labor reallocation. As shown in the first row
of the third column, a fiscal shock lowers the output share of tradables (see the blue line)
significantly and substantially increases that of non tradables (see the thick black line).
Because changes in output shares indicate how much sectoral output would increase if
GDP remained constant, they provide us with valuable information on the shift of inputs
across sectors and the resulting changes in their relative size. Quantitatively, since non
traded output rises by 0.7 ppt of GDP while the output share of non tradables rises by 0.35
ppt of GDP, the shift of resources toward the non traded sector alone contributes 50% of
non traded output growth. Our second set of findings shown in Fig. 2 thus reveals that
18The red line in the left panel of Fig. 1 shows the endogenous response of G over the period 1995-2015
as we estimate the responses of GT and GN over this period.
19For reasons of space, we do not show the responses of real consumption wages. Point estimates are
shown in Panel A of Table 5 at a one year-, two-year and four-year horizon. The Table is relegated to the
online Appendix D.2.
20Sectoral output and sectoral output share are measured in percentage points of total output relative to
trend. Sectoral labor shares are both measured as percentage deviations of total hours worked from trend.
The remaining variables are measured as percentage deviations from trend.
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a government spending shock generates a reallocation of labor that significantly
affects the relative size of sectors.21
As will be shown analytically in subsection 4.2, all else being equal (i.e., keeping private
demand fixed), for the relative price of non tradables to appreciate, the government spending
shock must be biased enough toward non traded goods, i.e., ωGN > νY,N . The last column
of Fig. 2 supports the conjecture that an aggregate government spending shock triggers a
demand shock in favor of non tradables. More specifically, the relative price of non tradables
(see the thick black line) appreciates significantly in the short-run, signaling excess demand
in the non traded goods market, while the ratio of traded output relative to non traded
output decreases substantially (see the blue line).
Obviously, for the increase in the GDP share of non tradables to materialize, resources
must be reallocated away from the traded sector to the non traded sector. If workers
experience mobility costs, the rise in the relative size of the non traded sector should be
less. As can be seen in the second row of the last column of Fig. 2, the sharp decline in
hours worked in the traded relative to the non traded sector (see the blue line) is associated
with a significant increase in non traded wages relative to traded wages (see the thick black
line). The positive response of the relative wage to a government spending shock suggests
the presence of intersectoral labor mobility costs.
< Please insert Figures 1-2 about here >
2.6 Intensity of Government Spending Shock in Non Tradables
We first investigate empirically whether the government shock is biased enough toward non
traded goods to increase the relative size of the non traded sector. In order to quantify
the intensity of the government spending shock in non tradables we split government fi-
nal consumption expenditure between government consumption on non tradables, gN , and
tradables, gT , by using the COFOG database from the OECD which provides a break-
down of government expenditure by function.22 The sample covers 13 OECD countries
over the period 1995-2015. We chose this period as time series for government consump-
tion by function are not available before 1995 for most of the countries in our sample,
while the period 1995-2007 would be too short to obtain consistent estimates.23 Then, we
estimate a VAR model in panel format on annual data that includes unanticipated govern-
21As suggested by a referee, labor mobility and thus the magnitude of changes in relative sector size
following a government spending shock could vary across the state of economy. In Appendix F.1, we explore
empirically this issue and find that when the economy is in expansion, the rise in the share of non tradables
lies in the upper range of the confidence bound for the baseline scenario, while the increase in the output
share of non tradables in recession lies in the lower range. The reason is twofold. Our evidence indicates
that the non traded sector is more intensive in the government spending shock in expansions. We also find
empirically that labor mobility is slightly higher when the economy is in expansion.
22See Appendix B for details about the breakdown of g into gN and gT .
23Data to construct time series for sectoral government consumption expenditure are available for all the
countries in our sample except Canada. In efforts to have a balanced panel and time series of a reasonable
length, Australia (1998-2015) and Japan (2005-2015) are removed from the sample, which leaves us with 13
OECD countries over the period 1995-2015.
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ment spending shocks, ²Git , ordered first, government consumption spending and sectoral
government consumption on non tradables and tradables. To identify exogenous and unan-
ticipated fiscal shocks, ²Gi,t, we estimate the VAR model that includes aggregate variables,
i.e., zi,t = [gi,t, yi,t, li,t, jei,t, wC,i,t], and adopt a Cholesky decomposition. The middle and
right panels of Fig. 1 display the response of government consumption of non tradables
and tradables to an exogenous and unanticipated increase in government spending by 1%
of GDP, respectively. On impact, government consumption of non tradables increases by
0.88%. Its contribution to the government spending shock averages 90% and is quite stable
over time as it varies from 88% up to 91%.24 Moreover, we find that the responses of
sectoral government consumption to an exogenous fiscal shock are both hump-shaped and
seem to mimic the adjustment of government spending shown in Fig. 1(a).
These findings thus corroborate our conjecture according to which government shocks
are strongly biased toward non traded goods and thus provide incentives to reallocate labor
toward this sector. Whilst the relative intensity of the non traded sector in the government
spending shock causes an increase in the share of non tradables by triggering a reallocation
of labor toward the non traded sector, its rise should be mitigated by labor mobility costs.
2.7 Implications of the Degree of Labor Mobility across Sectors
To assess the importance of labor mobility costs for fiscal transmission, we investigate
below whether the responses of sectoral shares vary across time and space, and whether
these variations are positively related to differences in labor mobility.
A first way to gauge the role of labor mobility costs in determining the adjustment
of the relative sector size to a government spending shock is to investigate whether the
responses of sectoral shares vary over time and explore their relationship with the extent
of labor reallocation across sectors triggered by a rise in government spending. To perform
this experiment, like Miyamoto, Nguyen and Sergeyev [2018], we compute the responses of
selected variables by using a two-step estimation procedure. We first identify government
spending shocks by adopting a Cholesky decomposition in which government spending is
ordered before the other variables.25 In the second step, we estimate the effects in a rolling
25-year window by using Jorda`’s [2005] single-equation method.26 The local projection
24See Table 2 in Appendix B.2 which displays the mean responses of the two components of government
consumption.
25More specifically, we estimate the baseline VAR model that includes aggregate variables, i.e., zi,t =
[gi,t, yi,t, li,t, jei,t, wC,i,t].
26By decoupling the shock identification and the estimate of the responses, the first advantage of Jorda`’s
[2005] projection method is that traded and non traded variables respond to the same shock. However, our
robustness check shows that the shock is identical across all VAR models. The second advantage over the
standard VAR approach is that it considerably reduces the number of coefficients and thus is particularly
suited when estimating the sectoral effects over overlapping subperiods of fixed length. The third advantage
is that it does not impose the dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and can accommodate
non-linearities in the response function. By imposing fewer restrictions, impulse responses obtained by
using the local projection method are rather erratic. Since we contrast empirical with theoretical responses
in the quantitative analysis and smooth impulse responses are therefore more appropriate for this exercise,
we stick to the VAR methodology, however, for most the empirical analysis undertaken in this paper. That
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method amounts to running a series of regressions of each variable of interest on a structural














where αji and β
j
i are the country fixed effects and country-specific linear trends respectively,
xj is the logarithm of the variable of interest of sector j, z is a vector of control variables (i.e.,
past values of government spending and of the variable of interest), ψjh (L) is a polynomial
(of order two) in the lag operator and ²Gi,t is the identified government spending shock.
27
Since we concentrate on impact effects, horizon h is set to zero in eq. (8). Given that we
are primarily interested in the reallocation effects, we estimate the impact of a government
spending shock on the labor and value added share of tradables and non tradables, i.e.,
xj = νY,j , νL,j (with j = T,N). As can be seen in Fig. 3 which reports impact responses of
sectoral shares to the government spending shock (i.e., γj0) in the blue lines, the magnitude
of changes in relative sector size decreases over time, i.e., γN0 becomes less positive and γ
T
0
less negative. In line with our conjecture, one obvious candidate to explain such a decline
in |γj | is an increase in labor mobility costs. If workers incur higher costs of switching
sectors, then a rise in government spending should result in a smaller reallocation of labor
between the traded and the non traded sector.28 As clearly stands out, the decline in
the magnitude of changes in relative sector size is associated with less labor reallocation
following a government spending shock, in line with our hypothesis. More specifically, our
estimates reveal that, in about fifteen years, the responses of sectoral shares have been
reduced over time by about 40% whilst the rate of workers shifting from one sector to
another has decreased by the same amount as well. Strikingly, time-varying responses of
labor and value added shares are highly correlated with those of labor reallocation, with the
correlation coefficient ranging from 0.82 to 0.86. This finding thus suggests that increasing
labor mobility costs have contributed to declining effects of fiscal policy on relative sector
size over time.
< Please insert Figures 3-4 about here >
Whilst the above evidence shows that the reallocation effects of expansionary budget
policy vary across time, we now investigate whether these effects vary across space. To
conduct this study, we explore the cross-country relationship between changes in the relative
size of sectors and the magnitude of workers’ costs of switching sectors. To explore this
cross-country relationship, we draw on Horvath [2000] and estimate the elasticity of labor
said, both methods lead to very similar, if not identical, results on impact and even at a longer time horizon.
27We allow for two lags on the variable of interest and government spending collected in vector z.
28Following Wacziarg and Wallack [2004], we compute the labor reallocation index in year t for country




j=T |Lji,t − Lji,t−τ | −









where τ = 5 and Lji,t denotes employment in sector j = T,N .
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supply across sectors for each country.29 This parameter, which plays a pivotal role in
our model presented in the next section, measures the extent to which workers are willing
to reallocate their hours worked toward the non traded sector following a 1% increase in
the relative wage. When the elasticity of labor supply across sectors is greater, workers’
mobility costs are thus lower, which in turn implies a higher degree of labor mobility.
Once we have estimated the magnitude of workers mobility costs for each country, we
then estimate the same model as in eq. (2) but for a single country at a time.30 In Fig.
4, we plot the impact responses of sectoral labor and sectoral output shares on the vertical
axis against our measure of the degree of labor mobility, denoted ², on the horizontal axis.
This exercise may be viewed as tentative as the sectoral effect of a government spending
shock varies considerably across countries and there is substantial uncertainty surrounding
point estimates given the relatively small number of observations available per country.
The cross-country analysis displayed in Fig. 4 highlights two major findings. First,
as shown in the top panels, whether we use labor or output, almost all countries in our
sample experience a fall in the relative size of the traded sector as impact responses from
the VAR model are below the X-axis. The bottom panels reveal that the reverse is true
for the non traded sector which benefits from the reallocation of inputs. This evidence
supports our earlier conjecture according to which a government spending shock is strongly
biased toward non tradables. Second, as can be seen in the top panels of Fig. 4, countries
where workers have lower mobility costs experience a larger decline in the share of tradables
while the bottom panels show that the relative size of non tradables increases more in these
economies. In sum, our findings reveal that the magnitude of the change in relative
sector size following a government spending shock increases with the degree of
labor mobility across sectors.
In the following, we develop an open economy version of the neoclassical model with
imperfect mobility of labor and capital installation costs in order to account for our evidence
on fiscal transmission. While these two features, along with high intensity of the government
spending shock in non tradables are necessary to replicate the change in relative sector size
for a representative OECD economy, we have to let the degree of labor mobility across
sectors vary across countries to account for the cross-country dispersion in the sectoral
output responses.
29See Appendix B which details our empirical strategy.
30When estimating the responses of sectoral labor and sectoral output shares to a government spending
shock for each country, we omit wjC,it in order to economize some degrees of freedom; the vector of endogenous








. We also estimated the VAR model by including ωjC,it and find that
the results are similar. We allow for two lags (i.e., k = 2 in eq. (1)), as we did for the panel data estimate.
It is worth mentioning that Jorda`’s local projection method gives similar results, except for the cross-
country relationship. As shown in Appendix D.4, whilst impact responses obtained with VAR and local
projection methods are highly correlated, and cross-country relationships between dνY,j(0) and ² display
the same pattern, the slopes of the trend line obtained with the local projection method display substantial
differences between tradables and non tradables which would undermine the quantitative analysis because
the slopes by construction should be identical.
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3 Small Open Economy Model with Imperfect Mobility of
Labor
We consider a small open economy populated by a constant number of identical households
and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever.31 The country is small in terms of
both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r?.32 One
sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T which can be exported at no
cost, invested and consumed domestically. A second sector produces a non traded good
denoted by the superscript N which can be consumed domestically or invested. The traded
good is chosen as the numeraire. Time is continuous and indexed by t.
3.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes traded and non traded goods de-









φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (9)
where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non traded goods.
The representative household supplies labor LT and LN in the traded and non traded
sectors, respectively. To rationalize the rise in the non traded wage relative to the traded
wage, we assume limited labor mobility across sectors. A shortcut to produce a difficulty in
reallocating hours worked is to assume that workers experience a utility loss when shifting
hours worked from one sector to another. We follow Horvath [2000] and consider that








² + (1− ϑ)−1/² (LN (t)) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (10)
and 0 < ϑ < 1 parametrizes the weight attached to the supply of hours worked in the
traded sector and ² is the degree of substitutability in hours worked across sectors.33
The representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, she/he supplies a fraction
L(t) as labor, and consumes the remainder l(t) ≡ 1−L(t) as leisure. At any instant of time,
31More details about the setup can be found in Appendix G.
32The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy. In a Technical Appendix, we relax the assumption of exogenous terms of trade by considering
a semi-small open economy model. As detailed in Appendix K.5, all the results obtained in the main text
are robust to the assumption of exogenous terms of trade.
33As pointed out by a referee, eq. (10) implies that workers’ costs of switching sectors are symmetric
whether they move away from the traded to the non traded sector or the other way around. In Appendix
F.2, we document evidence which lends credence to our hypothesis. More specifically, we estimate the effects
on relative sector size according to whether government spending is going up or down. If workers’ mobility
costs were symmetric, then the magnitude of the increase in the labor share of non tradables when the
shock is expansionary should be equivalent to that of its decline when the shock is recessionary. While our
evidence indicates that labor mobility is less when government spending is going down, the difference is
quite moderate.
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households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working.
Assuming that the felicity function is additively separable in consumption and labor, the











where β is the discount rate and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Factor income is derived by supplying labor L(t) at a wage rate W (t), and capital K(t)
at a rental rate R(t). In addition, households accumulate internationally traded bonds,
B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t). Denoting lump-sum taxes by T (t),
households’ flow budget constraint states that real disposable income (on the RHS) can be
saved by accumulating traded bonds, consumed, PC(t)C(t), or invested, PJ(t)J(t):
B˙(t) + PC(t)C(t) + PJ(t)J(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− T (t), (12)
where PC (P (t)) and PJ (P (t)) are consumption and the investment price index, respec-
tively, which are a function of the relative price of non traded goods, P (t). The aggregate
wage index, W (t) =W
(
W T (t),WN (t)
)







+ (1− ϑ) (WN (t))²+1] 1²+1 , (13)
where W T (t) and WN (t) are wages paid in the traded and the non traded sectors. The
investment good is produced (costlessly) using traded good and non traded good inputs










where αJ and 1− αJ are the shares of investment expenditure on non tradables and trad-
ables, respectively. Installation of new investment goods involves increasing and convex
costs, assumed quadratic, of net investment. Thus, total investment J(t) differs from effec-
tively installed new capital, I(t):









where the parameter κ > 0 governs the magnitude of adjustment costs to capital accumu-
lation, and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. Net investment gives rise to capital
accumulation according to the dynamic equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t). (16)
Households choose consumption, worked hours and investment in physical capital by
maximizing lifetime utility (11) subject to (12) and (16) together with (15). Denoting by
34In a Technical Appendix, we find numerically that relaxing the assumption of separability in preferences
between consumption and labor merely affects the results.
35In accordance with the empirical findings documented by Bems [2008] for OECD countries, we choose
an elasticity of substitution between JN and JT of 1.
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λ and Q′ the co-state variables associated with (12) and (16), the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:36
C(t) = (PC(t)λ(t))
−1 , (17a)











+ δK , (17c)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (17d)















and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0, limt→∞Q(t)K(t)e−βt = 0. In an
open economy model with a representative agent who has perfect foresight, a constant rate
of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order
to generate an interior solution. Setting β = r? into (17d) yields λ = λ¯. Eq. (17c) states
that investment is an increasing function of Tobin’s q, which is defined as the shadow value
to the firm of installed capital, Q(t), divided by its replacement cost, PJ(t). For the sake
of clarity, we drop the time argument below provided this causes no confusion.
Applying Shephard’s lemma (or the envelope theorem) to consumption expenditure
yields the following demand for the traded and non traded good, respectively:
CT = ϕ (1/PC)
−φC, CN = (1− ϕ) (P/PC)−φC. (18)
Denoting the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure by αC , expenditure in
non tradables and tradables is given by PCN = αCPCC and CT = (1− αC)PCC.
Applying the same logic for labor, given the aggregate wage index (13), we can derive





L, LN = (1− ϑ) (WN/W )² L, (19)
where ² is the elasticity of labor supply across sectors; it measures the extent to which
agents are willing to increase their relative hours worked in sector j, Lj/L, following a 1%
rise in the relative wage in sector j, W j/W . As ² takes higher values, more labor shifts
from one sector to another and thus the degree of labor mobility across sectors increases.
When we let ² tend toward infinity, the special case of perfect labor mobility is obtained.
Because workers are willing to devote their whole time to the sector that pays the highest
wages, the sectors pay the same wage. Denoting by αL the share of non tradable labor
revenue in labor income, labor income from supplying hours worked in the non traded and
the traded sectors are WNLN = αLWL and W TLT = (1− αL)WL.




Each sector consists of a large number of identical firms which use labor, Lj , and physical
capital, Kj , according to a constant returns to scale technology:







where Zj represents the TFP index which is introduced for calibration purposes only and
θj corresponds to the share of labor income in the value added of sector j. Firms lease
capital from households and hire workers. They face two cost components: a capital rental
cost equal to R, and wage rates in the traded and non traded sectors equal toW T andWN ,
respectively. Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital
and labor by taking prices as given. Since capital can move freely between the two sectors,
the value of marginal products in the traded and non traded sectors equalizes while costly
labor mobility implies a wage differential across sectors:
ZT
(








)1−θN ≡WN , (21c)
where kj ≡ Kj/Lj denotes the capital-labor ratio for sector j = T,N .
Aggregating over the two sectors gives us the resource constraint for capital:
KT +KN = K. (22)
3.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Total government spending, G, goes
on goods, GN , produced by non traded firms and goods, GT , produced by traded firms.
Both components of government spending are determined exogenously. The government
finances public spending by raising lump-sum taxes, T . As a result, Ricardian equivalence
obtains and the time path of taxes is irrelevant for the real allocation. We may thus assume
without loss of generality that government budget is balanced at each instant:37
G = GT + PGN = T. (23)
3.4 Model Closure and Equilibrium
To fully describe equilibrium, we first impose the market clearing condition for non trad-
ables:
Y N = CN + JN +GN . (24)
37In a Technical Appendix, we allow for distortionary labor taxation and consider a rise in government
spending which is debt-financed. Quantitative results in Appendix K.5 show that the sectoral impact of
fiscal policy is similar to that obtained when assuming a balanced-budget government spending shock.
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Equality between non traded output and its demand counterpart is achieved through ad-
justments to the relative price of non tradables, P , which guarantee that eq. (24) holds at
each point of time.
Regarding the allocation of government consumption to good j = T,N , we consider
a rise in G which is split between non tradables and tradables in accordance with their
respective shares in government expenditure (see eq. (5)). In order to account for the
non-monotonic pattern of the dynamic adjustment of G(t) in line with our evidence (see
Fig. 1(a)), we assume that the deviation of government spending relative to its initial value
as a percentage of initial GDP is:(
G(t)− G˜
)
/Y˜ = e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt, (25)
where we denote the steady-state value with a tilde; g > 0 parametrizes the magnitude of
the exogenous fiscal shock, ξ > 0 and χ > 0 parametrize the degree of persistence of the
fiscal shock; as ξ and χ take higher values, government spending returns to its initial level
more rapidly. More specifically, eq. (25) allows us to generate an inverted U pattern for
the endogenous response of G(t): if χ > ξ, we have G˙(t) > 0 following the exogenous fiscal
shock and then G(t) declines after reaching a peak at some time t.
After inserting appropriate first-order conditions into the non traded good market clear-
ing condition (24) and the no arbitrage condition (17e), it can be shown that the adjustment
of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic system which com-
prises two equations that form a separate subsystem in K and Q, i.e., K˙ ≡ Υ(K,Q,G) and
Q˙ ≡ Σ(K,Q,G). Linearizing these equations in the neighborhood of the steady-state and
using (5) leads to a system of first-order linear differential equations which can be solved
by applying standard methods and making use of (25):38
K(t)− K˜ = X1(t) +X2(t), Q(t)− Q˜ = ω12X1(t) + ω22X2(t), (26)
where we denote the negative eigenvalue by ν1, the positive eigenvalue by ν2, and ωi2 is the
element of the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2) and X1(t) and

















where K0 is initial stock of physical capital. When the shock is permanent, X2(t) = 0 while
38See e.g., Buiter [1984] who presents the continuous time adaptation of the method of Blanchard and
Kahn. The steps of the derivations of equations in the main text can be found in Appendix G.3.
39The coefficients of the Jacobian matrix are partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state, e.g., ΥX =
∂Υ
∂X
with X = K,Q, and the direct effects of an exogenous change in government spending on K and Q






, also evaluated at the steady-state. The terms on the RHS
of eq. (27) are functions of parameters and read as Γi = − ΦiY˜ν1−ν2
1
(νi+ξ)
, Φ1 = (ΥK − ν2)ΥG + ΥQΣG,
Φ2 = (ΥK − ν1)ΥG +ΥQΣG, and Θi = (1− g) νi+ξνi+χ (with i = 1, 2).
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. Because our objective is to account for VAR evidence, we
restrict our attention to a temporary fiscal shock.
Using the fact that RK+WL = Y T +PY N and inserting the market clearing condition
for non tradables (24) into (12) gives the current account equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT −GT − JT . (28)
Substituting appropriate short-run solutions, eq. (28) can be written as a function of
state and control variables, i.e., B˙ ≡ r?B + Ξ (K,Q,G). Linearizing around the steady
state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (26), solving and invoking the
transversality condition leads to the intertemporal solvency condition:40
B˜ −B0 = − ω
1
B




whereB0 is the initial stock of traded bonds. The assumption β = r? implies that temporary
policies have permanent effects. In this regard, eq. (29) determines the steady-state change
in the net foreign asset position following a temporary fiscal expansion.
4 Imperfect Mobility of Labor and Fiscal Transmission
In this section, we solve the model analytically by abstracting from physical capital.41
This enables us to derive a number of analytical results which show that a model assuming
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors can account for the evidence on fiscal transmission
documented in section 2, as long as the government spending shock is biased toward non
tradables. To avoid unnecessary complications, we solve the model by assuming that the
endogenous response of G(t) to an exogenous fiscal shock is governed by the following
dynamic equation:
dG(t)/Y˜ = ge−ξt, (30)
which amounts to setting ξ = χ into eq. (25). We consider a rise in G which is split
between non tradables and tradables in accordance with their respective shares in govern-
ment spending, ωGj , as described by (5). Building on our evidence which reveals that a
rise in government consumption is biased toward non tradables, we consider that ωGN is
high enough to produce an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables, in line with
our empirical findings.
Both sectors use labor as the sole input in a constant returns to scale technology,
i.e., Y j = Lj with j = T,N . Because there is a difficulty in reallocating labor, sectoral







+ Γ2 (1−Θ2)− Γ1 (1−Θ1)
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Γ2 (1−Θ′2) where Θ′ = (1− g) r
?+ξ
r?+χ
, and Θ′i = Θi
r?+ξ
r?+χ
(with i = 1, 2).
41The steps of derivation of all equations in the main text are detailed in Appendix H.
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wages do not equalize, i.e., 1 = W T and P = WN . The key equations characterizing
optimal household behavior are given by first-order conditions described by (17a)-(17b)
and (18)-(19). The market clearing conditions for non traded and traded goods read as
Y N = CN +GN and B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT −GT , respectively.
4.1 Solving the Model Analytically
Substituting first (17a) into (18), (17b) into (19), usingWN = P , totally differentiating the
market clearing condition for the non traded good and denoting the percentage deviation
relative to initial steady-state by a hat leads to the change in the relative price of non
tradables:
Pˆ (t) =








where we set Ψ = αL [² (1− αL) + σLαL] + ωCαC [(1− αC)φ+ αC ] > 0. In eq. (31), we
denote by ωC = PCC/Y consumption expenditure as a share of GDP, αC and αL the
non tradable content of consumption expenditure and labor compensation, respectively;
in a model without capital, αL also measures the share of non tradables in GDP, i.e.,
αL = PY N/Y .
Inserting first the demand for tradables (18) and labor supply to the traded sector
(19), linearizing in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the law of motion of
government spending (30), solving and invoking the transversality condition leads to the
solution for the net foreign asset position as a share of GDP:(
B(t)− B˜
)
/Y˜ = [ΥG/ (ξ + r?)] ge−ξt, (32)
consistent with the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜ −B0
)
/Y˜ = − [ΥG/ (ξ + r?)] g, (33)
where ΥG = ΥNGωGN +ωGT with Υ
N
G = [(1− αL)αL (²− σL) + (1− αC)ωCαC (φ− 1)] /Ψ.
If the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², is large enough with respect to aggre-
gate labor supply, σL, then we have ΥNG > 0, so that the current account unambiguously
deteriorates following a temporary fiscal expansion, in line with our VAR evidence.42
To determine the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth, we
have to differentiate the market clearing condition for the traded good evaluated at the
steady-state (i.e., B˙(t) = 0), using the fact that in the long-run, government spending is
restored to its initial level (i.e., dG = 0); next, inserting (33) into the resulting expression






g > 0, (34)
42Differentiating (32) with respect to time leads to the current account response as a percentage of GDP
which is unambiguously negative as long as ΥNG > 0. Intuitively, non traded output must increase to
meet higher demand for non tradables. At the same time, households wish to avoid a large reduction in
consumption and/or a large increase in labor supply. Because traded goods can be imported, resources are
reallocated toward the non traded sector, generating a current account deficit.
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where Γ = Ψ
{
[(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ] + [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] ΥNG
}
> 0.
4.2 Implications of Imperfect Mobility of Labor
What are the implications of imperfect mobility for fiscal transmission? As in a model that
imposes perfect mobility of labor, a rise in G produces an increase in the shadow value of
wealth as taxes must be raised to balance the budget which reduces households’ disposable
income. The negative wealth effect described by (34) encourages agents to work more and
cut real expenditure. Because the decline in real expenditure is spread over the two goods,
the rise in GN more than offsets the fall in CN if ωGN is high enough. As long as there is a
difficulty in reallocating labor, excess demand arises in the non traded goods market, which
in turn causes the relative price of non tradables to appreciate. To show this formally, we
determine the initial response of P by evaluating (31) at time t = 0 and inserting (34):
Pˆ (0) =
{












Eq. (35) shows that both the composition of government spending and the degree of labor
mobility across sectors matter in determining the response of P . First, when the rise in
G is fully biased toward non tradables (i.e., ωGN = 1), the relative price of non tradables
appreciates unambiguously.43 In contrast, if the government spending shock were fully
biased toward tradables (i.e., ωGT = 1), the relative price would depreciate, in contradiction
with our evidence. Because Pˆ (0) is increasing monotonically with ωGN , there is a critical
value ω¯GN so that Pˆ (0) > 0 for ωGN > ω¯GN . Second, as the degree of labor mobility across
sectors increases, a government spending shock leads to a lower appreciation in P . The
reason is that the shadow value of wealth, λ¯, increases further, which results in a larger
increase in non traded output and a greater decline in CN .44 In a model imposing perfect
mobility of labor across sectors (i.e., ² → ∞), P remains unaffected by a fiscal shock.
Intuitively, the appropriate amount of labor moves instantaneously toward the non traded
sector to eliminate any excess demand in the non traded goods market.
Conversely, as long as ² < ∞ and ωGN > ω¯GN , an excess demand shows up in the non
traded goods market so that P appreciates on impact. Non traded firms are encouraged to
produce and thus to hire more workers. To persuade workers who experience mobility costs
to increase their hours worked in the non traded sector, non traded firms must pay higher
wages, i.e., WˆN (0) = Pˆ (0) > 0. The subsequent shift of labor toward the non traded sector
raises non traded output unambiguously. It can be shown analytically that the response of
traded output is ambiguous; more precisely, Y T may fall if the degree of labor mobility, ²,
43To see this formally, the sign of the term in braces is unambiguously positive since 0 <
[αLσL + ωCαC ]
ΥNGΨ
Γ




44As the degree of labor mobility across sectors increases, more labor shifts toward the non traded sector
which results in a greater decline in traded labor and thus triggers a larger current account deficit. In the
long-run, for the intertemporal solvency condition to hold, the open economy must run a trade surplus and
consumption must thus be reduced more though a stronger negative wealth effect.
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is higher than σL.
We now turn to the initial response of the sectoral output share. As documented in
section 2, we find that a government spending shock increases the share of non tradables in
real GDP and all the more so in countries where the degree of labor mobility across sectors
is higher. In the data, the response of the sectoral output share is calculated as the growth
differential in GDP units between sectoral value added at constant prices and real GDP
denoted by YR. Totally differentiating non traded output and real GDP, the latter being
equal to overall labor compensation WL with L =
(
λ¯W
)σL , and evaluating at time t = 0
leads to the impact response of the share of non tradables in output in real terms:
αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
= αL (1− αL) ²Pˆ (0) > 0, (36)
where Pˆ (0) is given by (35). According to (36), the appreciation in P and the subsequent
increase in WN leads to a shift of labor toward the non traded sector which increases its
share in real GDP. A rise in the parameter ² exerts two opposite effects on the magnitude
of the positive response of the share of non tradables in output. On the one hand, as
the parameter ² on the RHS of (36) takes higher values, more labor shifts toward the
non traded sector, thus amplifying the positive response of the share of non tradables in
output. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the negative wealth effect turns out to be
greater as labor becomes more mobile across sectors; as a result, increased labor mobility
mitigates the excess demand in the non traded goods market and thus results in smaller
values of Pˆ (0) > 0. It can be shown analytically that the former effect predominates so that
αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
is increasing with ², since the elasticity of the relative price response
with respect to the degree of labor mobility is smaller than one, i.e., −∂Pˆ (0)∂² ²Pˆ (0) < 1.















g > 0. (37)
The analytical expression of the response of the share of non tradables in real GDP de-
scribed by (37) in the special case of perfect mobility of labor enables us to shed some light
on the relationship between the non tradable content of the government spending shock,
ωGN , and αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
. Keeping the responses of the private sector’s demand com-
ponents fixed, it is straightforward to show that the share of non tradables in real GDP
increases as long as ωGN > αL. In a general equilibrium model, demand components react
to the government spending shock and thus slightly modify this condition. Adding and sub-
tracting αL in the RHS of (37) implies that the response αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
is larger than







. Intuitively, while after-tax income is lower,
households want to keep their consumption high, which in turn produces excess demand in
45First inserting (35) into eq. (36), letting ² tend toward infinity and applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule that implies






= 1 gives eq. (37).
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the traded and non traded goods market. However, labor supply does not increase enough
to meet additional demand on both markets. Since traded goods can be imported while
non traded goods must be produced by domestic firms, it is optimal for the open economy
to run a current account deficit which further biases the government spending shock toward






second term on the RHS of eq. (35)), this result also holds when assuming imperfect mo-
bility of labor across sectors. Henceforth, the critical value ω¯GN above which the relative
price appreciates on impact, i.e., Pˆ (0) > 0, and thus the share of non tradables in real GDP
increases, is smaller than αL but would (almost) reduce to αL if the current account were
unresponsive to the fiscal shock. In sum, the change in the relative size of the non traded
sector is positively related to the relative intensity of this sector in the government spending
shock, ωGN − αL, the degree of labor mobility across sectors, ², and financial openness as
the current account deficit further biases the demand shock in favor of non tradables.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effects of a temporary and unanticipated rise in government
consumption quantitatively. For this purpose we solve the model described in section 3
numerically.46 We begin by discussing the parameter values before turning to the short-
term consequences of higher government consumption.
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate our model, we estimated a set of parameters so that the initial steady state
is consistent with the key empirical properties of a representative OECD economy. Our
sample covers the sixteen OECD economies in our dataset. Our reference period for the
calibration corresponds to the period 1990-2007.47 Table 4 summarizes our estimates of
the non tradable content of GDP, employment, consumption, gross fixed capital formation,
government spending, labor compensation, and gives the share of government spending on
traded and non traded goods in their respective sectoral output, the shares of labor income
in output in both sectors, for all countries in our sample. Moreover, columns 12-14 of
Table 4 display investment expenditure and government spending as a percentage of GDP
together with the labor income share, respectively, for the whole economy. To capture
the key properties of a typical OECD economy, chosen as the baseline scenario, we take
unweighted average values, as shown in the last line of Table 4. Some of the parameter
values can be taken directly from the data, but others like ϕ, ϑ, δK together with initial
conditions (B0, K0) need to be calibrated endogenously to fit a set of aggregate and sectoral
46Technically, the assumption β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady
state.
47The choice of this period was dictated by data availability for all the countries in the sample.
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ratios.48 We choose the model period to be one year and therefore set the world interest
rate, r?, which is equal to the subjective time discount rate, β, to 4%.
In light of our discussion above, ² plays a key role in fiscal transmission. The degree of
labor mobility captured by ² is set to 0.75, in line with the average of our estimates shown
in the last line of Table 4.49 Our estimates display a marked dispersion across countries
and we therefore conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. Excluding
the estimates of ² for Denmark and Norway which are not statistically significant at 10%,
estimates of ² range from a low of 0.22 for the Netherlands to a high of 1.39 for the U.S.
and 1.64 for Spain. Hence, we allow for ² to vary between 0.22 and 1.64 in the sensitivity
analysis.
Building on our panel data estimates, the elasticity of substitution φ between traded
and non traded goods is set to 0.77 in the baseline calibration since this value corresponds
to the average of estimates shown in the last line of column 15 of Table 4.50 The weight of
consumption in non tradables 1− ϕ is set to 0.51 to target a non-tradable content in total
consumption expenditure, αC , of 53%, in line with the average of our estimates shown in
the last line of column 2. In our baseline parametrization, we set intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for labor supply σL to 0.4, in line with evidence reported by Fiorito and
Zanella [2012]. The weight of labor supply to the non traded sector, 1 − ϑ, is set to 0.68
to target a non-tradable content of labor compensation of 66%, in line with the average of
our estimates shown in the last line of column 6 of Table 4.
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK of 6% to target an investment-to-GDP ratio of 21% (see
column 12 of Table 4). Labor income shares in the traded (θT ) and non traded sectors
(θN ) are set to 0.58 and 0.68, respectively, which correspond roughly to the averages for
countries with kT > kN (see columns 9 and 10 of Table 4). Such values give an aggregate
labor income share of 64%, in line with the average value shown in the last line of column
14 of Table 4. In line with our evidence shown in the last column of Table 4, we assume that
traded firms are 28 percent more productive than non traded firms; hence we set ZT and
ZN to 1.28 and 1 respectively. We set the share of investment expenditure on non-tradable
goods, αJ , to 64%, in accordance with the evidence shown in column 3 of Table 4. We
choose the value of parameter κ so that the elasticity of I/K with respect to Tobin’s q,
i.e., Q/PJ , is equal to the value implied by estimates in Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [2008].
The resulting value of κ is equal to 17.
As shown in column 4 of Table 4, the non tradable content of government spending,
48See Appendix I.
49Since estimates of ² for Denmark and Norway are not statistically significant at a standard threshold,
the values are left blank and we set φ to 0.75 which corresponds to the average value. To estimate ², we
run the regression of the sectoral employment growth arising from labor reallocation across sectors on the
percentage change in the relative share of sectoral value added accrued to labor, see Appendix B.
50The average value is calculated by excluding estimates for Italy which are negative.
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ωGN , averages 90%. We set government consumption on non traded goods, GN , and traded
goods, GT , so as to yield a non tradable share of government spending, ωGN , of 90%, and
government spending as a share of GDP to 20%.
We choose initial conditions for B0 and K0 so that trade is initially balanced. Since
net exports are nil and PJI/Y = 21% and G/Y = 20%, the accounting identity accord-
ing to which GDP is equal to the sum of the final uses of goods and services, leads to
a consumption-to-GDP ratio of PCC/Y = 59%. It is worthwhile mentioning that the
non tradable content of GDP is determined endogenously by the non tradable content
of consumption, αC , investment, αJ , and government expenditure, ωGN , along with the
consumption-to-GDP ratio, ωC , and the investment-to-GDP ratio, ωJ . More precisely, di-
viding the non traded good market clearing condition (24) by Y leads to the non tradable
content of GDP:
PY N/Y = ωCαC + ωJαJ + ωGNωG = 63%, (38)
where ωC = 59%, αC = 53%, ωJ = 21%, αJ = 64%, ωGN = 90%, and ωG = 20%.
According to (38), the ratios we target are consistent with a non tradable content of GDP
of 63% found in the data (see the last line of column 1 of Table 4).
In order to capture the endogenous response of government spending to exogenous fiscal
shock, we assume that the dynamic adjustment of government consumption is governed by
eq. (25). In the quantitative analysis, we set g = 0.01 so that government consumption
increases by 1 ppt of initial GDP. To calibrate ξ and χ that parametrize the shape of the
dynamic adjustment of government consumption along with its persistence, we proceed as
follows.51 Because G(t) peaks after one year, we have dG(1)/Y =
[
e−ξ − (1− g) e−χ] =
g′ > g with g′ = 0.011265 and G˙(1)/Y = − [ξe−ξ − χ (1− g) e−χ] = 0. Solving the system
gives us ξ = 0.408 and χ = 0.415. Left-multiplying eq. (25) by ωGj (with j = N,T ) gives







e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt
]
, (39)
where ωGj is the fraction of government consumption in good j. To determine (39), we
assume that the parameters that govern the persistence and shape of the response of sectoral
government consumption are identical across sectors, while the sectoral intensity of the
government spending shock is constant over time and thus corresponds to the share of
government final consumption expenditure on good j.
As the baseline scenario, we take the model with imperfect mobility of labor across
sectors and capital adjustments costs. In our baseline calibration we set ² = 0.75 and
κ = 17, but we also conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these two parameters by
51Our calibration of the government consumption shock is based on estimates of the first VAR model
zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. In Appendix E.3, we show that alternative VAR specifications give identical
results.
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setting alternatively: ² to 0.22 and 1.64 and κ to 0. In order to contrast our results with
those obtained when imposing perfect mobility of labor across sectors, we let ² tend toward
infinity.
5.2 Results
In this subsection, we analyze in detail the role of imperfect mobility of labor in shaping
the dynamics of the open economy in response to a government spending shock. Our
primary objective is to explain how workers’ costs of switching sectors change the model’s
predictions in a way that makes them consistent with our empirical findings on fiscal policy
transmission.
Table 1 shows the simulated impact effects of an exogenous and unanticipated increase
in government consumption by 1 ppt of GDP while column 1 shows impact responses from
our VAR model for comparison purposes. Column 2 shows results for the baseline model
which we contrast with those obtained when we impose perfect mobility of labor (i.e., we
set ² → ∞) and abstract from capital installation costs (i.e., we set κ = 0), as displayed
in column 6. Other columns give the results for the alternative scenarios discussed below.
While in Table 1, we restrict our attention to impact responses, in Fig. 5 and 6 we show
the dynamic adjustment to an unanticipated increase in government consumption by 1%
of GDP. Figures display the model predictions together with the respective VAR evidence.
In each panel, the solid blue line displays the point estimate of the VAR model, with the
shaded area indicating the 90% confidence bounds whilst the thick solid black line with
circles shows theoretical responses from the baseline model.
As shown in the left panel of Fig. 5, the endogenous response of government spending
to an exogenous fiscal shock that we generate theoretically by specifying the law of motion
(25) reproduces the dynamic adjustment from the VAR model remarkably well, as the black
line and the blue line cannot be differentiated. The right panel of Fig. 5 contrasts empirical
responses of sectoral government consumption to an exogenous fiscal shock with theoretical
responses derived from eq. (39) by setting ωGN and ωGT to 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.
The upper and lower lines show the responses of GN and GT , respectively. Overall, the
theoretical responses perform well in reproducing the evidence and thus the assumptions
underlying the dynamic equation (39) which governs the adjustment of Gj are consistent
with data.
< Please insert Table 1 and Figures 5-6 about here >
5.2.1 Effects on Relative Sector Size
We need to start with the whole picture as the aggregate and sectoral effects of a government
spending shock biased toward non tradables are strongly intertwined. Impact effects of a
government spending shock on GDP, its demand components and labor market variables
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are shown in panels A and B of Table 1.52 By producing a negative wealth effect, a
balanced-budget government spending shock leads agents to supply more labor, which in
turn increases real GDP. In contrast to a setup assuming ²→∞ (columns 6-7), the baseline
model (column 2) does a better job in replicating the evidence. First, because workers’
costs of switching sectors put upward pressure on WN and thus on the aggregate wage,
the positive response of L and the size of the aggregate fiscal multiplier are amplified with
imperfect mobility of labor. Moreover, the rise in W is large enough to increase the real
consumption wage. Second, whilst a model imposing perfect mobility of labor overstates
the current account deficit or predicts a current account surplus depending on whether
capital adjustment costs are included or not (see columns 7 and 6), the baseline model
(see column 2) is also able to produce a decline in investment and the current account
on impact which accords well with our VAR estimates. Intuitively, following a temporary
government spending shock, households lower their savings in order to avoid a large decrease
in their consumption and/or mitigate the rise in their labor supply. Lower savings result
in a decline in investment or the current account or both. With imperfect mobility, capital
shifts toward the non traded sector which lowers kH and increases the return on domestic
capital. As a result, the fall in investment is mitigated whilst a current account deficit
appears (see column 5 where κ = 0)). Capital adjustment costs further moderate the
decline in investment and amplify the current account deficit (see column 2 where κ = 17).
We turn to the sectoral and reallocation effects. Panels C and D of Table 1 show impact
responses of labor and product market variables, respectively, while in Fig. 6, we report
the model predictions together with the VAR evidence of sectoral variables. In Fig. 6, we
also contrast the responses from the benchmark setup with those from a model imposing
²→∞ and κ = 0, as displayed in the dashed dotted black line.
Focusing first on impact responses, column 6 of Table 1 shows that a model assuming
perfect mobility of labor fails to account for the evidence along a number of dimensions.
More specifically, comparing the VAR evidence reported in column 1 with simulated im-
pact effects, we find that a model abstracting from workers’ mobility costs understates the
expansionary effect of a government spending shock on non traded output, cannot generate
an appreciation in the P or a rise in WN/W T , and substantially understates the changes
in sectoral output shares.
In contrast, as displayed in column 2, the performance of the neoclassical model im-
proves, as long as we allow for imperfect mobility of labor. To begin with, the baseline
model which considers costs of switching sectors can account for the rise in the relative
wage. Intuitively, because government spending is biased toward non tradables, non traded
52For reasons of space, the empirical and theoretical responses of GDP, its demand components and labor
market variables are contrasted in Appendix J.1. It is worthwhile mentioning that the simulated responses
lie within the confidence interval along the transitional adjustment for all aggregate variables, with the
exception of the real consumption wage.
29
firms are encouraged to produce and thus to hire more to meet additional demand. As
workers experience intersectoral mobility costs, non traded firms must pay higher wages to
attract workers which raises the relative wage, Ω, by 1.44% (see Panel C).
Because labor shifts toward the non traded sector, the baseline model predicts a rise in
hours worked in non tradables by 0.44%, which accords well with the evidence shown in
column 1. Labor reallocation pushes up non traded output by 0.50%, the response being
almost double that obtained with perfect labor mobility (see column 6). The reason is
as follows. Because the aggregate wage increases when we allow for imperfect mobility of
labor, workers supply more labor, which further raises output in the non traded sector since
it is relatively more labor intensive. While the baseline model is able to account pretty well
for impact responses of hours worked and output of non tradables, it tends to somewhat
overstate the contraction in hours worked and the output of tradables which are fairly
muted according to VAR evidence.
As long as there is a difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors, excess demand shows
up in the non traded goods market. As a result, the price of non traded goods relative to
traded goods appreciates by 0.88%, as shown in the fourth line of panel D. The appreciation
in the P triggers a reallocation of resources toward the non traded sector, raising its output
share by 0.38% of GDP, while that of tradables falls by exactly the same amount. As we
move from column 3 to column 4 of Table 1, the utility loss resulting from the shift from
one sector to another is reduced. As shown analytically in section 4, a rise in the degree
of labor mobility exerts two opposite effects on sectoral output shares: while workers are
more willing to shift across sectors, the relative price of non tradables appreciates less, which
mitigates the incentive for labor reallocation. We find numerically that raising the elasticity
of labor supply across sectors, ², from 0.22 to 1.64 amplifies the rise in the output share of
non tradables from 0.26% to 0.49% of GDP, in accordance with our evidence documented
in section 2.7. Thus, the former effect more than offsets the latter.53
Turning to the adjustment of sectoral variables following a government spending shock
as shown by the solid black line with circles in Fig. 6, the dynamics of the relative price and
relative wage are captured fairly well by the baseline model. As government spending falls
and is restored to its initial level, excess demand in the non traded goods market is reduced,
which depreciates the relative price of non tradables along the transitional path, as shown
in Fig. 6(a). Decreasing prices of non tradables relative to tradables encourage non traded
firms to reduce hours worked and thus to lower output, in line with the evidence in Fig. 6(h)
and 6(g). Because non traded wages fall relative to traded wages during the transitional
adjustment, as shown in Fig. 6(b), labor is reallocated toward the traded sector, which
53However, the latter influence may predominate if the values of ² are higher, because the relative price
merely appreciates in this case. In the polar case where ² tends toward infinity, the output share of non
tradables increases by only 0.24%, a value that is much smaller than the estimated response of 0.35% of
GDP.
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recovers gradually, while both hours worked and output remain below their initial levels for
almost ten years. As shown in Fig. 6(e) and 6(d), the model tends to somewhat understate
the contraction of labor and the output of tradables in the medium run.54
Conversely, as displayed by dashed dotted black line, the performance of the model
declines considerably when imposing ² → ∞ and setting κ = 0; in this special case, the
model predicts a flat temporal path for Ω and P , which is in conflict with the evidence;
whilst it understates the responses of sectoral output shares on impact, the model overstates
their changes along the transitional path. The reason is that the capital stock falls sharply
in the short-run and then recovers rapidly after two years, resulting in sharp changes in the
relative size of sectors due to the Rybczynski effect.
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To gauge the relative role of limited labor mobility and capital adjustment costs, we also
report results from two restricted versions of the model where one of the two features is,
respectively, shutdown. Column 7 of Table 1 shows the predictions of a model allowing
for perfect mobility of labor along with capital installation costs while column 5 reports
impact responses from a model assuming imperfect mobility while setting κ = 0.55 Both
models fail to account for the responses of sectoral output shares to a government spending
shock. While introducing capital installation costs restores transitional dynamics for the
relative price of non tradables, the restricted model where labor is perfectly mobile across
sectors considerably overstates the responses of sectoral output shares. Intuitively, workers
no longer experience a mobility cost and are thus willing to shift their whole time to the
sector that pays the highest wage. As a result, sectoral labor and thus sectoral output
become unrealistically sensitive to a change in relative price, thus leading to a change in
the sectoral output share which is about twice what is estimated empirically, as can be seen
in column 7. In contrast, as reported in column 5, a model assuming imperfect mobility of
labor while abstracting from capital installation costs tends to substantially understate the
responses of sectoral output shares. As investment is crowded out by a larger amount than
if capital were subject to adjustment costs, the excess demand in the non traded goods
market is lower so that the relative price appreciates less, resulting in smaller shifts of labor
and capital toward the non traded sector.
54The explanation is intuitive: the baseline model underpredicts the decumulation of physical capital
along the transitional path while the traded sector is more capital intensive.
55To save space we develop intuition regarding the implications of imperfect mobility of labor and capital
adjustment costs by restricting attention to impact responses. In Appendix J.3, we contrast the dynamic
adjustment from the baseline model with the responses from the restricted model where one of the two
features is shut down.
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5.3 Cross-Country Differences: Taking the Model to Data
We have shown above that the performance of the neoclassical model in replicating the
evidence related to fiscal transmission improves as long as we allow for imperfect mobility
of labor and capital adjustment costs. We now move a step further and assess the ability
of the model to generate a similar cross-country relationship between the degree of labor
mobility and changes in the relative size of sectors to that in the data.
To compute the impact responses of sectoral output shares to a government spend-
ing shock numerically, we calibrate our model to match the key characteristics of the 16
OECD economies in our sample, including the share of non traded hours worked to total
hours worked, the non tradable content of consumption, investment and public expendi-
ture, investment- and government spending-to-GDP ratios, and the degree of labor mobility
across sectors. Table 4 summarizes the country-specific data for non tradable and GDP
component shares. The elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², which plays a pivotal
role in fiscal transmission, is set in accordance with our estimates shown in the last column
of Table 4. While we explore the sectoral effects of a rise in G by 1 ppt of GDP for each
country in our sample, to be consistent with the calibration to a representative OECD
economy described in section 5.1, we assume that the increase in public purchases is split
between non tradables and tradables in accordance with their respective shares in govern-
ment spending, i.e., ωGN and 1 − ωGN , respectively, where ωGN is set in accordance with
its country-specific value shown in column 4 of Table 4, except for Australia and Ireland.56
< Please insert Figures 7-8 about here >
To explore the cross-country relationship quantitatively, we first plot in Fig. 7 the
simulated responses of sectoral output shares on the vertical axis against the degree of labor
mobility captured by the parameter ² on the horizontal axis.57 Restricting our attention
to countries where the rise in government consumption is biased toward non tradables,
impact changes in non traded output relative to real GDP range from 0.26% of GDP for
the Netherlands to 0.49% of GDP for Spain. Fig. 7(a) and 7(b) also show that these
differences in the responses of sectoral output shares are positively correlated with the
measure of the degree of labor mobility across sectors. This result thus reveals that the
sectoral impact of fiscal policy increases with the degree of labor mobility, which
accords with our evidence. Quantitatively, as we move along the trend line shown in Fig.
7(a), our model predicts that a country with a low degree of labor mobility, as captured by
56For Australia and Ireland, we find empirically that the output share of tradables increases on impact
while the share of non tradables declines. To be consistent with empirical evidence, we consider a rise in
public purchases which is fully biased toward tradables. It is worthwhile mentioning that at the initial
steady-state, we set the non tradable content of government spending, ωGN , to 88% and 90% for Australia
and Ireland, respectively, in accordance with the shares reported in column 4 of Table 4.
57Because our panel data estimates are not statistically significant at 10% for Denmark and Norway,
these two countries are removed from the cross-country analysis. If we include them, the conclusions are
unaffected.
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a value of ² of 0.2, will experience a decline in the output share of tradables of 0.2% of GDP,
while a country with a higher degree of labor mobility, as captured by a value of ² of 1.2,
will face a fall by 0.4% of GDP, a decline which is twice as great. Hence, cross-country
differences in the degree of labor mobility generate substantial dispersion in
the sectoral impact of fiscal policy.
In Fig. 8, we contrast the cross-country relationship from the calibrated baseline model
shown by the solid black line with circles with the cross-country relationship from the VAR
model shown by the solid blue line. When we calibrate our model to cross-country data,
we obtain a correlation between the responses of sectoral output shares and the measure
of the degree of labor mobility of -0.207 for tradables (t − stat = −2.238) and 0.207 for
non tradables (t − stat = 2.238). While it tends to understate the changes in the relative
size of sectors since the cross-country relationship is higher for tradables and lower for non
tradables, the model is able to generate a cross-country relationship between the responses
of sectoral output shares and the degree of labor mobility which is quite similar to that in
the data.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature related to the effects of a government spending
shock both empirically and theoretically. From an empirical point of view, we provide
new evidence on fiscal transmission by focusing on changes in relative sector size. Using
a panel of 16 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007 and adopting a SVAR approach,
our estimates reveal that the non traded sector is very intensive in government spending
shocks which trigger a shift of resources toward this sector. More precisely, our evidence
reveals that the non tradable content of the government spending shock averages 90%,
while the reallocation of inputs alone contributes to 50% of non traded output growth on
impact. Whilst the shift of labor is responsible for half of the increase in non traded hours
worked, our evidence points to the presence of labor mobility costs, as we detect empirically
a significant increase in non traded wages relative to traded wages. The degree of labor
mobility across sectors appears empirically to be a key determinant of the response of the
share of non tradables to a government spending shock, which varies across time and space.
Whilst the rise in the relative size of the non traded sector has been declining over time, this
decrease is highly correlated with the declining response of the intersectoral reallocation of
labor. Labor mobility also matters for the variations in sectoral shares across space. Whilst
the responses of sectoral shares vary substantially across countries, we detect empirically
a positive cross-country relationship between changes in relative sector size and the degree
of labor mobility across sectors.
To rationalize our evidence, we develop a two-sector neoclassical model with two key
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features. First, we allow the government spending shock to be biased toward non tradables
in line with our empirical findings while financial openness also matters in replicating the
evidence. Since traded goods can be imported while non traded goods must be produced
by domestic firms, the current account deficit further biases the demand boom toward non
traded goods. Second, as in Horvath [2000], agents cannot costlessly reallocate hours worked
from one sector to another. Because mobility is costly in utility terms, workers demand
higher wages in order to compensate for their cost of switching sectors. Calibrating the
model to a representative OECD economy and considering a rise in government consumption
biased toward non tradables, we find quantitatively that the open economy version of
the neoclassical model with tradables and non tradables can account for the panel VAR
evidence, in particular the changes in relative sector size, as long as we allow for adjustment
costs to physical capital accumulation along with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors.
The former feature mitigates the decline in investment and thus guarantees that the excess
demand and therefore incentives to shift resources toward the non traded sector are high
enough. By reducing the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, the latter feature hampers
the reallocation of labor and thus allows the model to match the changes in relative sector
size quantitatively. In contrast, the restricted version of the model where one of the two
features is shut down fails to account for the evidence.
When we calibrate our baseline model to each OECD economy in our sample, our nu-
merical results reveal that international differences in the degree of labor mobility generate
a wide dispersion in the responses of sectoral output shares to a government spending shock:
changes in the relative size of sectors are twice as strong in the country with the highest
degree of labor mobility than in the economy with the lowest labor mobility. Finally, we
find quantitatively that the model reproduces pretty well the cross-country relationship
between the degree of labor mobility and the responses of sectoral output shares that we
estimate empirically.
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Figure 1: Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Government Final Con-
sumption Expenditure and its Non Tradable and Tradable Components. Notes: Exogenous
increase of government consumption by 1% of GDP. The government spending shock is identified by estimating a
VAR model that includes real government final consumption expenditure, GDP (constant prices), total hours worked,
private fixed investment, and the real consumption wage. The baseline response of government final consumption
expenditure is displayed by the solid blue line in the left panel with shaded area indicating the 90 percent confi-
dence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data. The responses
of government final consumption expenditure on non tradables (i.e., gN ) and tradables (i.e., gT ) to the identified
government spending shock (in the baseline VAR model) are displayed by solid blue lines in the right panel with
shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds; sample: 13 OECD countries, 1995-2015, annual data. The
red line in the left panel displays the dynamic response of government final consumption expenditure which has been
computed by summing mean responses of government consumption expenditure on non tradables and tradables.
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Figure 2: Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Sectoral Variables. Notes:
Exogenous increase of government consumption by 1% of GDP. Horizontal axes indicate years. Vertical axes measure
percentage deviation from trend in output units (sectoral output, sectoral output shares), percentage deviation from
trend in labor units (sectoral labor, sectoral labor shares), deviations from trend (ratio of traded value added to non
traded value added, ratio of hours worked of tradables to hours worked of non tradables), and percentage deviation
from trend (relative price, relative wage). Solid blue and solid black lines display point estimates; thick black lines
which are above the X-axis show responses of νY,N in Fig. 2(c), νL,N in Fig. 2(g), Ω, in Fig. 2(d), P in Fig. 2(h);
shaded areas: bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
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(a) Non Traded Goods Share, νN















(b) Traded Goods Share, νT
Figure 3: Plot of Impact Responses of Sectoral Shares to a Government Spending Shock in
Rolling Sub-Samples against Impact Response of Intersectoral Labor Reallocation. Notes:
Exogenous increase of government consumption by 1% of GDP. The government spending shock is identified by
estimating a VAR model that includes real government final consumption expenditure, GDP (constant prices), total
hours worked, private fixed investment, and the real consumption wage. We adopt the local projection method
for estimating impulse responses of the sectoral shares (i.e., νY,j , νL,j) and the labor reallocation index (i.e., LR)
to identified government spending shock; as we restrict attention to impact effects, we run the regression of each
variable of interest on the structural shock, setting h = 0 into eq. (8). To explore empirically time-varying effects of
government spending shocks, we estimate impact effects on rolling 25-year window. The time-varying impact response
of the value added (labor) share of sector j is shown in the solid (dashed) blue line while the time-varying impact
response of intersectoral labor reallocation is displayed in the dotted red line; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007,
annual data.
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Figure 4: Effect of Government Spending Shocks on Sectoral Shares against the Degree of
Labor Mobility across Sectors. Notes: Figure 4 plots impact responses of sectoral labor and sectoral output
shares. Impact responses shown in the vertical axis are obtained by running a VAR model for each country and are
expressed in percentage point. Horizontal axis displays the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², which captures


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Gov. Spend. on Non
Tradables and Tradables
Figure 5: Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Government Final Con-
sumption Expenditure and Its Two Components: Empirical vs. Theoretical Impulse Re-
sponse Functions. Notes: The baseline response of government final consumption expenditure is displayed by the
solid blue line in the left panel with shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap
sampling; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data. The responses of government final consumption
expenditure on non tradables (i.e., gN ) and tradables (i.e., gT ) to the identified government spending shock (in the
baseline VAR model) are displayed by solid blue lines in the right panel; sample: 13 OECD countries, 1995-2015,
annual data. Theoretical responses of government final consumption expenditure, g, along with of those of its two
components, gN and gT , are displayed by thick solid black lines with circles in the left and the right panel, respectively.
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Figure 6: Theoretical vs. Empirical Responses Following Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR with shaded areas indicating 90% confidence
bounds; the thick solid black line with circles displays model predictions in the baseline scenario with imperfect
mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17) while the dashed dotted black line
shows predictions of the model imposing perfect mobility of labor (²→∞) and abstracting from capital adjustment
costs (κ = 0).
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(a) Output Share of Tradables









(b) Output Share of Non Tradables
Figure 7: Cross-Country Relationship between the Responses of Sectoral Output Shares
to Government Spending shock and the Degree of Labor Mobility across Sectors. Notes:
Horizontal axes display panel data estimates of the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², taken from the last
column of Table 4, which captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors. Vertical axes report simulated impact
responses from the baseline model with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors and adjustments costs to capital
accumulation.






(a) Output Share of Tradables








(b) Output Share of Non Tradables
Figure 8: Cross-Country Relationship from Simulated Responses vs. Cross-Country Rela-
tionship from VAR Estimates. Notes: Horizontal axes display panel data estimates of the elasticity of labor
supply across sectors, ², taken from the last column of Table 4, which captures the degree of labor mobility across
sectors. Vertical axes report simulated responses from the baseline model (black circles) and impact responses from
the VAR model (blue squares). The solid blue line shows the cross-country relationship from VAR estimates whilst
the solid black line with circles displays the cross-country relationship from numerical estimates.
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• Appendix A and B present the source and construction of the data used in the empirical
and quantitative analysis, and empirical strategies to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between traded and non traded goods and the elasticity of labor supply across sectors.
• Appendix C provides more details about the interpretation of our empirical results and deter-
mines the conditions under which a government spending shock is biased toward non traded
goods.
• Appendix D provides more VAR results, conducts a robustness check with respect to the
classification of industries as tradables or non tradables, and contrasts responses obtained in
the main text by adopting a VAR approach with those estimated by using local projection
method.
• Section E deals with the potential endogeneity problem by using narratively identified govern-
ment spending shocks from the dataset constructed by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014],
conducts an investigation of the potential presence of anticipation effects, addresses a poten-
tial concern related to the fact that various VAR models could identify different structural
government spending shocks.
• Section F explores the potential presence of state-dependent effects by contrasting the ef-
fects of our identified government spending shock when the economy is in expansion with
those when the economy is in recession. We also investigate a potential asymmetry in the
effects of government spending spending shocks by contrasting their effects on variables when
government consumption is going up with those when it is going down.
• Section G derives first-order conditions and sets out the approach taken to solve the model.
Then we provide the main steps leading to formal solutions following a temporary rise in
government consumption in a continuous time setup.
• Section H give more details on the model without physical capital accumulation, sets out
the approach taken to solve the model, provides formal solutions for temporary fiscal shocks,
investigates the effects of a rise in government consumption, analyzes the role of the degree
of labor mobility across sectors, and provides the main steps leading to equations in the main
text of section 4.
• Section I gives more details about the calibration of the model to data.
• Section J gives more numerical results. In particular, we contrast empirical with theoretical
results for aggregate variables, and we conduct a robustness check of our results by contrasting
responses from our baseline model and VAR estimates with those from variants of the baseline
model where one feature is shut down.
• In section K, we conduct a robustness check of our quantitative analysis. More specifically,
we contrast empirical and theoretical results presented in the main text with those obtained
by considering four variants of the baseline model; we explore the effects a deficit-financed
government spending shock, we allow for endogenous markups, we consider a model where
both labor and capital are imperfectly mobile across sectors, we relax the assumption of
exogenous terms of trade by considering a semi-small open economy.
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A Data Description for Empirical Analysis
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 16 countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ireland (IRL),
Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE),
the United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). The period is running from 1970 to 2007,
except for Japan (1974-2007).
Sources: Our primary sources for sectoral data are the OECD and EU KLEMS databases.
We use the EU KLEMS [2011] sectoral database (the March 2011 data release, available at http:
//www.euklems.net) which provides annual data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries for all
countries of our sample with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For Canada and Norway,
sectoral data are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD
[2011]. In addition, expenditure aggregates are obtained from the Economic Outlook Database
provided by the OECD [2017].
The eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries are classified as tradables or non tradables. To do so, we
adopt the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006],
we have updated this classification by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as a traded industry. We
construct traded and non traded sectors as follows (EU KLEMS codes are given in parentheses):
• Traded Sector: ”Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing” (AtB), ”Mining and Quar-
rying” (C), ”Total Manufacturing” (D), ”Transport, Storage and Communication” (I) and
”Financial Intermediation” (J).
• Non Traded Sector: ”Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (E), ”Construction” (F), ”Whole-
sale and Retail Trade” (G), ”Hotels and Restaurants” (H), ”Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services” (K) and ”Community Social and Personal Services” (LtQ).
Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, for any macroeconomic variable
X, its sectoral counterpart Xj for j = T,N is constructed by adding the Xk of all sub-industries k
classified in sector j = T,N as follows Xj =
∑
k∈j Xk.
Relevant to our work, the EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases provide data, for each
industry and year, on value added at current and constant prices, permitting the construction of
sectoral deflators of value added, as well as details on labor compensation and employment data,
allowing the construction of sectoral wage rates. In the VAR models, with the exception of the
current account, all quantity variables are in log levels and scaled by the working age population
(15-64 years old), while price deflators and wage rates are in natural logs. Source: OECD ALFS
Database for the working age population. Setting price indices at the base year to 1, i.e., P¯ j = 1, for
simplicity, we describe below the construction for the sectoral data employed in section 2 (mnemonics
are given in parentheses):
• Sectoral output, Y j : sectoral value added at constant prices in sector j = T,N (VA QI).
Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases.
• Relative output, Y T /Y N : ratio of traded value added at constant prices to non traded
value added at constant prices.
• Sectoral output share: ratio of value added in sector j to GDP both at constant prices,
i.e., Y j/YR) where j = T,N and YR is real GDP .
• Relative price of non tradables, P : ratio of the non traded value added deflator to the
traded value added deflator, i.e., P = PN/PT . The sectoral value added deflator P j for
sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing value added at current prices (VA) by value added
at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases.
• Sectoral labor, Lj : total hours worked by persons engaged in sector j (H EMP). Sources:
EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases.
• Relative labor, LT /LN : ratio of hours worked in the traded sector to hours worked in the
non traded sector.
• Sectoral labor share: ratio of hours worked in sector j to total hours worked, i.e., Lj/(LT +
LN ) for j = T,N .
• Sectoral real consumption wage, W j/CPI: nominal wage in sector j divided by the
consumer price index (CPI). Source: OECD Prices and Purchasing Power Parities for the
consumer price index. The sectoral nominal wage W j for sector j = T,N is calculated by
dividing labor compensation in sector j (LAB) by total hours worked by persons engaged
(H EMP) in that sector. Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases.
• Relative wage, Ω: ratio of the nominal wage in the non traded sector WN to the nominal
wage in the traded sector WT , i.e., Ω =WN/WT .
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• Labor reallocation index, LR: measures the ratio of the absolute change in sectoral em-
ployment resulting from labor reallocation to average employment over 5 years:
LRt(5) =
∑N
j=T |Ljt − Ljt−τ | −









Data for labor (H EMP), used to compute LR, are taken from EU KLEMS and OECD STAN
databases.
In the following, we provide details on data construction for aggregate variables (mnemonics are
in parentheses):
• Government spending, G: real government final consumption expenditure (CGV). Source:
OECD Economic Outlook Database.
• Gross domestic product, YR: real gross domestic product (GDPV). Source: OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook Database.
• Private investment, JE: real private non-residential gross fixed capital formation (IBV).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
• Current account, CA: ratio of the current account to the gross domestic product at current
prices (CBGDPR). Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
• Labor, L: total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP). Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD
STAN databases.
• Real consumption wage, W/CPI: nominal wage divided by the consumer price index
(CPI). Source: OECD Prices and Purchasing Power Parities for the consumer price index.
The nominal wage is calculated by dividing labor compensation (LAB) by total hours worked
by persons engaged (H EMP). Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD STAN databases.
Government spending, investment and GDP variables are deflated with their own deflators.
B Data for Calibration
B.1 Non Tradable Content of GDP and its Components
Table 4 shows the non tradable content of GDP, consumption, investment, government spending,
labor and labor compensation. In addition, it gives information about the share of government
spending on the traded and non traded goods in the corresponding sectoral value added and the
sectoral labor income shares. The column 11 shows the ratio of labor productivity of tradables
to labor productivity of non tradables as we use labor productivity to approximate technological
change. Columns 12 to 14 display the investment-to-GDP ratio and government spending in % of
GDP and the labor income share, respectively, for the whole economy. Our sample covers the 16
OECD countries mentioned in Section A. Our reference period for the calibration corresponds to
the period 1990-2007. The choice of this period has been dictated by data availability. Columns 15
and 16 report estimates for the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and non
traded goods, φ, and the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ². In the following, statistics for
the sample as a whole represent (unweighted) averages of the corresponding variables among the
group.
To calculate the non tradable share of output, labor and labor compensation, we split the eleven
industries into traded and non-traded sectors by adopting the classification proposed by De Gregorio
et al. [1994] and updated by Jensen and Kletzer [2006]. Details about data construction for sectoral
output and sectoral labor are provided in section A. We calculate the non-tradable share of labor
compensation as the ratio of labor compensation in the non traded sector (i.e., WNLN ) to overall
labor compensation (i.e., WL). Sources: EU KLEMS [2011] and STAN databases. Data coverage:
1990-2007 for all countries. The non tradable content of GDP, labor and labor compensation, shown
in columns 1, 5 and 6 of Table 4, average to 63%, 67% and 66% respectively.
To split consumption expenditure (at current prices) into consumption in traded and non traded
goods, we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) pub-
lished by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2011]). Among the twelve items, the following
ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: ”Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages”, ”Alcoholic
Beverages Tobacco and Narcotics”, ”Clothing and Footwear”, ”Furnishings, Household Equipment”
and ”Transport”. The remaining items are treated as consumption in non traded goods: ”Hous-
ing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fuels”, ”Health”, ”Communication”, ”Recreation and Culture”,
”Education”, ”Restaurants and Hotels”. Because the item ”Miscellaneous Goods and Services” is
somewhat problematic, we decided to consider it as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) in
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equal shares. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN,
NLD, NOR and USA, 1993-2007 for SWE and 1995-2007 for BEL, ESP and IRL. The non-tradable
share of consumption shown in column 2 of Table 4 averages to 53%.
To calculate the non tradable share of investment expenditure, we follow the methodology pro-
posed by Burstein et al. [2004] who treat ”Housing”, ”Other Constructions” and ”Other Products”
as non-tradable investment and ”Products of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture”,
”Metal Products and Machinery”, ”Transport Equipment” as tradable investment expenditure.
Source: OECD Input-Output database [2012]. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for AUT, CAN, ESP,
FIN, GBR, IRL, JPN, NLD, and NOR, 1990-2006 for DNK, FRA, ITA and USA, and 1993-2007
for SWE. Data are not available for AUS and BEL. The non tradable share of investment shown in
column 3 of Table 4 averages to 64%, in line with estimates provided by Burstein et al. [2004] and
Bems [2008].
Sectoral government final consumption expenditure data (at current prices) were obtained from
the OECD General Government Accounts database (Source: COFOG, OECD [2017]). ”Economic
Affairs” which includes ”Fuel and Energy”, ”Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting”, ”Min-
ing, Manufacturing, and Construction”, ”Transport and Communications” is classified as tradable.
Items treated as non traded are: ”General Public Services”, ”Defense”, ”Public Order and Safety”,
”Environment Protection”, ”Housing and Community Amenities”, ”Health”, ”Recreation, Culture
and Religion”, ”Education”, ”Social Protection”. Data coverage: 1995-2007 for AUT, BEL, DNK,
ESP, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, NLD, NOR and SWE, 1998-2007 for AUS, 1990-2007 for FIN, 2005-2007
for JPN and 1970-2007 for the USA. Data are not available for CAN. The non tradable component
of government spending shown in column 4 of Table 4 averages to 90% over the period 1990-2007.
Government spending on traded and non traded goods in % of the corresponding sectoral output,
i.e., GT /Y T and GN/Y N , respectively, is shown in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4. They average 5%
and 30%, respectively.
The labor income share for sector j denoted by θj is calculated as the ratio of labor compensation
of sector j to value added of sector j at current prices. Sources: EU KLEMS [2011] and STAN
databases. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for all countries. As shown in columns 9 and 10 of Table 4,
θT and θN average 0.60 and 0.67, respectively. When kT > kN , the shares of labor income average
0.58 and 0.67 for the traded and the non traded sector, respectively, while if kN > kT , θT and θN
average 0.70 and 0.64, respectively. In addition, column 14 of Table 4 gives the aggregate labor
income share which averages 0.64 in our sample.
We use sectoral labor productivities to approximate technological change. Column 11 of Table 4
displays the ratio of labor productivity in tradables to labor productivity in non tradables (ZT /ZN )
averaged over the period 1990-2007. To measure labor productivity in sector j = T,N , we divide
value added at constant prices in sector j (VA QI) by total hours worked by persons engaged
(H EMP) in that sector. Sources: EU KLEMS [2011] and STAN databases. Data coverage: 1990-
2007 for all countries. As shown in column 11, the traded sector is 28 percent more productive on
average than the non traded sector for the whole sample.
Columns 12 and 13 of Table 4 display gross capital formation and final consumption expenditure
of general government as a share of GDP, respectively. Source: OECD National Accounts Database.
Data coverage: 1990-2007 for all countries.
B.2 Non Tradable Intensity of the Government Spending Shock
We turn to the calibration of the breakdown of the government spending shock between non tradables
and tradables. In first approximation, the share of the government spending shock received by the
non traded sector could be measured by the non tradable content of government spending we
calculated above by using the COFOG dataset from the OECD. Denoting by ωGj the content of
government spending in good j, we have:
G(t) = ωGNG(t) + ωGTG(t). (41)
Assuming that ωGj is fixed over time and differentiating (41) leads to:
dG(t)/Y = ωGN (dG(t)/Y ) + ωGT (dG(t)/Y ). (42)
Thus according to (42), the non tradable intensity of the government spending shock corresponds to
the fraction of government consumption spent on non tradables. In order to reproduce the hump-
shaped pattern of the endogenous response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal shock,
we assume that the deviation of government spending relative to its initial value as a percentage of
initial GDP is governed by the dynamic equation (25). Left-multiplying (25) by ωGj (with j = N,T )







e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt] . (43)
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We set g to 0.01 as we consider an exogenous increase in government spending by 1% of GDP and
choose values of ξ and χ in order to reproduce the hump-shaped pattern of the endogenous response
of government spending to the exogenous fiscal shock. To the extent that ωGj is considered as
fixed over time, we set ωGj to the share of government consumption on good j in government final
consumption expenditure, i.e., we set ωGN to 90% and ωGT to 10%.
The derivation of the dynamic equation (43) that governs the adjustment of sectoral government
consumption following an exogenous fiscal shock relies on a number of assumptions. We assume
that the parameters that govern the persistence and shape of the response of sectoral government
consumption are identical across sectors, while the sectoral intensity of the government spending
shock is constant over time and thus corresponds to the share of government final consumption
expenditure in good j. To investigate whether our assumptions are consistent with the data, we
contrast empirical with theoretical impulse response functions of sectoral government consumption.
To estimate the dynamic effects on sectoral government consumption of an exogenous fiscal shock, we
have to identify the government spending shock. We thus estimate the first VAR model that includes
government final consumption expenditure, real GDP, total hours worked, private investment, and
the real consumption wage. Then, we estimate a VAR model in panel format on annual data that
includes unanticipated government spending shocks, ²Git , ordered first, government spending, git,









it]. All quantities are logged, expressed in real terms and scaled by the working
age population.
Since time series for government consumption by function taken from the COFOG dataset are
not available before 1995 for most of the countries in our sample, and because our objective is to
estimate the non tradable content of the aggregate government spending shock, we consider a period
running from 1995 to 2015 in order to have time series of a reasonable length. Data to construct
time series for sectoral government consumption expenditure are available for all the countries in our
sample except Canada. In efforts to have a balanced panel and time series of a reasonable length,
Australia (1998-2015) and Japan (2005-2015) are removed from the sample, which leaves us with
13 OECD countries over the period 1995-2015.
Table 2 reports, for various horizons, the responses of government consumption expenditure on
non tradables and tradables to the identified government spending shock. We normalize the impulse
responses so that government spending rises by one percentage point of GDP on impact. As can
be seen in the first two columns of Table 2, a government spending shock leads to an increase in
government consumption expenditure on non tradables by 0.88% on impact while the rise in public
purchases of tradables accounts for the remaining share, i.e., 12%. The contribution of government
consumption on non tradables to the government spending shock is displayed in the last column of
Table 2. Its contribution is quite stable over time and varies between 88% and 91%. The contribution
of government expenditure on non tradables averages 90% as can be seen in the last line of the table.
Empirical and theoretical impulse response functions for government spending and its two com-
ponents are contrasted and displayed in Figure 5. Before discussing the results, we first focus on
the response of government final consumption expenditure to the exogenous fiscal shock shown in
the left panel of Figure 5. The endogenous response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal
shock displayed in the solid blue line corresponds to the baseline government spending shock shown
in the blue line in Fig. 1(a) we obtain from estimates of the first VAR model. The dynamic re-
sponse of government final consumption expenditure which has been computed by summing mean
responses of government consumption consumption on non tradables and tradables is displayed by
the solid red line in Figure 1(a). While the solid blue line displays point estimate from a sample of
16 OECD countries over 1970-2007, the solid red line displays point estimate from a sample of 13
OECD countries over 1995-2015. Whereas the samples are different, the discrepancy is quite mod-
erate. Since theoretical responses of sectoral government consumption are based on the response of
government spending shown in the solid blue line in the left panel while the sum of mean responses
of government consumption expenditure on non tradables and tradables gives a slightly different re-
sponse of government spending as shown in the solid red line, we have to rescale empirical responses
for Gj so that the sum of mean responses corresponds exactly to the point estimate displayed in the
solid blue line. The rescaled empirical responses of sectoral government consumption are displayed
by solid blue lines in the right panel of Figure 5 with shaded areas indicating the 90 percent con-
fidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. We contrast empirical with theoretical responses
displayed by the solid black lines with circles. It turns out that differences are rather moderate,
if not absent. We may notice that whereas the theoretical response of government consumption of
non tradables (tradables) slightly overstates (understates) the estimated response in the short-run,
it lies within the confidence bounds for both goods. To conclude, the assumptions underlying the
dynamic equation (43) which governs theoretical responses of Gj are reasonable and consistent with
data.
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Table 2: Responses of GN and GT to Identified Government Spending Shock: Point Esti-
mates
Horizon Responses Non tradable intensity
GN GT of gov. spending shock
0 0.876 0.119 88%
1 1.045 0.150 87%
2 0.892 0.125 88%
3 0.753 0.098 88%
4 0.623 0.076 89%
5 0.493 0.057 90%
6 0.381 0.041 90%
7 0.294 0.030 91%
8 0.226 0.022 91%
9 0.175 0.017 91%
10 0.136 0.013 91%
Mean - - 90%
Notes: Horizon measured in year units. We generate impulse response functions






i,t], with 2 lags. To identify
the government spending shock ²Gi,t we estimate the VAR model that includes
aggregate variables, i.e., zi,t = [gi,t, yi,t, li,t, jei,t, wC,i,t], and adopt a Choleski
decomposition. The last column of the table displays, for all horizons, the con-
tribution of the response of non tradable component to the government spending
shock. Data coverage: 1995-2015 for AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR,
IRL, ITA, NLD, NOR, SWE and the USA. All variables are real and scaled by
the working age population.
B.3 Estimates of ² and φ: Empirical strategy
Column 1 of Table 3 shows our estimates of the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², while
columns 2-3 show our estimates of the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and
non traded goods, φ. We detail our empirical strategy to estimate these two parameters.
Along the lines of Horvath [2000], we derive a testable equation by combining optimal rules for
labor supply and labor demand and estimate ² by running the regression of the worker inflow in
sector j = T,N of country i at time t arising from labor reallocation across sectors computed as
lˆji,t − lˆi,t on the relative labor’s share percentage changes in sector j, βˆji,t:58
lˆji,t − lˆi,t = fi + ft + γiβˆji,t + νji,t, (44)
where we denote logarithm in lower case and the deviation from initial steady-state by a hat; νji,t
is an i.i.d. error term; country fixed effects are captured by country dummies, fi, and common
macroeconomic shocks by year dummies, ft. The LHS term of (44) is calculated as the difference
between changes (in percentage) in hours worked in sector j, lˆji,t, and in total hours worked, lˆi,t.
The RHS term βj corresponds to the fraction of labor’s share of output accumulating to labor in
sector j. Denoting by P jt Q
j











where ξj is labor’s share in output in sector j = T,N defined as the ratio of the
compensation of employees to output in the jth sector, averaged over the period 1971-2007.59 Be-
cause hours worked are aggregated by means of a CES function, total hours percentage change lˆi,t is







The parameter we are interested in, the degree of substitutability of hours worked across sectors, is
given by ²i = γi/(1− γi). In the regressions that follow, the parameter γi is alternatively assumed
to be identical across countries when estimating for the whole sample (γi = γi′ ≡ γ for i 6= i′) or
to be different across countries when estimating ² for each economy (γi 6= γi′ for i 6= i′). Data are
taken from the EU KLEMS [2011] and STAN databases, and the sample includes the 16 OECD
countries mentioned above over the period 1971-2007 (except for Japan: 1975-2007). Table 3 reports
empirical estimates that are consistent with ² > 0. All values are statistically significant at 10%,
except for Denmark and Norway.60
58Details of derivation of the equation we explore empirically can be found in a Technical Appendix.
59As Horvath [2000], we use time series for output instead of value added so that our estimates can be
compared with those documented by the author.
60In a Technical Appendix, we address one potential econometric issue. While βji,t (i.e., the RHS term in
eq. (44)) is constructed independently from the dependent variable (i.e., the LHS term in eq. (44)), if the
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To estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption, φ, between traded and non traded
goods, we first derive a testable equation by inserting the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of











where NX ≡ B˙ − r?B is net exports, Ij and Gj are investment in physical capital and govern-
ment spending in sector j, respectively. Isolating
(






= α+ φ lnP . Adding an error term µ, we estimate φ by running the regression of the
(logged) output of tradables adjusted with net exports at constant prices in terms of output of non







= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t, (45)
where fi and ft are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively. Because the term





is composed of ratios, denoted by υGj and υIj , of GT (GN ) and IT
(IN ) to Y T − NX (Y N ) and hence may display a trend over time, we add country-specific linear
trends, as captured by αit.61
Instead of using time series for sectoral value added, we can alternatively make use of series for
sectoral labor compensation by inserting the first-order condition equating the marginal revenue of
labor and the sectoral wage, i.e., θ
jP jY j
Lj = W
j , into the goods market clearing condition. Elimi-
nating Y j , denoting by γT =
(






= η + φ lnP where η is a term composed of both preference (i.e., ϕ) and production (i.e.,
θj) parameters, and (logged) ratios of GT (GN ) and IT (IN ) to WTLT − θTPTNX (WNLN ). We






= gi + gt + σit+ φi lnPi,t + ζi,t, (46)
where gi and gt are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively, and we add country-
specific trends, as captured by σit, because η is composed of ratios that may display a trend over
time.
Time series for sectoral value added at constant prices, labor compensation, and the relative
price of non tradables are taken from the EU KLEMS [2011] and STAN databases (see Section A).
Net exports correspond to the external balance of goods and services at current prices taken from
OECD Economic Outlook Database. To construct time series for net exports at constant prices,
NX, data are deflated by the value added deflator of traded goods PTt .
Since LHS terms of (45) and (46) and the relative price of non tradables display trends, we ran
unit root and then cointegration tests. Having verified that these two assumptions are empirically
supported, we estimate the cointegrating relationships by using fully modified OLS (FMOLS) pro-
cedure for cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. FMOLS estimates of (45) and
(46) are reported in the second and the third column of Table 3 respectively. As a reference model,
we consider eq. (45) which gives an estimate for the whole sample of φ = 0.66. This value is roughly
halfway between estimates documented by cross-section studies, notably Stockman and Tesar [1995]
who find a value for φ of 0.44 and Mendoza [1995] who reports an estimate of 0.74.
C Condition for the Government Spending Shock to be Bi-
ased toward Non Tradables
In this section, we provide more details about the interpretation of our empirical results and the
condition(s) for a government spending shock to be biased toward non tradables.
C.1 Standard Definition of Government Spending Shocks Biased toward
Non Tradables
In subsection 2.3, we interpret the rise in non traded output relative to traded output that we
document empirically as the result of government spending shocks biased toward non tradables. In
labor’s share is (almost) constant over time and thus is close from the average ξj , an endogeneity problem
may potentially show up. Our empirical results reveal that for the majority of the countries in our sample,
the dependent variable does not Granger-cause the explanatory variable.
61Because an endogeneity problem of relative prices may potentially affect our econometric results, we ran
Granger causality tests. Our empirical results reveal that for the majority of the countries in our sample,
the dependent variable does not Granger-cause the explanatory variable. Our results show that one can
consider the regressor in eq. (45) as exogenous with respect to the dependent variable.
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Table 3: Estimates of the Elasticity of Labor Supply across Sectors (²) and the Elasticity
of Substitution in Consumption between Tradables and Non Tradables (φ)
Country Labor Mobility (²) Elasticity of Substitution (φ)












































































































Countries 16 16 16
Observations 1178 605 605
Data coverage 1971-2007 1970-2007 1970-2007
Country fixed effects yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Time trend no yes yes




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































this subsection, we provide more details about our interpretation and the assumptions underlying
this conjecture. The traded good is the numeraire and its price, PT , is normalized to 1.
To begin with, we write down the market clearing conditions:
Y N (t) = CN (t) + JN (t) +GN (t), (47a)
Y T (t) = CT (t) + JT (t) +GT (t) +NX(t), (47b)
where Y j is value added at constant prices in sector j = N,T , Cj and Gj stand for private and
public consumption of good j = N,T , respectively, Jj corresponds to private investment in sector
j = N,T , and NX is net exports. Summing value added at constant prices across sectors gives real
GDP which we denote by YR:
YR(t) = Y T (t) + PY N (t), (48)
where P is the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods that is kept fixed in order to
evaluate non traded value added at constant prices. Note that at the initial steady-state, real GDP
and nominal GDP coincide, i.e., YR = Y .
Government spending, G, is the sum of public purchases on non traded goods, GN , and traded
goods, GT :
G(t) = PGN (t) +GT (t). (49)
We denote by ωGN = PG
N
G and ωGT =
GT
G = 1 − ωGN the non tradable and tradable content of
government spending. Assuming that the share ωGj is constant over time, eq. (49) can be rewritten
as follows:
G(t) = ωGNG(t) + ωGTG(t), (50)
with ωGN + ωGT = 1.






Totally differentiating (50) and dividing by initial GDP, a rise in government spending is split










A government spending shock is said to be biased toward non tradables if
ωGN > ωGT . (53)




= ωGωGN GˆN (t) + ωGωGT GˆT (t). (54)






, j = N,T. (55)
Before investigating the impact of higher government spending on sectoral value added, it is
convenient to denote by νNY =
PY N




of tradables in GDP. Keeping private consumption, Cj , private investment, Jj , and net exports,
NX, constant, totally differentiating market clearing conditions for non tradables and tradables
described by (47a) and (47b), respectively, leads to:
νY,N Yˆ N (t) = ωGωGNG
N (t), (56a)
νY,T Yˆ T (t) = ωGωGTGT (t), (56b)
where νY,T = 1 − νY,N . The LHS of eqs. (56), νY,j Yˆ j(t), corresponds to the deviation of value
added in sector j relative to its initial steady-state value in percentage of initial GDP. Subtracting
(56b) from (56a) allows us to relate the change in output of non tradables relative to tradables, both
expressed in percentage points of GDP, to changes in sectoral government consumption:
νY,N Yˆ N (t)− νY,T Yˆ T (t) = ωGωGNGN (t)− ωGωGTGT (t),




where use has been made of (55) to obtain the second line of eq. (57). In accordance with the
definition (53), eq. (57) implies that non traded output increases relative to traded output when
government spending is biased toward non tradables, i.e.,
νY,N Yˆ N (t)− νY,T Yˆ T (t) > 0, if ωGN > ωGT . (58)
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C.2 Stricter Definition of Government Spending Shocks Biased toward
Non Tradables
In subsection 2.3 we document a second empirical fact which reveals that the share of non tradables
in GDP (in real terms) increases while the share of tradables in GDP (in real terms) falls following
a rise in government consumption. In this subsection, we relate the responses of sectoral output
shares to changes in sectoral government spending.
To begin with, summing value added at constant prices across sectors, i.e., (47a) and (47b), and
using the definition (48) leads to the standard accounting identity according to which GDP is equal
to final expenditure:
YR(t) = PCC(t) + PJJ(t) +G(t) +NX(t), (59)
where PC and PJ are the consumption (C) and investment (J) price index, respectively.
Keeping consumption and investment expenditure along with net exports fixed, totally differ-
entiating (59) leads to:




Totally differentiating (48) leads to:
YˆR(t) = νNY Yˆ
N (t) + νY,T Yˆ T (t), (61)
where νY,j = P
jY j
Y , remembering that P
T = 1. Subtracting YˆR(t) from both sides of eq. (61) and
using the fact that νY,T = 1− νNY leads to:
νY,N
(











corresponds to the deviation of sectoral output share in GDP relative





= νY,j νˆY,j(t). (63)
To relate the response of the share of non tradables in GDP to changes in sectoral government




















where we use eq. (55) to obtain the second line of eq. (64). According to (64), the share of non
tradables in GDP increases following a fiscal shock as long as the fraction of government expenditure
spent on non traded goods, ωGN , is higher than that the share of non tradables in GDP, νY,N . Thus,
a government spending shock is biased toward non tradables if:
ωGN > ν
Y,N . (65)
Building on (53) and (65), there exists two definitions of government spending biased toward
non traded goods. The first definition establishes that government spending is biased toward non
traded goods if a larger fraction of public spending is spent on non traded traded goods than on
traded goods. Such a definition implies that non traded output increases relative to traded output,
as documented in Figure 2(h), as long as ωGN > ωGT . However, this definition does not take into
account that non traded output accounts for a larger fraction of GDP. Thus, for the share of non
tradables in GDP to increase, inequality (53) is a necessary but not sufficient condition. For the
share of non tradables in GDP to increase, as documented in Figure 2(c), the fraction of government
spending spent on non traded goods must exceed the share of non tradables in GDP, in line with
the stricter inequality (65).
It is worth noting that for the increase in the GDP share of non tradables to materialize,
resources must be reallocated away from the traded sector to the non traded sector. In other words,
the fact that government spending is biased toward non tradables in accordance with the stricter
definition (65) is sufficient as long as labor and/or capital can shift toward the non traded sector.
So far, we have investigated the response of the share of non tradables in real GDP to a rise in
government spending by keeping the private sector’s demand components fixed. We now investigate
how much the responses of the private sector’s demand components influence our results. To avoid
unnecessary complications, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non
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tradables is equal to one for both consumption and investment. Thus, consumption (investment)
in non tradables is a fixed fraction αC (αJ ) of consumption (investment) expenditure described by
PCC (PJJ). First, log-linearizing (59) leads to the deviation from initial steady-state in percentage
for real GDP, YR:







where Y is initial real GDP. Totally differentiating (47a) leads to the fiscal multiplier for non traded
output in GDP units:




Pre-multiplying (66) by νY,N , the initial response of the share of non tradables in real GDP to a
government spending shock is:
νY,N
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)





(dG(0)/Y )− νY,N (dNX(0)/Y ) . (68)
Since νY,N takes values which are close to both αJ and αC , the response of the share of non tradables




along with the deficit in the balance of trade on
impact. In sum, when taking into account the reaction of the private sector’s demand components,
the current account deficit triggered by the rise in government spending tends to reinforce the fact
that the government spending shock is biased toward non tradables.
D More VAR Results and Robustness Check
In this section, we provide more VAR results, conduct a robustness check with respect to the
classification of industries, and contrast VAR results with those obtained by adopting local projection
method.
D.1 Estimated Effects on GDP and Demand Components of Government
Spending Shock
Importance of aggregate effects for understanding the sectoral effects. To provide an elab-
orate and clear understanding of the inter-sectoral reallocation effects triggered by a government
spending shock, we need to have the whole picture as aggregate and sectoral effects are strongly
intertwined. In this regard, as pointed out in section 2 in the main text, the response of the sec-
toral output share can be defined as the excess of the sectoral fiscal multiplier over the aggregate
fiscal multiplier (both adjusted with the share of the sector in real GDP). The same logic applies
to the sectoral labor share which can be defined as the excess of the government spending multi-
plier for sectoral labor over the government spending multiplier for total labor (both adjusted with
the corresponding sectoral content of overall labor compensation). Additionally, the changes in
aggregate demand components such as the responses of investment and current account play a key
role in driving the inter-sectoral reallocation effects. A muted response of investment guarantees
a substantial appreciation in the relative price of non tradables that provides incentives to shift
capital toward the non traded sector. By considering an open economy which has perfect access
to world capital markets, it is optimal for the country to run a significant current account deficit.
Because traded goods can be imported while non traded goods must be produced by the home
country, the ability of the country to borrow abroad tends to make the non traded sector more
intensive in the aggregate government spending shock. Third, while our main contribution is to
investigate the magnitude of changes in relative sector size following a government spending shock,
the assumptions set in the paper can be considered reasonable only if the model can account for
both the aggregate and sectoral effects. In this regard, because the use of an open economy version
of the neoclassical model to address the effects of a government spending shocks quantitatively are
somewhat less common, we find it convenient to show how the model behaves regarding aggregate
economic variables. Fourth, we aim at providing a better understanding of fiscal transmission in an
open economy by shedding some light on the implications of the imperfect mobility of labor across
sectors, which requires a back and forth between aggregate and sectoral effects. More specifically,
by amplifying the rise in the aggregate wage and thus the positive response of labor supply to a
fiscal shock, the open economy version of the neoclassical model with imperfect mobility of labor can
produce an increase in hours worked in line with evidence in contrast to a model imposing perfect
mobility of labor across sectors. The increase in total hours worked has an expansionary effect on
both sectors (with imperfect mobility of labor, the Rybczynski theorem does not hold). Because the
non traded sector is more intensive in labor, the rise in non traded output is amplified and in line
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with the evidence. Fifth, our calibration of the government consumption shock is based on estimates
of the first VAR model that includes aggregates variables, i.e., zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. While
the endogenous response of government spending is almost identical across VAR models, we find
it more appropriate to base our calibration strategy on estimates of a VAR model, which is fairly
standard in the literature instead of a specification that includes sectoral variables.
VAR specification. Because their movements are strongly intertwined, we explore empirically
the effects of government spending shocks on both aggregate and sectoral variables. The former
variables consist of government consumption (Git), GDP (Yit), private fixed investment (JEit),
current account (CAit), labor (Lit), and real consumption wage (WC,it). All data are obtained from
the OECD Economic outlook and OECD STAN database together with EU KLEMS database.62
To explore the magnitude of the aggregate fiscal multiplier empirically, we consider a VAR model
that includes in the baseline specification (log) government consumption, git, GDP, yit, total hours
worked, lit, private fixed investment, jeit, and the real consumption wage denoted by wC,it. Our
vector of endogenous variables, is given by: zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. In the second specification
we replace private investment with the current account expressed in percentage of GDP, cait.
Empirical Results. Figure 9 shows aggregate effects of a government spending shock. The
impact on GDP is fairly moderate as the fiscal multiplier is about 0.5 and averages 0.29 during the
first four years after the shock.63 As shown in the last row, the dynamic adjustment of real GDP
seems to mimic the dynamic adjustment of hours worked which increase on impact by 0.53% and
declines after one year. In addition, we detect a moderate increase in the real consumption wage
followed by a rapid decline. Its cumulative response over a two-year horizon is 0.6% approximately,
and subsequently becomes negative.
Turning to the response of investment and the current account as shown in the second column
of Fig. 9, the top panel indicates that investment is fairly unresponsive on impact which suggests
the presence of installation costs, while the middle panel reveals that the current account moves into
deficit in the short-run. The government spending shock leads to a protracted decline in investment
which remains below trend while the current account recovers after two years and moves into surplus
after about 5 years.
D.2 Point Estimates for Responses to Government Spending Shock and
Split-Sample Analysis
Table 5 shows point estimates at a one year-, two-year and four-year horizon. While panel A
displays results for the whole sample, panel B shows estimates for sectoral effects when we split our
sample into groups of ’high mobility’ and ’low mobility’ economies. The ’low mobility’ economies
are those for which the switching cost is above average for the sample and comprise Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, while
’high mobility’ economies consist of France, Japan, Spain, United-Kingdom, United States. In order
to provide some support for our measure of workers’ mobility cost, we compute an intersectoral labor
reallocation index in year t for each country i, denoted by LRi,t, by calculating the absolute change
in sectoral employment resulting from labor reallocation over τ = 5 years in sector j as a fraction
of the average employment over five years:64 The first term in the numerator of (40) captures the
change in employment over five years in sector j while the second term ”filters” the change in labor
arising from total employment growth. The term in the denominator of (40) is a measure of total
employment in the economy (i.e., the average employment computed over t and t−5). Dividing one
by the other gives the rate of workers that have shifted from one sector to another over five years.
We choose τ = 5 to eschew year-to-year changes because of the low frequency changes in labor at
that horizon and consider only differences over 5 years. As the values of the labor reallocation index,
LR, increase, the fraction of workers who are working in a different sector in year t than in year
t− τ is thus larger.65
In the following, we compare the cumulative responses of the labor reallocation index, hours
worked in tradables relative to non tradables, and the relative wage for the ’low mobility’ group
with those for the ’high mobility’ group. The last two columns of Panel B of Table 5 show the
point estimates for both sub-samples for selected horizons. Contrasting point estimates reported in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we find that the magnitude of the shift of labor in the ’low mobility’
62Details of data construction and the source of variables used in our estimate are given in Appendix A.
63Like Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh [2013], we calculate the (aggregate or sectoral) multiplier at a k-year
horizon by computing the ratio of the present value of the cumulative change in output to the present
value of the cumulative change in government consumption, setting the world interest rate set to 4% to be
consistent with the model calibration.
64See e.g., Wacziarg and Wallack [2004] who compute the same labor reallocation index (40).
65When we estimate the response of the intersectoral labor reallocation index to a government spending
shock, we replace hours worked in the traded sector in terms of hours worked in the non traded sector, lTit−lNit
with LR(5)it and thus consider the ’labor reallocation’ specification that is given by: z
W
it = [git, LRit(5), ωit].
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Figure 9: Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Aggregate Variables.
Notes: Exogenous increase of government consumption by 1% of GDP. Aggregate variables include GDP (constant
prices), total hours worked, private fixed investment, the current account and the real consumption wage. Horizontal
axes indicate years. Vertical axes measure percentage deviation from trend in output units (government spending,
GDP, investment, current account), percentage deviation from trend in labor units (total hours worked), percentage
deviation from trend (real consumption wage). Solid blue lines: point estimates; shaded areas: bootstrapped 90%
confidence intervals; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
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group, as captured by the LR index (40), is about four times less in first year. This finding thus lends
credence to our measure of mobility costs. Importantly, in accordance with our conjecture, we find
that the magnitude of the responses of the relative wage and relative hours worked in tradables are
different across the sub-samples. As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 5, non traded wages
increase substantially relative to traded wages for the ’low mobility’ economies while the relative
wage response for ’high mobility’ countries is not statistically different from zero. Columns 5 and 6
of Table 5 also show that the ’low mobility’ economies experience a fall in relative hours worked of
tradables which is less pronounced as labor supply is less elastic to the relative wage. Because the
shift of labor toward the non traded sector is less, ’low mobility’ economies also experience a smaller
decline in output of tradables relative to non tradables as shown by point estimates reported in the
last two columns of Table 5.
D.3 Sectoral Classification
This section explores the robustness of our findings to the classification of the eleven 1-digit ISIC-
rev.3 industries as tradables or non tradables. When we conduct the robustness analysis, we modify
the baseline classification in a number of ways to ensure that some industries with specific charac-
teristics are not driving the results. In particular, the classification of items ”Wholesale and Retail
Trade”, ”Hotels and Restaurants”, ”Transport, Storage and Communication”, ”Financial Interme-
diation” and ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” may display some ambiguity. In order
to address this issue, we re-estimate the various VAR specifications for different classifications in
which one of the five above industries initially marked as tradable (non tradable resp.) is classified
as non tradable (tradable resp.), all other industries staying in their original sector. In doing so,
the classification of only one industry is altered, allowing us to see if the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of a particular industry in the traded or the non traded sector. The baseline and the five
alternative classifications considered in this exercise are shown in Table 6.
Figures 10 and 11 report the responses of variables of interest to an exogenous increase in
government spending by one percent of GDP. The solid blue line shows results for the baseline
classification while the responses for alternative classifications are shown in the five colored lines.
The last line of Table 6 provides the matching between the color line and the classification between
tradables and non tradables. In each panel, the shaded area corresponds to the 90% confidence
bounds.66 Figure 10 contrasts the responses of sectoral output (Y j), sectoral labor (Lj), sectoral
output shares (Y j/Y ), sectoral labor shares (Lj/L), real consumption sectoral wages (W j/PC) for
the baseline classification with those obtained for alternative classifications of industries as tradables
or non tradables. Alternative responses are fairly close to those for the baseline classification as they
lie within the confidence interval (for the baseline classification) for almost all the selected horizons
(8 years). Figure 11 reports the effects of an exogenous increase in government consumption by
1% of GDP on the ratio of sectoral output (Y T /Y N ), sectoral labor (LT /LN ), the intersectoral
labor reallocation index (LR), the relative price (P ) and the relative wage (Ω). For LR, P and
Ω, the responses are remarkably similar across the baseline and alternative classifications. While
the pattern of the dynamic adjustment of Y T /Y N is similar across all classifications, the decline
in output of tradables relative to non tradables is more pronounced when the industry ”Wholesale
and Retail Tarde” is treated as tradables (classification #1). We can also notice some differences
in responses of LT /LN across the baseline and the five alternative classifications. For specifications
#1 and #5, the response of LT /LN does not lie within the confidence interval of the baseline. Yet,
across all classifications, LT /LN declines significantly on impact, and stay below trend for a number
of periods. By and large, our main findings hold and remain unsensitive to the classification of
one specific industry as tradable or non tradable; in sum, the specific treatment of ”Wholesale and
Retail Trade”, ”Hotels and Restaurants”, ”Transport, Storage and Communication”, ”Financial
Intermediation” and ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” does not drive the results.
66We do not report the responses for aggregate variables included since these variables, by construction,
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of the Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Sec-
toral Variables to the Classification of Industries as Tradable or Non Tradable. Notes: The
blue line shows results for the baseline classification. The red line and the yellow line show
results when ’Whole and retail traded’ and ’Hotels and restaurants’ are treated as trad-
ables, respectively. The green line and the black line show results when ’Transport, storage
and communication’ and ’Financial intermediation’ are classified as tradables, respectively.
The cyan line reports results when ’Real Estate, renting and business services’ is treated
as tradables.
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Table 6: Robustness check: Classification of Industries as Tradables or Non Tradables
KLEMS code Classification
Baseline #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing AtB T T T T T T
Mining and Quarrying C T T T T T T
Total Manufacturing D T T T T T T
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E N N N N N N
Construction F N N N N N N
Wholesale and Retail Trade G N T N N N N
Hotels and Restaurants H N N T N N N
Transport, Storage and Communication I T T T N T T
Financial Intermediation J T T T T N T
Real Estate, Renting and Business Services K N N N N N T
Community Social and Personal Services LtQ N N N N N N
Color line in Fig. 10 and 11 blue red yellow green black cyan
Notes: T stands for the Traded sector and N for the Non traded sector.
D.4 Cross-Country Analysis: Local Projection vs. VAR Method
In the main text, we estimate impact responses of sectoral shares in real GDP or employment to a
government spending shock for each country in our sample by adopting a VAR methodology. More
specifically, we estimate the responses of sectoral labor and sectoral output shares to a government









but for one single country as a time. While we omit the sectoral real consumption wage, we also
estimated the VAR model by including ωjC,it and find that the results are similar. We allow for two
lags (i.e., k = 2 in eq. (1)), as we did for the panel data estimate.
One potential issue with the VAR methodology is related to the fact that we estimate two VAR
models, one including non traded variables and the other traded variables, and each VAR model
is used to simultaneously identify the government spending shock and generate impulse response
functions. In doing that, one might be potentially concerned by the fact that structural government
spending shocks are different and thus responses of the shares of non tradables and tradables cannot
be compared with. Instead of adopting a VAR approach, we can choose a two-step method. In
the first step, we identify the shock by estimating the baseline VAR model that includes aggregate
variables, i.e., zi,t = [gi,t, yi,t, li,t, jei,t, wC,i,t]. In the second step, we estimate the effects by using the
Jorda`’s [2005] single-equation method. The local projection method amounts to running a series of














where αji and β
j
i are the constant and linear trends respectively, x
j is the logarithm of the variable
of interest of sector j, z is a vector of control variables (i.e., past values of government spending and
of the variable of interest), ψji,h (L) is a polynomial (of order two) in the lag operator and ²
G
i,t is the
identified government spending shock. While we allow for two lags on the variable of interest and
government spending collected in vector z, we consider the effects of a current exogenous government
spending shock. Since we concentrate on impact effects, horizon h is set to zero in eq. (69).
We estimate impact responses, i.e., coefficient γji,0 in eq. (69), for each country in our sample.
Columns 1-4 of Table 7 show impact responses when adopting the VAR approach, as in the main
text, while columns 5-8 display results when adopting the local projection method. First, for the
four variables of interest, the correlation coefficient is high, as it varies between 0.91 and 0.93 for
labor shares and from 0.95 to 0.97 for output shares. In Fig. 12, we plot impact responses obtained
by using a SVAR approach against those estimated by adopting a local projection method. As it
stands out, both methods lead to very similar results.
Whereas Jorda`’s local projection method gives similar results, one can notice some differences in
Fig. 13 which plots impact responses of sectoral output shares against the degree of labor mobility
across sectors. More specifically, cross-country relationships between dνY,j(0) and ² obtained using
a VAR methodology (solid blue line) display the same pattern, as the slope is 0.235 for non tradables
and -0.249 for tradables. Since by construction, a rise in the share of non tradables must be exactly
offset by a decline of the same amount in the share of tradables, such symmetry between the traded
and the non traded sector is consistent with our quantitative analysis. While the pattern of solid
black lines with circles which display the cross country relationship from local projection estimates is
similar to that of solid blue lines, the slope is 0.30 for non tradables and -0.43 for tradables. When we
simulate the model, we obtain the same slope in absolute terms and adopting the local projection
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Figure 11: Sensitivity of the Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Rela-
tive Price and Relative Wage to the Classification of Industries as Tradable or Non Tradable.
Notes: The blue line shows results for the baseline specification. The red line and the yellow
line show results when ’Whole and retail traded’ and ’Hotels and restaurants’ are treated
as tradables, respectively. The green line and the black line show results when ’Transport,
storage and communication’ and ’Financial intermediation’ are classified as tradables, re-
spectively. The cyan line reports results when ’Real Estate, renting and business services’
is treated as tradables.
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Table 7: Impact Responses of Sectoral Shares: VAR vs. Local Projection Method
Country VAR Local Projection
νY,T νY,N νL,T νL,N νY,T νY,N νL,T νL,N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AUS 0.487 -0.155 0.058 0.072 0.669 -0.568 0.035 0.239
AUT -0.355 0.223 -0.488 0.601 -0.223 0.185 -0.422 0.485
BEL -0.116 0.121 -0.246 0.306 -0.095 0.043 -0.502 0.415
CAN -1.034 0.944 -0.497 0.516 -1.066 0.976 -0.496 0.442
DNK -0.769 0.681 -0.311 0.294 -0.725 0.676 -0.224 0.310
ESP -0.187 0.389 -0.726 0.532 -0.265 0.320 -0.826 1.015
FIN -0.809 0.896 -0.648 0.678 -0.688 0.725 -0.530 0.568
FRA -0.358 0.409 -0.092 0.123 -0.412 0.338 -0.084 0.076
GBR -0.459 0.552 -0.928 0.853 -0.756 0.766 -0.839 0.727
IRL 0.051 -0.072 0.002 -0.114 -0.021 -0.077 0.085 -0.242
ITA -0.598 0.505 -0.141 0.168 -0.624 0.517 -0.182 0.248
JPN -0.960 0.894 -0.730 0.923 -1.060 0.730 -0.968 1.076
NLD -0.184 0.218 -0.090 -0.093 -0.212 0.202 -0.074 -0.075
NOR 0.027 0.092 -0.082 0.161 0.233 -0.193 -0.065 0.136
SWE -0.692 0.586 -0.457 0.412 -0.502 0.566 -0.288 0.264
USA -1.206 0.769 -0.723 0.830 -1.494 0.975 -0.770 0.966
Traded Sector Non Traded Sector
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Figure 12: Impact Responses of Sectoral Output and Labor Shares: VAR vs. Local Pro-
jection Method. Notes: Figure 12 plots impact (i.e., at time t = 0) responses obtained when adopting a VAR
approach (horizontal axis) against those estimated by adopting a two-step approach in which the second step consists
in estimating eq. (69) (vertical axis). Sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
analysis would therefore undermine the quantitative analysis because the slopes by construction
should be identical.
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(a) Output Share of Tradables





(b) Output Share of Non Tradables
Figure 13: Cross-Country Relationship from VAR estimates against Cross-Country Rela-
tionship from Local Projection Estimates. Notes: Horizontal axes display panel data estimates of the
elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², taken from the last column of Table 4, which captures the degree of labor
mobility across sectors. Vertical axes report impact responses from the VAR model (blue squares) and those from the
local projection method (black circles). The solid blue line shows the cross-country relationship from VAR estimates
whilst the solid black line with circles displays the cross-country relationship from local projection estimates.
E VAR Evidence: Robustness Check
The main obstacle in empirical fiscal policy analysis is to identify exogenous and unexpected fiscal
events. Following Blanchard and Perotti [2002], identification of fiscal shocks is based on the as-
sumption that government spending does not react contemporaneously to other variables included
in the VAR model. Since there are some delays inherent to the legislative system, this is a natural
assumption when using quarterly data. However, this argument may not necessarily be true when
using annual data since some adjustment could be possible. Another concern is related to the pres-
ence of anticipation effects. As argued by Ramey [2011], Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] approach to
identifying government spending shocks in VAR models may lead to incorrect timing of the identified
fiscal shocks. If the fiscal shock is anticipated in advance, agents may have modified their decisions
before the rise in government spending actually materializes. Consequently, when the fiscal shock
is anticipated, and thus VAR approach captures the shocks too late, it misses the initial changes
in variables that occur as soon as the news is learned. We conduct below a number of robustness
checks to investigate whether our empirical strategy is subject to endogeneity or anticipation issues.
Finally, we address a potential concern related to the fact that various VAR models could identify
different structural government spending shocks.
E.1 Endogeneity Issue
In the main text, we identify fiscal shocks by adopting the SVAR methodology pioneered by Blan-
chard and Perotti [2002]. Like the authors, we base the identification scheme on the assumption
that discretionary government spending is subject to certain decision and/or implementation lags
that prevent government spending from responding to current output developments. The advantage
of the Blanchard and Perotti’s approach over the first approach by Ramey and Shapiro [1998] is
that it can be implemented for a large set of countries. However, the potential drawback is that
we use annual data instead and thus the Blanchard and Perotti identifying assumption is some-
what less natural in our case. In order to address this potential endogeneity issue, we alternatively
used narratively-identified government spending shocks from the dataset constructed by Guajardo,
Leigh, and Pescatori [2014] who do not consider war times but rather identify unexpected changes
in government spending directly from historical policy documents. Reassuringly, we find that both
methodologies lead to the same results, in particular the share of non tradables increases substan-
tially.
Before discussing the results from the narrative approach, it is worth mentioning that we con-
ducted alternative robustness checks. Following Beetsma and Giuliodori [2011], for the largest
available subset of the countries in our current sample, we estimate the same VAR model on a
quarterly basis, assuming that government purchases take at least one quarter to react to an out-
put shock. We find that the dynamic responses of government spending along with the remaining
aggregate variables included in the VAR model are similar to those when estimating the same VAR
model on annual data. To deal further with the potential endogeneity problem, like Beetsma and
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions for Government Spending across VAR specifications
when G is Ordered Last in the VAR Model. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by
1% of GDP. Results for baseline specification, i.e., G is ordered first in the VAR model, are displayed by solid blue
lines with the shaded area indicating 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; the black line
reports results for a VAR model in which G is ordered last; sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
Giuliodori [2011] and Bru¨ckner and Pappa [2012], we also order government purchases last in the
VAR model and thus alow for G to respond to all variables included in the VAR model. If the
endogenous response of G to an exogenous fiscal shock is similar to that when the VAR is estimated
by ordering G first, then we can be confident that the endogeneity problem is mitigated as G is not
or at least little responsive to output shocks. As displayed in Figure 14, the endogenous response
of G lies within the confidence bounds of the primary VAR model where G is ordered first across
all VAR specifications. This finding could be explained by the fact that automatic stabilizers which
operate through unemployment benefits or transfers should not pose a problem, since we consider
government spending net of transfers. Finally, Born and Mu¨ller [2012] test whether annual gov-
ernment spending is predetermined conditional on being predetermined at the quarterly frequency
for four countries, i.e., United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Their main result
is that the restriction that government spending does not respond to other variables in the VAR
within a year cannot be rejected.
An alternative estimation strategy is suggested by Ramey and Shapiro [1998]. Their narrative
approach amounts to considering major political events which led to large military buildups asso-
ciated with significant increases in government spending. The advantage of the narrative approach
over alternatives is that political events are arguably exogenous (with respect to economic condi-
tions) and thus identified government spending shocks are not subject to the potential endogeneity
problem. To further explore the potential endogeneity problem empirically, we use a dataset con-
structed by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014]. Our objective is to investigate whether our main
conclusions hold when adopting an alternative identification method. Using a narrative approach.
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014] identify changes in fiscal policy directly from historical doc-
uments. More precisely, the dataset contains 173 fiscal policy changes for 17 OECD countries over
the period 1978-2009. In order to make our results when adopting the ’event’ approach comparable
with our evidence obtained by adopting the Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identifying assumption,
we restrict the set of countries to 15 and the period to 1978-2007. We then estimate the same VAR
models described in section 2 in the main text.67 We augment each VAR model with identified fiscal
events (ordered first in the VAR specification) corresponding to changes in government spending,
i.e. ’spending-based’ events.
While our results obtained by adopting Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identifying assumption
are broadly in line with those obtained with the narrative approach, we may nevertheless note some
differences. Before discussing these differences, it is worth mentioning that Guajardo, Leigh, and
Pescatori [2014] identify cases of fiscal consolidation motivated by a desire to reduce the budget
deficit. To be consistent with the objective of our paper, we concentrate on episodes of fiscal
67We exclude DEU and PRT which are not included in our empirical study while NOR is removed from
our sample.
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Figure 15: Contrasting Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Govern-
ment Spending Shock between Alternative Identification Schemes of Government Spending
Shock. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. In the baseline case, government
spending shocks are identified by assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the other variables
in the VAR model. Results for the baseline case are displayed by solid blue lines with the shaded area indicating 90 per-
cent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line reports results for narratively-identified
government spending shocks from the dataset constructed by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014]; sample: 15
OECD countries, 1978-2007, annual data.
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Figure 16: Contrasting Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government
Spending Shock between Alternative Identification Schemes of Government Spending
Shock. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. In the baseline case, govern-
ment spending shocks are identified by assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the other
variables in the VAR model. Results for the baseline case are displayed by solid blue lines with the shaded area
indicating 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line reports results for
narratively-identified government spending shocks from the dataset constructed by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
[2014]; sample: 15 OECD countries, 1978-2007, annual data.
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consolidation implemented through changes in government spending rather than changes in tax
rates. The authors find that fiscal consolidation through spending cuts gives rise to a contraction
in GDP and investment. In order to be able to compare the effects of a government spending shock
identified by applying Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identification scheme with those following
fiscal shocks identified by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori [2014], we normalize the impulse response
functions so that government consumption rises by 1 percentage point of GDP. In Figures 15 and
16, we report aggregate and sectoral effects along with the sectoral composition effects. Results
for the ’event’ study are displayed in the solid black line while the solid blue line shows results for
the baseline case in which government spending shocks are identified by applying Blanchard and
Perotti’s [2002] method.
Differences in responses of aggregate variables. As displayed in the first row of Figure 15,
while the shape of endogenous responses of government spending is similar, the fiscal shock displays
less persistence over time in the ’event’ approach and is greater in the short-run; more precisely, we
observe that increases in government spending over the first two years are more pronounced, while
G is restored back toward its initial level more rapidly. In addition, in most of the cases, we observe
a spending reversal which echoes Corsetti et al. [2012]; the magnitude of the cut in government
spending during the reversal period (after 5 years approximately) is moderate though. Inspection of
the dynamic effects of a government spending shock shows that the responses of aggregate variables
are qualitatively similar whether the fiscal shock is identified by applying Blanchard and Perotti’s
[2002] method or by using an ’event’ approach, except for investment. More precisely, while a rise in
government spending increases both real GDP and hours worked and leads to a decline in the current
account, we detect a significant increase in investment on impact in the ’event’ approach, while
investment declines gradually in the baseline case. We may also note some differences quantitatively,
as real GDP and hours worked increase more in the ’event’ approach than in the baseline case while
the current account deficit is more pronounced. This result is not surprising since the government
spending shock is more pronounced in the short-run.
Differences in responses of sectoral variables. The last two columns of Figure 15 show
the responses of sectoral labor and output, while Figure 16 displays the dynamic adjustment of
sectoral shares along with the responses of the relative price and relative wage of non tradables. As
can be seen in the last two columns of Figure 15, hours worked in the traded sector increase in the
’event’ study while traded output rises in the short-run. Because the rise in government spending
is more pronounced in the ’event’ study, we also find empirically that labor and output in the non
traded sector increase by a larger amount. While we detect a positive impact on traded output in
the short run, the first column of Figure 16 shows that the share of tradables, whether measured in
total employment or real GDP, declines after a fiscal shock. As can be seen in the first two columns
of Figure 16, the responses of sectoral output shares are somewhat less pronounced in the ’event’
study but lie within the confidence bounds of the baseline case. As displayed in the last two columns
of Figure 16, hours worked and output in the traded sector falls relative to the non traded sector.
Yet, the decline is much less pronounced than that in the baseline case. Moreover, both the relative
price and the relative wage of non tradables appreciate by a smaller amount.
In sum, whether we consider a narrative approach or Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identification
scheme, all our results hold qualitatively, except for investment which is found to be crowded-in in
the former approach. As mentioned above, we may notice some quantitative differences though. In
particular, we find empirically that the rise in government spending has an expansionary effect on
non traded output relative to traded output which is somewhat less pronounced in the ’event’ study.
In addition, the government spending shock gives rise to a positive response of traded output on
impact and a contraction in the medium-run only.
How can the discrepancy between the two approaches be rationalized? Because the apprecia-
tion in the relative price of non tradables along with the decline in traded output relative to non
traded output are less pronounced when using narratively-identified government spending shocks, it
seems reasonable to conjecture that changes in government spending identified by Guajardo, Leigh,
and Pescatori [2014] are somewhat less biased toward non tradables than those identified by apply-
ing Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] method. This conjecture could provide an explanation to the
mitigated responses of sectoral output and sectoral labor shares to narratively-identified govern-
ment spending shocks. Furthermore, a relatively less intensive non traded sector in the government
spending shock could rationalize the increase in investment expenditure in the short-run in the event
approach. The reason is that the relative price of non tradables appreciates less which results in a
much smaller increase in the investment price index. The rise in the shadow value of capital, Q,
could thus offset the smaller increase in the investment price index, PJ . A second potential cause
of the discrepancy between the results obtained in the narrative approach and those obtained by
applying Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identification scheme could be based on the change in public




We address a major concern regarding the evidence on fiscal transmission we document in the main
text due to anticipation effects. We conduct below an investigation of the potential presence of
anticipation effects, using alternative measures of forecasts for government spending. The former
measure was provided by Born, Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013] and stems from the OECD, while the
latter measure is taken from a dataset constructed by Fioramanti et al. [2016] where forecasts are
performed by the European Commission. We use two alternative datasets as the former contains
observations from 1986 to 2007 for all countries, while the latter provides a longer time horizon for a
restricted set of countries. As is common in the literature, we alternatively include forward-looking
variables like stock prices into the VAR model in order to control for potential fiscal foresight. We
first summarize our main results. First, we run Granger-causality tests and do not find that fiscal
forecasts have any predictive power for our identified government spending shocks. Second, our
main results are not altered by the inclusion of forecasts for government spending. We detect some
differences quantitatively however, when we include the OECD forecast for spending growth in the
VAR model. More precisely, when we control for anticipation effects, the responses of sectoral output
shares are more pronounced, while the appreciation in the relative price and the relative wage of
non tradables are somewhat more muted.
Drawing on previous studies, we conduct three robustness exercises to explore the potential
implications of anticipations effects:
• Like Beetsma and Giuliodori [2011], we run Granger-causality tests in order to investigate
whether fiscal forecasts have any predictive power for the identified government consumption
shocks.
• A second way to deal with the complications of possibly anticipated government spending
shocks is to augment the VAR specification with the forecasts for government spending, see
Beetsma and Giuliodori [2011], Born, Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013].
• A third route followed by Beetsma and Giuliodori [2011], Bru¨ckner and Pappa [2012] is to
augment the baseline VAR specification with forward-looking variables such as short-term
interest rates, the log of the GDP deflator, stock prices, or oil prices in order to control for
fiscal-foresight effects.
In the following, we conduct an investigation of the potential presence of anticipation effects by
performing the three robustness exercises mentioned above. To perform the first robustness exercise,
we use a dataset constructed by Born, Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013] that contains time series for
forecasts for government spending from the OECD.68 Since the OECD prepares forecasts in June
and December for each year, the dataset contains semi-annual observations for the period running
from 1986 to 2011. To investigate the extent to which evidence on fiscal transmission can be affected
by anticipation effects, we use the December forecasts. Data are available over the period 1986-2007
for CAN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN and USA, 1997-2007 for AUS, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, IRL, NLD,
NOR, SWE and 1997-2004 for AUT. We denote fct+1t the period-t forecast of the growth rate of
government spending for the next year t+ 1.
Granger-causality tests. Before exploring the VAR model augmented with forecasts for
government spending empirically, we first test whether the anticipation problem is relevant in our
annual VAR. We run a Granger-causality test (see Table 8). In particular, we test whether fiscal
forecasts fct+1it have any predictive power for the government spending shocks estimated from our
benchmark model zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. The results for individual countries show that, with
the exception of GBR, ITA and JPN, there is no causality running from fct+1it to the VAR-based
government spending shocks, ²Gi,t, at the 5% level of significance suggesting that VAR shocks are not
forecastable. For the whole sample, we find that forecasts for government spending fct+1it do not
Granger-cause the VAR shocks using the Cholesky decomposition to the benchmark specification
zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it].
First robustness exercise to control for potential anticipation effects. Following Born
et al. [2013], we augment the four VAR specifications with the forecasts for real government spending
growth (ordered after gt). In order to make our evidence comparable with that without government
spending forecasts, we estimate the four sets of VAR specifications over the same period, i.e., from
1986 to 2007.
Figures 17 and 18 show IRF when augmenting each baseline VAR specification with forecasts for
government spending. The solid blue line reports the results for the baseline case without forecasts
for government spending growth, while the solid black line displays the results for the VAR model
augmented with forecasts. In both cases, the VAR model is estimated over the period running from
1986 to 2007. Overall, it turns out that differences are rather moderate and anticipation effects
thus play a limited quantitative role in the dynamic adjustment to a government spending shock.
68We thank Born, Juessen and Mu¨ller [2013] for providing this dataset to us.
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Table 8: Granger Causality Tests (p-values)
Country p-value Country p-value
AUS 0.545 GBR 0.042
AUT 0.090 IRL 0.752
BEL 0.884 ITA 0.017
CAN 0.218 JPN 0.000
DNK 0.617 NLD 0.723
ESP 0.532 NOR 0.905
FIN 0.817 SWE 0.761
FRA 0.073 USA 0.884
Whole Sample 0.258
Notes: the null hypothesis that fct+1it does not Granger-cause ²
G
i,t
is rejected if p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level.
Yet, some differences can be noticed. Once anticipation effects are controlled for, the rise in hours
worked displays more persistence and is more in line with what we obtained numerically. In this
regard, this conclusion squares well with evidence documented by Born et al. [2013], except that
the authors detect a smaller increase in real GDP when anticipation effects are not controlled for,
while this finding applies to hours worked in our case as differences in the dynamic effects for real
GDP are almost insignificant quantitatively. Likewise, impact responses of sectoral outputs are
also very similar to impact effects computed numerically once the VAR model is augmented with
forecasts for government spending. Some slight differences can be noticed, however. The decline
in empirically-estimated traded output is found to be more pronounced while the increase in non
traded output is slightly smaller. We may also note that the reallocation effects are slightly greater
as changes in sectoral shares in real GDP are somewhat more pronounced while the relative wage of
non tradables increases less than in the baseline case. However, the responses of the sectoral shares
in labor, Lj/L, are merely affected once the anticipation effects are controlled for.
Second and third robustness exercise to control for potential anticipation effects. As
emphasized above, to ensure that our results are not subject to the fiscal foresight problem, we carry
out a number of robustness exercises by augmenting the baseline VAR model with forward-looking
variables along the lines of Beetsma and Giuliodori [2011], and Bruckner and Pappa [2012]. Since
one major contribution in this paper is to shed some light on the reallocation effects of a government
spending shock, we restrict attention to the dynamic responses of the sectoral shares. Columns 1
and 2 of Figure 19 show results when augmenting the baseline VAR model with the forecast for
the budget balance-GDP ratio which we denote by bbrt+1t . The year-ahead forecasts are taken from
the Commission’s Fall forecasts, which are published in November. In terms of VAR specifications
shown above, we replace fct+1t with bbr
t+1
t . It is worth mentioning that Beetsma and Giuliodori
[2011] find empirically that the balance-ratio forecast has strong predictive power for gt. Time series
for the general government balance to GDP ratio forecast (one year ahead) are available for BEL
(1971-2007), DNK (1977-2007), ESP (1987-2007), FRA (1970-2007), GBR (1974-2007), IRL (1974-
2007), ITA (1970-2007), NLD (1970-2007). The impulse response functions shown in the solid black
line, reported in columns 1-2 of Figure 19, are similar, if not identical, to those under the baseline
shown in the solid blue line and thus do not deserve more comments. As an additional, and final,
test we augment the baseline model with the log of nominal stock prices denoted by pst. In terms
of VAR specifications, we replace fct+1t with spt as this variable captures information about the
future effects of fiscal shocks. Time series for stock prices are taken from OECD Main Economic
Indicators. Data are available over 1970-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA,
JPN, NLD, SWE and USA, 1983-2007 for DNK, 1985-2007 for ESP and 1986-2007 for BEL and
NOR. Again, the discrepancy in the estimated responses is quite moderate.
To conclude, we do not find that OECD forecasts of government spending predict our identified
government spending shocks. Next, in estimating the fiscal shock and reducing potential fiscal-
foresight problems, we augment each VAR model with OECD or European Commission forecasts in
order to control for anticipated changes in government spending. It turns out that fiscal foresight
has little impact on our findings.
E.3 Identified Government Spending Shocks across Alternative VAR Spec-
ifications
We address a potential concern related to the fact that the government spending shock may display
noticeable differences across alternative VAR specifications. Such differences could potentially make
the comparison of the effects of a government shock across sectors difficult. Because in the quanti-
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Figure 17: Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Anticipation Effects. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Baseline sample:
16 OECD countries, 1986-2007. Solid blue line: Results for baseline case without controlling for anticipation effects;
the shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line
reports the results from estimates of VAR models with forecast of government spending growth (ordered after gt).
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Figure 18: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Anticipation Effects. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Baseline sample:
16 OECD countries, 1986-2007. Solid blue line: Results for baseline case without controlling for anticipation effects;
the shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line
reports the results from estimates of VAR models with forecast of government spending growth (ordered after gt).
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Figure 19: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Alternative Forecasts Measures and Anticipation Effects. Notes: Exogenous increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP. Baseline sample: 8 OECD countries (first two columns) and 16 OECD countries (last
two columns), 1970-2007. Solid blue line: Results for the baseline case without controlling for anticipation effects;
the solid black line reports the results from estimates of VAR models with balance-ratio forecast (first two columns)
or stock prices (last two columns).
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tative analysis we base our calibration on one unique government spending shock, such differences
could potentially undermine the comparison of theoretical with empirical responses. Before sum-
marizing the main conclusions of robustness exercises, it is worth mentioning that, in line with the
current practice, to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we normalize the impulse responses so
that government consumption rises by one percentage point of GDP on impact. Such a normaliza-
tion thus makes the responses of economic variables directly comparable quantitatively across VAR
models. Since we base the greatest part of our analysis and discussion on impact effects, potential
problems caused by differences in the government spending shock could be mitigated. However,
even if the magnitude and the shape of the government spending shock is similar across VAR spec-
ifications, different VAR models could pickup different structural government spending shocks. In
order to investigate the extent of the discrepancy in the estimated responses caused by potentially
different government spending shocks across VAR specifications, we proceed in four stages. Reas-
suringly, the discrepancy in estimated responses turns out to be quite moderate in all robustness
exercises.
First robustness exercise: testing for differences in endogenous responses of gov-
ernment spending across VAR models. A straightforward check of the extent of differences
of the government spending shock across VAR specifications is performed by contrasting impulse
response functions for G. Figure 20 compares the dynamic response of government consumption to
an exogenous fiscal shock for the first VAR model with the endogenous response of G for alternative
VAR models. The solid blue line displays the point estimates for the first VAR model while the
solid black line in each panel displays the point estimates for an alternative VAR model. All of the
empirical impulse response functions for G, and to a lesser extent the response of G we generate
from estimates of the VAR model that includes the current account, lie within the 90% confidence
bounds of the first IRF for G for all horizons. Moreover, the test we perform indicates that the
assumption that the point estimate for the response of G in the first VAR model is significantly
different from that for alternative VAR models is strongly rejected.
Second robustness exercise: Assessing the discrepancy caused by potentially differ-
ent identified government spending shocks on annual data. We now conduct an elaborate
investigation of the potential discrepancy in the estimated effects caused by considering alternative
VAR models. To perform such an analysis, we proceed as follows. Once we identified the government
spending shock in the first VAR model that includes private investment, zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it],
we augment each VAR model with the identified government spending shocks, ordered first, and use
shocks to government spending (identified with the Cholesky decomposition) as the fiscal shock, see
e.g., Ramey [2011] who adopts a similar procedure to identify military spending shocks. Then, we
contrast the responses for the baseline model with those for augmented VAR models. Figures 21 and
22 compare the results in the main text displayed in the solid blue line with those for the same VAR
model augmented with the identified government spending shock in the first VAR model estimated
on annual data. As shown in the first row of Figures 21 and 22, across all VAR specifications, the
endogenous response of government spending is quite similar, if not identical, whether the fiscal
shock is identified in the first VAR model (solid black line) or is identified in the corresponding VAR
model (solid blue line). The dynamic effects displayed in Figure 21 do not deserve comments as
impulse response functions are very similar. Turning to the sectoral composition effects displayed
in Figure 22, while we may notice some slight differences for the responses of sectoral shares, the
real consumption wage in non tradables, and the relative wage of non tradables, the discrepancy
is not statistically significant, except for the relative wage in the short-run. Overall, reassuringly,
this robustness exercise shows that our different VAR models identify similar structural government
spending shocks and it turns out that differences are quantitatively rather moderate, if not absent.
Third robustness exercise: Identifying the government spending shock in the first
VAR model on quarterly data and assessing the potential discrepancy in estimated
responses. The identification scheme proposed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002] is based on the
assumption that government spending does not respond contemporaneously to current output de-
velopments due to delays between current output observation and the implementation of fiscal
measures. The potential problem is that Blanchard and Perotti’s argument is not necessarily true
when using annual data, as some adjustment could be possible within the year. Below we assess
the legitimacy of our identifying restriction in one more way. We use quarterly data and assume
that government spending does not respond within the quarter to the other variables included in
the VAR model. This assumption is in the spirit of Blanchard and Perotti [2002]. We take the
identified government spending shock in the first VAR model as the baseline spending shock and
annualize the estimated shock. Then we augment each VAR model with the baseline spending shock
identified on a quarterly basis. Such a procedure should ensure that the fiscal shock is exogenous
and variables respond to the same identified government spending shock. The disadvantage is that
the largest available subset of the countries in our current sample for which we have sufficient quar-
terly fiscal data is 8 instead of 16. In order to make our baseline results comparable with those
when we augment each VAR model with the spending shock identified in the first VAR model, i.e.
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zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it], we re-estimate each VAR model on annual data for the set of countries
restricted to eight. In the latter case, we do not augment VAR models with the identified govern-
ment spending shock in the first VAR model. The solid blue line in Figures 23 and 24 displays the
baseline results for a government spending shock identified on annual data, while the solid black line
displays the results when each VAR model is augmented with the government spending shock iden-
tified in the first VAR model on quarterly data. As shown in the first row of Figures 23 and 24, the
response of government spending to the exogenous fiscal shock identified on quarterly data displayed
in the solid black line is somewhat more pronounced in the short term and the IRF of G remains
above that in the baseline. In sum, the government spending shock displays more persistence and is
somewhat more pronounced when identified on quarterly data. Because the government spending
shock is larger in this configuration, as can be seen in Figure 23, hours worked and output fall more
in the traded sector while they increase more in the non traded sector. It is thus not surprising that
the responses of sectoral shares are more pronounced, as can be seen in Figure 24. Regarding the
responses for the relative price and the relative wage, differences are quantitatively rather moderate.
Fourth robustness exercise: Assessing numerically the discrepancy caused by po-
tentially different identified government spending shocks. In the last robustness exercise
we perform, we take a different approach. We normalize the exogenous fiscal shock to a rise in
G by 1 percentage point of GDP in the quantitative analysis but let the endogenous response of
government consumption vary across VAR specifications. Thus, when we compute the theoretical
impulse response functions of one variable, we calibrate the government spending shock so as to
reproduce the endogenous response of G we generate from estimates of the VAR model in which
the variable is included. The objective of this exercise is to compute quantitatively the discrepancy
in the estimated response of each variable caused by an identified government spending shock that
potentially varies across VAR models while in the baseline quantitative analysis, we consider one
unique spending shock identified in the first VAR model zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. In the first
row of Figures 25 and 26, the solid blue line displays the adjustment of government spending we
generate from estimates of the first VAR model zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it] while the solid red line
displays the endogenous response of G we generate from estimates of the VAR model in which the
variable shown in the second row is included.
As discussed above, the differences between the government spending shock identified in the
first VAR model and the government spending shock identified in alternative VAR models are quite
moderate, and in most of the cases insignificant, except for the specification that includes the current
account shown the first column of Figure 25. The solid blue line in the second row of Figures 25
and 26 shows empirical impulse response functions, while the solid black line displays theoretical
responses when the government spending shock is calibrated on the basis of the first VAR model.
The dotted black line displays the theoretical responses when the government spending shock is
identified in the VAR model in which the economic variable (shown in the second row) is included.
Overall, the differences between the solid and the dotted black line are quantitatively small or
hardly noticeable for all variables. Thus, our quantitative analysis should not be altered by the
small differences in the government spending shock across VAR specifications.
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(g) VAR zW with Ω
Figure 20: Effects of an Unanticipated Fiscal Shock on Government Spending. Notes: Exoge-
nous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Blue line: baseline VAR model zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
;
shaded areas: 90 percent confidence intervals; black line: alternative VAR specifications.
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Figure 21: Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences Caused by Identifying Different Government Spending Shocks on
Annual Data. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Results for the baseline
specification are displayed by solid lines with the shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained
by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line reports the results for the same VAR model which is augmented with the
identified government spending shock in the first VAR model estimated on annual data; sample: 16 OECD countries,
1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 22: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences Caused by Identifying Different Government Spending Shocks on
Annual Data. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Results for the baseline
specification are displayed by solid lines with the shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained
by bootstrap sampling; the solid black line reports the results for the same VAR model which is augmented with the
identified government spending shock in the first VAR model estimated on annual data; sample: 16 OECD countries,
1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 23: Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences Caused by Identifying Different Government Spending Shocks. Notes:
Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Results for the baseline specification are displayed
by solid lines with the shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling;
the solid black line reports the results for the same VAR model which is augmented with the identified government
spending shock in the first VAR model estimated on quarterly data; sample: 8 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual
data.
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Figure 24: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences Caused by Identifying Different Government Spending Shocks. Notes:
Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. Results for the baseline specification are displayed
by solid lines with the shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling;
the solid black line reports the results for the same VAR model which is augmented with the identified government
spending shock in the first VAR model estimated on quarterly data; sample: 8 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual
data.
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(g) Share of Non Tradables











(h) Share of Tradables
Figure 25: Contrasting Theoretical Impulse Response Functions for Potentially Varying
Government Spending Shock. Notes: Impulse response functions to an exogenous increase in real government
spending by one percent of GDP. The solid blue line displays the point estimate of VAR with the dotted blue lines
indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline scenario, i.e., when we
calibrate the model on the basis of the first VAR model, zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
; the dotted black line displays
model predictions when we calibrate the model for a government spending shock specific to the VAR specification.
In the first row, the red line and the dotted black line with squares display the empirical and theoretical response of
government spending specific to the VAR specification, respectively.
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Figure 26: Contrasting Theoretical Impulse Response Functions for Potentially Varying
Government Spending Shock. Notes: Impulse response functions to an exogenous increase in real government
spending by one percent of GDP. The solid blue line displays the point estimate of VAR with the dotted blue lines
indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline scenario, i.e., when we
calibrate the model on the basis of the first VAR model, zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
; the dotted black line displays
model predictions when we calibrate the model for a government spending shock specific to the VAR specification.
In the first row, the red line and the dotted black line with squares display the empirical and theoretical response of
government spending specific to the VAR specification, respectively.
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F State-Dependent and Potential Asymmetry Effects of Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks
Recently, the literature investigating the effects of a rise in government consumption contrasted
the effects of fiscal policy on output across a number of countries’ characteristics. Using a panel
of 44 industrialized and developing countries, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh [2013] find that fiscal
multipliers increase with the level of development, decrease with the level of public debt, and are
lower in countries which are more open to international trade, or operating under flexible exchange
rate regimes. These findings have also been further explored by Corsetti Meier and Mu¨ller [2012]
who show in a panel of 17 OECD countries for the period 1975-2008 that fiscal multipliers are
larger under fixed than under flexible exchange rates, lower when debt is high and larger during
financial crises. A third noteworthy work is the paper by Brinca, Holter, Krusell, Malafry [2016] who
show both empirically and theoretically that there is a strong positive relationship across countries
between the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and wealth inequality captured by the Gini index.
Another key characteristic which appears to play a pivotal role in determining the size of the
output multiplier is the state of the business cycle. For the United States, evidence documented by
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] reveals that the size of fiscal multipliers is higher in recessions
than in expansions, i.e., ranging between 1 and 1.5 in recessions and between 0 and 0.5 in expansions.
These findings can be rationalized on the basis of the Keynesian approach which predicts that a rise in
government spending is less likely to crowd out private consumption and/or investment. Extending
their work to a panel of 30 0ECD countries, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013] estimate the impact
output multiplier to be essentially zero during expansions and about 0 to 0.5 in recessions. Moreover,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo [2011] show that monetary policy can affect government spending
multipliers as the fiscal multiplier is above 3 when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
binds. Intuitively, when the nominal interest rate does not respond to an increase in government
spending, there is no crowding out of investment or consumption, which thus leads to much higher
fiscal multipliers.
Whereas empirical and theoretical findings documented by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012],
[2013] and Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo [2011], among others, provide some support for the the
state dependence of fiscal multipliers, the debate about whether the size of the output multiplier
varies over the business cycle is unsettled both empirically and theoretically, see e.g., Canzoneri,
Collard, Dellas and Diba [2016]. In particular, Ramey and Zubairy [2017] have questioned the
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] findings. Using quarterly data from 1889 through 2015 for the
U.S, covering multiple large wars and deep recessions, the authors report the absence of any state
dependence of government spending multipliers.69
In the same vein, Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin [2015] tackles a new dimension of fiscal
policy. Collecting data for a panel of 29 OECD countries over the period from 1986 to 2008, the
authors explore empirically the size of the fiscal multiplier whether government spending is going up
or down. They show that not treating separately increases and decreases in government spending
can lead to biased state-dependent multiplier estimates. In particular, the long-run expansionary
multiplier (the multiplier associated with an increase in government spending) is 2.3 in times of
economic slack while the multiplier is only 1.3 in recession when no distinction is made between in-
creases and decreases in government spending. We also explore the implications of such a dimension
for the sectoral effects of a government spending shock by using our sample of 16 OECD coun-
tries over 1970-2007. However, due to data limitation, we do not differentiate between expansions
and recessions. As emphasized below, differentiating between contractionary and expansionary gov-
ernment spending shocks allows us to investigate whether labor mobility costs are symmetrical or
asymmetrical. If mobility costs are greater when shifting hours worked away from the non traded to
the traded sector than the other way around, the share of tradables in employment should increase
less when the shock is contractionary. Our evidence tends to corroborate this hypothesis.
F.1 Sectoral Effects of Government Spending Shocks in Good and Bad
Times
In the main text, we do not differentiate the effect of a rise in government spending on the relative size
of the non traded sector across the state of economy. In this subsection, we investigate empirically
whether the size of the increase in the share of non tradables, whether measured in total employment
or GDP terms, varies over the business cycle.
Identifying Recession and Expansion Periods. In order to contrast the sectoral effects
69It is worthwhile mentioning that Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] find that a government spending
multiplier on impact of 0.5 whether the economy is in recession or in expansion. Since in our paper we base
most of our analysis on impact effects, this empirical finding (on U.S. data only though) suggests that not
differentiating between good and bad times should not affect the results.
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of a government spending shock in expansions with those in recessions, we have to identify the
state of the economy across the business cycle. Following standard practice (see Riera-Crichton,
Vegh, and Vuletin [2015] for instance), we define a recession period as a situation where the output
gap declines, i.e., the economy is moving from its peak to trough, and an expansion period as a
situation where the output gap increases, i.e., the economy is moving from its trough to peak. Such
a definition implies that unemployment increases in recessions and declines in expansions. This
measure of the state of the economy can be criticized on the grounds that recession periods are not
necessarily periods of high unemployment, see Ramey and Zubairy [2017]. Denoting real GDP in
country i at time t by Yit, taking logarithm and applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of λ = 100 (as we use annual data), we obtain a measure of the output gap which allows













where Y¯it is the potential GDP at time t in country i. Once we have identified expansions and
recessions for each OECD country in our sample, we define a dummy variable DUk which takes i)
a value of one (i.e., DUE = 1) in expansions and 0 otherwise, ii) a value of one (i.e., DUR = 1) in
recessions and 0 otherwise.
Empirical Strategy. To assess the role of the state of economy for the transmission of fis-
cal shocks, we perform a two-stage estimation strategy. In the first step, we identify government
spending shocks in a structural VAR by adopting the Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identification
procedure procedure based on the assumption of delays between current output observation and
the implication of fiscal measures. In the second step, we use the estimated government spending
shocks to explore the state-dependency of the effects of an increase in government spending. Draw-
ing on previous studies, we conduct two robustness exercises in this step to explore the potential
implications of state-dependency effects:
- We augment the VAR specification with the set of dummy variables DUk (with k = R,E)
scaled by the size of the fiscal shock. This estimation strategy is advocated by the narrative
approach proposed by Ramey [2011] in which the military date dummy variable is embedded
in the standard VAR, but ordered before the other variables.
- A second route followed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013], Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and
Vuletin [2015] and Ramey and Zubairy [2017] is to use the Jorda`’s [2005] single-equation local
projection method. This approach has the advantage to easily accommodate state-dependence
in the response function of variables of interest to an exogenous government spending shock.
In accordance with the empirical strategy in the main text, the first step amounts to iden-
tifying government spending shocks by adopting the Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] identification
procedure based on the assumption of implementation delays. We thus adopt a Cholesky decompo-
sition in which government spending is ordered before the other variables so that the fiscal shock
is exogenous. We estimate a VAR model which includes government final consumption expen-
diture, real GDP, total hours worked, private investment, and the real consumption wage, i.e.,
zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it], with two lags which corresponds to the baseline model in the main text.
All quantities are logged, expressed in real terms and scaled by the working age population.
Once we have identified structural government spending shocks, i.e., denoted by ²G,it, we perform
a second step by estimating each VAR model augmented with the identified government spending
shocks, ordered first. More specifically, we consider the three following augmented VAR models to
explore the state-dependency of the effects of fiscal shocks:











where the shock is simply given by ²G,it in the baseline model 71a), ²RG,it = DU
R
it ²G,it in recessions
(eq. (71b)), ²EG,it = DU
E
it ²G,it in expansions (eq. (71c)) where DU
k
it (with k = R,E) is a dummy
variable that indicates the state of the economy i at time t when the shock hits. By exploring
empirically these three VAR specifications, we thus consider the same government spending shock
but allow all of the coefficients of the model to vary according to the state of the economy. To have
a reference point, we estimate all VAR specifications detailed in the main text and then we contrast
them with those obtained when the economy is in recession or in expansion.
Local Projection. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013] and Ramey and Zubairy
[2017], we alternatively use Jorda`’s [2005] projection method to estimate impulse responses in the
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second step. The first advantage of this method over the standard VAR approach is that it reduces
considerably the number of coefficients. The second advantage is that it does not impose the
dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and can accommodate non-linearities in the
response function. The Jorda` method amounts to running a series of regression for each horizon
h = 0, 1, 2, ... for each variable of interest. The linear model reads as follows:
xt+h = αh,i + βh,i .t+ ψh (L) zt−1 + γh .²G,it + νi,t, (72)
where αi and βi are the country fixed effects and country-specific linear trends respectively, x is the
logarithm of the variable of interest, z is a vector of control variables (i.e., past values of government
spending and of the variable of interest), ψh (L) is a polynomial (of order two) in the lag operator
and ²G,i,t is the identified government spending shock. While we allow for two lags on the variable
of interest and government spending collected in vector z, we consider the effects of a current
exogenous government spending shock. We thus construct the impulses responses directly from the
γh estimated coefficient which gives the response of x at time t + h to the shock ²G,t at time t.
We compute confidence intervals that correct for serial correlation by using Newey-West standard















+ αi,h + βi,h .t+ νi,t, (73)
where k = R,E, −k = E,R and DUk (with k = R,E) is a dummy variable that indicates the
state of the economy when the shock hits. Like for the VAR approach, our aim is to estimate the
coefficients of the model (other than deterministic terms) which are allowed to vary according to
the state of the economy. The impulse responses for the two regimes can be computed directly from
estimated coefficients γkh and γ
−k
h .
Descriptive Statistics. Before turning to estimates, it is useful to look at the descriptive
statistics related to expansions and recessions summarized in Table 9. The first two columns gives
the percentage of time expansion and recession regimes. Some features deserve some comments.
First, with the exception of Spain, the number of years of expansions are substantially higher than
those associated with recessions. As shown in the last line of Table 9, the average share of the
number of observations associated with an increasing output gap is 55% and thus is slightly higher
than that of observations associated with a declining output gap. This finding is well in line with
that reported in Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin [2015] who document that industrial countries
spend, on average, 50% of the time in a recessionary regime. While we will come back to this point
later, it is worth mentioning that both recessions and expansions can be associated with a positive
or a negative government spending shock as can be seen in the last four columns of Table 9.
Aggregate and Sectoral Effects. We first present the main results of our analysis using
the augmented VAR method. We generate impulse response functions which are normalized so
that government consumption increases by 1 percentage point of GDP. Figure 27 shows aggregate
and sectoral effects effects when augmenting each baseline VAR with the estimated structural fiscal
shock. The solid blue line reports results for the model (71a) which assumes that the effects of
²G,it are invariant to the state of the economy. The solid red line displays results when we restrict
the government spending shocks to occur when the economy is in recession and contrast them with
those obtained when the economy is in expansion (shown in the green line). In Figure 27 (and in
subsequent Figures 28 and 29 as well), the shaded bands are 90 percent confidence intervals for the
baseline scenario. Reassuringly, all conclusions drawn in the main text hold since estimates from the
state-dependent model lie within the confidence interval of those obtained from the baseline model
in which effects of fiscal shocks are invariant to the state of the economy. A detailed description of
our results is performed below.
First, as can be seen in the first row of Figure 27, the government spending shock is somewhat
less persistent in recessions. Second, focusing on the first two columns which report aggregate
effects of a government spending shocks, our evidence indicate that in accordance with empirical
findings documented by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013] who use a panel of 30 OECD countries,
output effects of an unanticipated government spending shock are of a greater magnitude when the
economy is in recession. More specifically, as can be seen in the first column of Figure 27, the fiscal
multiplier for output on impact is 0.5 in the baseline model and ranges from 0.1 in expansions and
1 in recessions.70 As can be seen in the third row, such an outcome is the result of a larger increase
in hours worked following a government spending shock. However, one can notice that the positive
impact of the government spending shock on the real consumption wage is less in recessions; more
precisely, the rise in W/PC is approximately as much as two times smaller than that in expansions.
70However, we find no significant difference between fiscal multipliers in the expansion regime and the
recession regime.
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Hours worked increase more on impact in recession though. Such an outcome could be the result of
an increased fraction of poor non credit constrained agents who are at risk of hitting the constraint;
according to the explanation put forward by Brinca et al. [2016], these agents react to the negative
wealth effect by increasing their labor supply substantially in order to avoid hitting the constraint.
Third, inspection of results in the fifth row reveals that the responses of investment and the current
account do not vary much across the state of the economy on impact. As a result, it is very likely
that private consumption increases by a larger amount in recessions. As suggested by Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko [2012], private expenditure are less likely to be crowded out since the economy
operates below its potential.
Fourth, turning to the sectoral multipliers for output and labor shown in the last two columns of
Figure 27, the conclusion that emerges is that a government spending shock increases sectoral hours
worked and output more in recessions. In particular, the adjustment in hours worked and output in
the traded sector is quite distinct whether the government spending shock occurs when the economy
is in recession or in expansion. The explanation lies in the fact that households supply more labor
when the economy is in recession, as mentioned above. Strikingly, our evidence shows that a rise in
public expenditure raises LT and Y T in recessions while both hours worked and output fall in the
traded sector during expansions. The reason is twofold. First, we find that government spending
shocks are somewhat less biased toward non tradables during recessions; however, the difference is
very moderate and not statistically significant. Second, less workers decide to shift hours worked
from one sector to another in recession than in expansion which is the main explanation of the
increase in traded output. We make inference of this result from the evidence related to changes in
sectoral labor shares which allow us to gauge the extent of labor mobility.
Non Tradable Content of Government Spending Shocks. To generate impulse response
functions of sectoral government consumption to our identified government spending shock, we
estimate a VAR model in panel format on annual data that includes unanticipated government
spending shocks ordered first, government spending, git, government consumption on non tradables,
gNit , and government consumption on tradables, g
T
it. As before, the shock is ²
G
it for the baseline model
or alternatively either ²RG,it in bad times or ²
E
G,it in good times when estimating the state-dependent
model.71 As can be seen in the second column of Figure 28, the tradable content of the government
spending shock is slightly larger in recession than that in expansion on impact. Because the non
traded sector is somewhat less intensive in the government spending shock when the economy is in
recession, incentives to reallocate resources toward the non traded sector are less.
Sectoral Composition Effects. The first two columns of Figure 29 show the dynamic ad-
justment of sectoral shares in employment and real GDP as well following a government spending
shock. As displayed in the red and green line, respectively, the fall in the traded goods share of
employment and real GDP in recession lies in the upper range of the confidence bound for the
baseline scenario while the decline in the share of tradables in expansion lies in the lower range.
Conversely, the share of non tradables increases more in expansions than in recessions. As stressed
above, the non traded sector is somewhat more intensive in the government spending shock which
results in greater incentives to move resources toward the non traded sector. In accordance with
this interpretation, the relative price of non tradables, P , appreciates more in expansions than in
recessions because the larger non tradable content of the government spending shock in the former
situation produces a greater excess demand in the non traded goods market. Whereas the non
traded sector is more intensive in the government spending shock in expansions, the difference in
the non tradable content of the shock between expansions and recessions is not large enough to
rationalize the rise in the share of non tradables in expansion relative to that in recession. As can
be seen in the second column of Figure 29, the share of non tradables in real GDP increases by 0.4
ppt of GDP in expansion and 0.1 ppt when the economy is in recession. Beside the non tradable
content of the government spending shock, such a discrepancy can be attributed to higher mobility
of labor across sectors. Our estimates reveal that more labor shifts from one sector to another in
expansions (displayed in the green line) than in recessions (displayed in the red line). As workers
are willing to shift more hours toward the non traded sector, they require a higher increase in non
traded wages, as can be seen in the last column of Figure 29. The reason is that the utility loss
from switching is increasing with the additional amount of hours worked. However, for a reason
which remains unexplained by our model, less workers decide to shift hours worked from one sector
to another in recession than in expansion. To rationalize our evidence, we believe that the model
should be extended to search frictions in the labor market with endogenous sectoral labor force




it], all quantities are logged, expressed in real terms
and scaled by the working age population. As mentioned above, data to construct time series for sectoral
government consumption expenditure are available for all countries in our sample except Canada. In an
effort to have a balanced panel and time series of a reasonable length, Australia (1998-2015) and Japan
(2005-2015) are removed from the sample which leaves us with 13 OECD countries over the period 1995-
2015. To be consistent, we estimate the first VAR model that includes aggregate variables for these 13
OECD countries only.
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participation decision. More precisely, in recession, demand is low for both traded and non traded
goods and thus firms post less job vacancies which reduces the marginal benefit of searching for a
job. As job search is lower, less people shift from one sector to another.
Local Projection. While our first results obtained by augmenting the VAR models with the
identified government spending shocks estimated in expansions or recessions show no significant
state-dependence effects, we present now the results using the Jorda`’s [2005] local projection ap-
proach. This robustness check also gives us the opportunity to test whether all of our results hold
when we depart from the VAR method for estimating the effects of a rise in government consump-
tion in the linear baseline model. Figure 30 shows the responses obtained with the local projections
methods to the three identified shocks: ²G,t for the linear model (the solid blue line and the shaded
area which indicates the 90 percent confidence bands), ²EG,it when the economy is in expansion (the
green line) and ²RG,it during slack states (the red line).
72 Overall, it turns out that differences are
rather moderate and state-dependence effects thus play a limited quantitative role in the dynamic
adjustment to a government spending shock.
F.2 Differentiating between Negative and Positive Government Spending
Shocks
We now investigate whether effects of government spending shocks depend on the sign of the shock.
Few papers have attempted to relax the assumption of symmetric government spending shocks.
To the best of our knowledge, only two examples exist. Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin [2015]
conduct an empirical analysis which reveal that estimation of state-dependent multipliers may un-
derestimate output effects of government spending shocks by not taking into account increases and
decreases in government spending. The authors use a panel of 29 OECD countries and estimate
state-dependent multipliers on semiannual data by taking into account whether the shock is contrac-
tionary or expansionary. Using a novel econometric procedure applied to the US economy over the
period 1966-2014, Barnichon and Matthes [2018], show that the fiscal multiplier does vary according
to the direction of the fiscal action.
While this analysis is beyond the scope of our paper, we find it interesting to evaluate whether
government spending going up or down matters for the size of the sectoral composition effects. It
is worth mentioning that we are not able to simultaneously allow for shocks’ asymmetry and state
dependence due to the small size of the sample in either cases; we can differentiate though the sectoral
effects according to whether government spending shocks are positive and negative. Importantly,
such a study can alternatively be viewed as an indirect test of our assumption of symmetry of
intersectoral labor mobility costs. The explanation is as follows. In our paper, we show that the
change in relative sector size depends on two factors, namely the non tradable intensity of government
spending shocks and the degree of labor mobility across sectors. While a rise in government spending
raises the relative size of the non traded sector because the non traded sector is intensive in the
government spending shock, the same logic applies to contractionary government spending shocks.
Hence, the share of non tradables should decline when government spending is going down, and
more so in countries where labor mobility across sectors is higher. In the main text, we consider
that workers’ costs of switching sectors are symmetric whether they move away from the traded to
the non traded sector or the other way around. Since a decline in government spending produces
a reallocation of labor toward the traded sector, evidence should indicate that the extent of labor
reallocation after a contractionary shock is identical to that following an expansionary shock. We
document evidence below which supports our assumption and thus indicates that workers’ costs of
switching sectors can be considered as symmetric between sectors. We may notice some differences,
quite moderate though. We find that labor shifts from the traded to the non traded sector are
higher than those from the non traded to the traded sector. However, at the same time, evidence
reveals that the non traded sector is more intensive in the government spending shock when public
expenditure are going up than if they are going down.
Empirical Strategy. To determine whether effects of fiscal shocks are asymmetric depending
on whether government spending is increasing or decreasing, we perform a two-stage procedure
similar to the one detailed in the previous section. In the first step and as detailed above, we
identify government spending shocks by adopting the Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] assumption
and thus adopt a Cholesky decomposition in which government spending is ordered before the other
variables so that the fiscal shock is exogenous. We estimate a VAR model which includes government
final consumption expenditure, real GDP, total hours worked, private investment, and the real
consumption wage, i.e., zit = [git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it]. Once we have identified the VAR model, we
72When estimating eq. (72) or (73), we lose observations from the end of the sample as the horizon h
increases. As discussed in Ramey and Zubairy [2017], the Jorda` method tends to produce erratic estimates
of γh at longer horizons. Since in our paper, our analysis focuses mainly on impact effects, we limit the time























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 27: Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences between Recessions and Expansions. Notes: Exogenous increase in government
final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue line reports the results for VAR models which are
augmented with the identified government spending shock, ²G,it in the first VAR model zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
.
The shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. The solid red (green)
line shows aggregate and sectoral effects of the same identified government spending shock except that changes in
public expenditure are implemented when the economy is in recession (expansion). Sample: 16 OECD countries,
1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 28: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Government Final
Consumption Expenditure on Non Tradables and Tradables: Assessing Differences between
Recessions and Expansions. Notes: Exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. The
government spending shock is identified by estimating a VAR model that includes real government final consumption
expenditure, GDP (constant prices), total hours worked, private fixed investment, and the real consumption wage.
The responses of government final consumption expenditure on non tradables (i.e., GN ) and tradables (i.e., GT ) to
the identified government spending shock are displayed by solid blue lines with the shaded area indicating the 90
percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. Sample: 13 OECD countries, 1995-2015, annual data.
The solid red (green) line shows the effects of the same identified government spending shock except that changes in
public expenditure are implemented when the economy is in recession (expansion).
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Figure 29: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences between Recessions and Expansions. Notes: Exogenous increase in government
final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue line reports the results for VAR models which are
augmented with the identified government spending shock, ²G,it in the first VAR model zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
.
The shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. The solid red (green)
line shows aggregate and sectoral effects of the same identified government spending shock except that changes in
public expenditure are implemented when the economy is in recession (expansion). Sample: 16 OECD countries,
1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 30: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock: Assessing Differences
between Recessions and Expansions Using Local Projection. Notes: Exogenous increase in govern-
ment final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue line reports the results obtained by using Jorda`’s
[2005] local projection method to estimate impulse responses. For the baseline case, we estimate eq. (72) where the
government spending shock is identified by adopting the Blanchard and Perotti [2002] assumption. The shaded area
indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds. The solid red (green) line shows aggregate and sectoral effects of the same
identified government spending shock except that changes in public expenditure are implemented when the economy
is in recession (expansion). Sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
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split the estimated exogenous government spending shocks depending on whether ²G,it has positive
or negative values. For this purpose we build two dummy variables, denoted by DU+G,it and DU
−
G,it,
that indicates whether the government spending shock is expansionary or contractionary:
DU+G,it = 1 if ²G,it > 0 and 0 otherwise, (74a)
DU−G,it = 1 if ²G,it < 0 and 0 otherwise. (74b)
As can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, more than half of the identified government spend-
ing shocks are contractionary. The last four columns of the Table 9 show the fraction of expan-
sions/recessions which are associated with increases/decreases in government spending. For example,
column 6 indicates that OECD countries spend, on average, 30.6 percent of the time in expansions
with government spending going down. Furthermore, when the economy is in recession, government
spending is going down in about 23.7 percent of the time, see column 7. All of these empirical
facts are well in line with those documented by Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin [2015]. While
the authors consider a panel of 29 OECD countries and estimate state-dependent multipliers along
four dimensions by using semiannual data, our own sample size prevents us from performing such an
analysis; we thus estimate the same VAR model by separating increases and decreases in government
spending and do not differentiate between expansions and recessions.
In the second step, the series of previously identified fiscal shocks is used to assess the dynamic
effects of government spending on aggregate and sectoral macroeconomic variables of interest. Ac-
cordingly, we replicate the exercise of the previous section and consider augmented VAR and Jorda`’s
[2005] local projection approaches. We augment each VAR model with the identified government
spending shocks, ordered first, and consider the following VAR models:











where the shock is simply given by ²G,it in the baseline model, ²+G,it = DU
+
it ²G,it when government
spending is expansionary, ²−G,it = DU
−
it ²G,it when government spending is contractionary, where
DUk (with k = +,−) is a dummy variable that indicates whether the spending shock is positive
or negative. By exploring empirically these three VAR specifications, we thus consider the same
government spending shock but allow all of the coefficients of the model to vary according whether
government spending increases or decreases. To have a reference point, we estimate all VAR speci-
fications detailed in the main text and then we contrast them with those obtained when the State
spends more or cuts expenditure.
Next, in order to allow for non-linearities in the response function, we alternatively adopt the
Jorda` method and thus estimate (72) for each horizon h. To differentiate between positive and
















+ αi,h + βi,h .t+ νi,t, (76)
where k = +,−, −k = −,+ and DUk (with k = +,−) is a dummy variable that indicates whether
the shock is positive or negative. Like for the VAR approach, our aim is to estimate the coefficients
of the model which are allowed to vary according to whether the government spending shocks are
expansionary or contractionary.
Aggregate and Sectoral Effects. The first two columns of Figure 31 show aggregate effects of
a government spending shock in the solid blue line and contrast the effects of an expansionary gov-
ernment spending displayed in the green line with those when the shock is contractionary. Because
a decline in government spending leads to opposite effects to those triggered by increases in public
purchases, for comparison purposes, we take the opposite of all impulse responses in the former case
by considering a rise in government spending by 1% of GDP. As shown in the first row, decreases
in government spending display a smaller magnitude than increases in G but the difference is quite
moderate. The second row reports the output effects of a government spending shock. Like Riera-
Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin [2015], we find that the output multiplier is smaller when government
spending is going down. However, as can be seen in the third row, the fiscal multiplier for hours
worked is higher when the shock is contractionary. Given our normalization, it means that hours
worked fall sharply when government spending is going down. We provide below an explanation to
this result which is based on the asymmetry in labor mobility costs.
The last two columns of Figure 31 show the effects on output and hours worked in the traded and
the non traded sector. The second row reveals that differences in the estimated effects of sectoral
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output multipliers are quite moderate if not absent. However, the responses of sectoral hours worked
are quite distinct whether the shock is contractionary or expansionary (but the differences are not
statistically significant). As can be seen in the third row, while the fiscal multiplier for employment
in the traded sector is negative when the government spending shock is expansionary, it turns out to
be positive when the shock is contractionary. This result means that traded hours decline whether
government spending is going up or down. The difference is that in the latter case, the negative
impact on LT caused by the decline in labor supply more than offsets the positive impact triggered
by the reallocation of labor toward the traded sector. As discussed below, the shift of labor toward
the traded sector is less when the government spending is going down since both the non tradable
intensity in the government spending shock and the degree of labor mobility are lower.
Non Tradable Content of Government Spending Shocks. Figure 32 contrasts the effects
of a government spending shock on its two components when the shock is expansionary (displayed
in the green line) with those when the shock is contractionary (displayed in the red line). When
government spending is going up, the non traded sector sector is strongly intensive in the government
spending shock on impact while when government spending is going down, the non tradable content
of public expenditure is lower and thus the rise in the relative size of the traded sector should be
less. Because the non traded sector is less intensive in the government spending shock when the
shock is contractionary, incentives to reallocate resources toward the traded sector are lower.
Sectoral Composition Effects. The first two columns of Figure 33 show the changes in the
sectoral shares measured in terms of employment and real GDP as well. Evidence reveals that
changes in sectoral shares of employment are less when government spending is going down. As
emphasized above, there are two explanations to this result. First, the non tradable content of
government spending cuts is lower than that of government spending increases. As can be seen in
the third column, the change in the relative price is less pronounced when the shock is contractionary
which corroborates our result related to higher intensity of government spending in traded goods
when the shock is contractionary. In other words, the relative price of non tradables depreciates
by a smaller amount if government expenditure are decreased. As a result, there are less incentives
to shift labor toward the traded sector. Because non traded wages decline less, the real aggregate
wage falls by a smaller amount. This result is also in line with our findings in Figure 31, see the
fourth row of the first two columns. The second explanation to smaller changes in sectoral shares
of employment when the shock is contractionary is lower labor mobility across sectors. In line with
this hypothesis, the change in the relative wage displays a much greater magnitude when the shock
is contractionary. In other words, our evidence suggest that workers experience greater mobility
costs when shifting hours worked from the non traded to the traded sector produces; these costs are
reflected in a greater sectoral wage differential. It is worth mentioning that the differences are not
statistically significant though. As explained below, these larger mobility costs can rationalize the
greater response of labor supply when government spending is going down.
Labor Mobility and Asymmetry in the Response of Aggregate Labor Supply. Gov-
ernment spending cuts produce an excess supply in the non traded goods markets. When labor
mobility costs are larger, less labor moves away from the non traded to the traded sector. As a
result, the excess supply in the non traded goods market is greater which should depreciate the
relative price of non tradables more. The large depreciation in the relative price of non tradables
provides high incentives to shift capital toward the traded sector. The capital-labor ratio in the
traded sector increases more while the capital-labor ratio in the non traded sector declines more.
Thus, non traded wages decrease sharply which in turn drives down the aggregate wage and thus
encourage households to supply less labor. Moreover, as a result of the greater depreciation in the
relative price of non tradables, the real aggregate wage declines less than if labor mobility were
higher. This chain of events can rationalize our evidence, except for the change in the relative price
which is found to display a smaller magnitude when the shock is contractionary.
Local Projection. Figure 34 shows the responses obtained with the local projections methods
to the three identified shocks: ²G,t for the linear model (the solid blue line and the shaded area
which indicates the 90 percent confidence bands), ²+G,it when government spending goes up (the
green line) and ²−G,it when government spending goes down (the red line). By and large, the results
are similar to those obtained when estimating a VAR model. Given our normalization, hours worked
fall sharply when government spending is going down. Finally, less labor shifts toward the traded
sector as a result of greater mobility costs when the government spending is contractionary.
G Solving the Small Open Economy Model and Solutions
for Temporary Government Spending Shocks
This section presents in more details our open economy setup with imperfect mobility of labor
and adjustment costs to physical capital accumulation. Then we provide the main steps for the
derivation of formal solutions following a temporary government spending shock splits between non
90



































































































































































Figure 31: Aggregate and Sectoral Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences between Expansionary and Contractionary Government Spending
Shocks. Notes: Exogenous change in government final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue
line reports the results for VAR models which are augmented with the identified government spending shock, ²G,it,
from the first VAR model zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
. The shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds
obtained by bootstrap sampling. The solid red (green) line shows aggregate and sectoral effects of a negative (positive)
government spending shock. Sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 32: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock on Government Final
Consumption Expenditure on Non Tradables and Tradables: Assessing Differences between
Expansionary and Contractionary Government Spending Shocks. Notes: Exogenous Change in
government consumption by 1% of GDP. The government spending shock is identified by estimating a VAR model
that includes real government final consumption expenditure, GDP (constant prices), total hours worked, private
fixed investment, and the real consumption wage. The responses of government final consumption expenditure on
non tradables (i.e., GN ) and tradables (i.e., GT ) to the identified government spending shock are displayed by solid
blue lines with the shaded area indicating the 90 percent confidence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. Sample:
13 OECD countries, 1995-2015, annual data. The solid red (green) line shows the effects of a negative (positive)
government spending shock.
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Figure 33: Sectoral Composition Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock:
Assessing Differences between Expansionary and Contractionary Government Spending
Shocks. Notes: Exogenous change in government final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue
line reports the results for VAR models which are augmented with the identified government spending shock, ²G,it
from the first VAR model zit =
[
git, yit, lit, jeit, wC,it
]
. The shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds
obtained by bootstrap sampling. The solid red (green) line shows aggregate and sectoral effects of a negative (positive)
government spending shock. Sample: 16 OECD countries, 1970-2007, annual data.
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Figure 34: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock: Assessing Differences
between Expansionary and Contractionary Government Spending Shocks Using Local Pro-
jection. Notes: Exogenous increase in government final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. The solid blue line
reports the results obtained by using Jorda`’s [2005] local projection method to estimate impulse responses. For the
baseline case, we estimate eq. (72) where the government spending shock is identified by adopting the Blanchard and
Perotti [2002] assumption. The shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence bounds. The solid red (green) line
shows aggregate and sectoral effects of contractionary (expansionary) government spending shocks. For comparison
purposes, we consider an increase in government consumption in both cases which amounts to take opposite responses




The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and investment that
















subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− T (t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− PJ (P (t)) J(t), (78)
and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t). (79)
We assume that capital accumulation is subject to increasing and convex cost of net investment:






























+ δK , (81c)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (81d)















together with intratemporal decisions on allocation between tradables and non tradables




























JT (t) = (1− αJ)PJ(t)J(t), (82f)
with consumption, investment and wage indices described by
PC(t) =
[











+ (1− ϑ) (WN (t))²+1] 1²+1 . (83c)
In an open economy model with a representative agent who has perfect foresight, a constant rate of
time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate
an interior solution. Setting β = r? into (81d) yields λ = λ¯.
We assume constant returns to scale technology of production. Production functions take a
Cobb-Douglas form.


















P jY j −W jLj −RKj} . (85)
Since capital can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products in the traded
and non traded sectors equalizes while costly labor mobility implies a wage differential across sectors:
ZT
(








)1−θN ≡WN (t), (86c)
where kj ≡ Kj/Lj denotes the capital-labor ratio for sector j = T,N . Aggregating over the two
sectors gives us the resource constraint for capital:
KT (t) +KN (t) = K(t). (87)
G.2 Solving the Model
Government spending is a fixed fraction ωG of GDP, Y . Government expenditure on non tradables
and tradables are fixed fraction of government consumption at ωNG and 1 − ωNG , respectively. To
fully describe equilibrium, we impose the market clearing condition for non tradables. Using the
fact that RK +WL = Y T + PY N and inserting the market clearing condition for non tradables
into (78) gives the market clearing condition for tradables, i.e., the current account. Government
spending rules, and market clearing conditions can be summarized as follows:
G(t) = ωGY (t), (88a)
PGN (t) = ωGNG(t), (88b)
GT (t) = (1− ωGN )G(t), (88c)
Y N (t) = CN (t) +GN (t) + JN (t), (88d)
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + Y T (t)− JT (t)− CT (t)−GT (t), (88e)
YR(t) = Y T (t) + PY N (t), (88f)
where YR(t) is real GDP.
Inserting (81a) into (82a)-(82b) allows us to solve for consumption in non tradables and trad-




. Inserting (81b) into (82c)-(82d) allows us to solve for labor supply to




. Plugging first the solutions for LT
and LN into the resource constraint for capital, the system consisting of (86a)-(86c) and (87) can












into R = ZT
(
kT
)−θT allows us to solve for the return




. Inserting short-run solutions for sectoral capital-labor
ratios and sectoral labor into production functions (84a)-(84b) allows us to solve for sectoral output:

















Inserting first solutions for CN and Y N , and substituting JN described by (82e) while using



























Eq. (89) can be solved for the relative price of non tradables:
P (t) = P
(
λ¯,K(t), Q(t), GN (t)
)
. (90)
Making use of (79)-(80) and (88d), the capital accumulation equation reads as follows:
K˙(t) =









Inserting (90) into solutions for non traded output, consumption in non tradables, optimal invest-
ment decision, and the return of domestic capital and plugging them back into the physical capital
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accumulation equation (91) and the dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital stock (81e)
and making use of (88b), the adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described
by a dynamic system which comprises two equations that form a separate subsystem in K and Q,
i.e.,
K˙(t) ≡ Υ(K(t), Q(t), G(t)) , (92a)
Q˙(t) ≡ Σ(K(t), Q(t), G(t)) . (92b)




and (88d), the current account equation can be rewritten as follows:







Y N (t)− CN (t)−GN (t)) , (93)
Inserting first (90) into solutions for traded and non traded output, consumption in tradables and
non tradables, optimal investment decision, plugging back them back into (93) and making use of
(88b)-(88c), the accumulation equation for traded bonds reads as:
B˙(t) ≡ r?B + Ξ (K,Q,G) . (94)
Linearizing (92a)-(92b) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, assuming saddle-path stability
and denoting the eigenvalue by νi, the general solutions for the capital stock and its shadow value are
K(t)− K˜ =∑2i=1Dieνit and Q(t)− K˜ =∑2i=1 ωi2Dieνit where (1, ωi2)′ is the eigenvector associated
with eigenvalue νi. Linearizing (94) around the steady-state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and
Q(t), solving and invoking the transversality condition, yields the nations’s intertemporal solvency
condition:





where we denote the steady-state value with a tilde, B0 and K0 are initial foreign asset position




ν1−r? with partial derivatives evaluated at
the steady-state.
Setting K˙ = Q˙ = B˙ = 0 into (79), (81e) and (88e), the initial steady-state reduces to:
ZT
(
1− θT ) [kT (K˜, P˜ , λ¯)]−θT = PJ (P˜) (r? + δ) , (96a)
Y N
(






+ αJ P˜αJ−1δKK˜ +GN , (96b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(






+ (1− αJ) P˜αJ δKK˜ +GT , (96c)





These four equations jointly determine the values for P , K, B and λ¯ at the initial long-run equilib-
rium. Eq. (96d) shows that assumption β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition
and the steady state since the term Ψ1 ia a function of eigenvalues and eigenvectors.
G.3 Solving for Temporary Government Spending Shocks
Because the endogenous response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal shock is hump-






e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt] , (97)
where g > 0 parametrizes the magnitude of the exogenous fiscal shock, ξ > 0 and χ > 0 are (positive)
parameters which are set in order to capture the non-monotonic endogenous response of G(t). We
assume that the rise in government consumption is split between non traded and traded goods in
accordance with their respective shares, ωGN = PG
N
G and ωGT =
GT











In line with the evidence we document in the main text and subsection B.2, ωGN refers to the non
tradables content of government consumption and government spending shock as well.






















where the coefficients of the Jacobian matrix are partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state,
e.g., ΥX = ∂Υ∂X withX = K,Q, and the direct effects of an exogenous change in government spending
on K and Q are described by ΥG = ∂Υ∂G and ΣG =
∂Σ
∂G , also evaluated at the steady-state.
We denote by V =
(
V 1, V 2
)




and we denote by









































where dG(t) = G(t)− G˜ and we set
Φ1 = [(ΥK − ν2)ΥG +ΥQΣG] , (101a)
Φ2 = [(ΥK − ν1)ΥG +ΥQΣG] . (101b)
As will be useful later, in order to express solutions in a compact form, we set:










Θ1 = (1− g) ν1 + ξ
ν1 + χ
, (102c)














































where Γ1 and Θ1 are given by (102a) and (102c), respectively.










Because ν2 > 0, for the solution to converge to the steady-state, the term in brackets must be nil




















= −Γ2 (1−Θ2) , (105)
where Γ2 and Θ2 are given by (102b) and (102d), respectively.
Inserting first X2(0), the ’stable’ solution for X2(t), i.e., consistent with convergence toward the



























Eq. (106) corresponds to eq. (27b) in the main text.
Using the definition of Xi(t) (with i = 1, 2) given by (99), we can recover the solutions for K(t)
and Q(t):
K(t)− K˜ = X1(t) +X2(t), (107a)
Q(t)− Q˜ = ω12X1(t) + ω22X2(t). (107b)
Eqs. (107) correspond to eqs. (26) in the main text.
















Eq. (108) corresponds to eq. (27a) in the main text.
Linearizing the current account equation (94) around the steady state, substituting the solutions
for K(t) and Q(t) given by (107), solving and invoking the transversality condition, yields the
solution for traded bonds:
B(t)− B˜ = ω
1
B






















+ Γ2 (1−Θ2)− Γ1 (1−Θ1)
]
, with ΞK = ∂Ξ∂K , ΞQ =
∂Ξ
∂Q , and
ΞG = ∂Ξ∂G evaluated at the steady-state, and Θ
′ = (1− g) r?+ξr?+χ , and Θ′i = Θi r
?+ξ
r?+χ (with i = 1, 2).
To ultimately remain solvent, the open economy must satisfy the following condition:
B˜ −B0 = − ω
1
B











Γ2 (1−Θ′2). Eq. (110) corresponds to eq. (29) in the main text.
H Solving Analytically the Model without Capital
In this section, we provide the main steps to solve the two-sector model without capital accumulation.
This enables us to shed some light on the implications of a difficulty in reallocating labor across
sectors for the fiscal transmission. To ease the interpretation of analytical results, we set the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 The elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², is higher than the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for labor, σL.
In order to clearly differentiate the intertemporal from intratemporal channel, we assume that
instantaneous utility for aggregate consumption takes a CARA form. The expressions derived below
are identical to those shown in the main text by setting σC = 1.
H.1 First-Order Conditions
The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and investment that
















subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +W (t)L(t)− T (t)− PC (P (t))C(t). (112)
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (112) by λ, the first-order conditions charac-











λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (113c)
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and the transversality condition limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0. In an open economy model with a rep-
resentative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access to
world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution. This standard
assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a
discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain constant over time from
thereon, i.e. λ = λ¯.
Once aggregate consumption and labor supply have been chosen, households decide to allocate
consumption expenditure and total hours worked to tradables and non tradables:
























where consumption and wage indices are given by (83a) and (83c) respectively.
Both the traded and non traded sectors use labor, LT and LN , according to linearly homogenous
production functions:
Y j(t) = Lj(t). (115)
Both sectors face a labor cost equal to the wage rate, i.e., WT and WN , respectively. The traded
sector and non traded sector are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The first order conditions
derived from profit-maximization state that factors are paid to their respective marginal revenue:
1 =WT (t), (116a)
P =WN (t). (116b)
H.2 Solving the Model
Government spending rules are those described by eqs. (88a)-(88c). Market clearing conditions can
be summarized as follows:
Y N (t) = CN (t) +GN (t), (117a)
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + Y T (t)− CT (t)−GT (t), (117b)
where we used the fact that Y T +PY N =WTLT +WNLN and inserted (117a) into (112) to obtain
(117b). As will be clear later, it is useful to remind a number of properties and introduces some
definitions:
Y (t) = Y T (t) + P (t)Y N (t) =W (t)L(t), (118a)
Y (t) = PC(t)C(t) +G(t) +NX(t), (118b)












where Y (t) and YR(t) are nominal and real GDP.
We assume that the rise in government spending is split between non tradables and tradables










Log-linearizing (117a), making use of (88b) and dividing both sides by initial GDP leads to:
αLLˆ




where we used the fact that PdGN (t) = ωGNdG(t). Inserting first (113a) into (114a), and (113b)
together with (116a)-(116b) into (114c), totally differentiating, leads to:
CˆN (t) = −σC ˆ¯λ− [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] Pˆ (t), (121a)
LˆN (t) = [² (1− αL) + σLαL] Pˆ (t) + σL ˆ¯λ. (121b)
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Plugging (121a)-(121b) into (120) allows us to solve for the relative price of non tradables expressed
in deviation in percentage from the initial steady-state:
Pˆ (t) =









where we set Ψ
Ψ = αL [² (1− αL) + σLαL] + ωCαC [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] > 0. (123)
Eq. (122) corresponds to eq. (31) in the main text.










where we used the fact that dGT (t) = (1− ωGN ) dG(t). Inserting first (113a) into (114b), and
(113b) together with (116a)-(116b) into (114d), totally differentiating, leads to:
CˆT (t) = −σC ˆ¯λ+ αC (φ− σC) Pˆ (t), (125a)
LˆT (t) = −αL (²− σL) Pˆ (t) + σL ˆ¯λ. (125b)
We set
ΥNG =
[(1− αL)αL (²− σL) + ωC (1− αC)αC (φ− σC)]
Ψ
> 0, (126a)
ΥG = ΥNGωGN + (1− ωGN ) > 0. (126b)









where ΥG > 0 is given by (126b).
To avoid unnecessary complications, we solve the model by assuming that the endogenous re-




which amounts to setting ξ = χ into eq. (97).
Substituting the law of motion of government spending (128) and solving leads to the general






























Eq. (129) corresponds to eq. (32) while eq. (130) corresponds to eq. (33) in the main
text.
Plugging first (122) into (125), setting B˙ = 0 while remembering that government spending is
restored back toward its initial level in the long-run, and making use of (130) leads to a system that
allows us to solve for the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and the












g < 0. (131b)
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where (131b) is equivalent to (130) and we set
Γ = [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] [ωC (1− αC)αC (φ− σC) + (1− αL)αL (²− σL)]
+ [(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ] Ψ > 0. (132)
The two equations (131a)-(131b) jointly determine the steady-state changes for B and λ¯ following
a government spending shock since the assumption β = r? implies that temporary policies have
permanent effects. Eq. (131a) indicates that a temporary increase in G unambiguously lowers the
stock of net foreign assets.







g > 0, (133)
where Γ > 0, Ψ > 0, ΥG > 0, ξ > 0, and g > 0. Eq. (133) corresponds to eq. (34)
in the main text. Since the marginal utility of wealth permanently increases and government
spending is restored back toward its initial level, eq. (122) shows that the relative price of non
tradables unambiguously depreciates in the long-run as the result as the negative wealth effect
lowers expenditure on non tradables.
Before evaluating the short-run effects of the fiscal shock, it is straightforward to show that Γ
given by eq. (132) satisfies:
Γ > [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] ΥNGΨ,




(αLσL + ωCαCσC) < 1, (134)
where Γ > 0, Ψ > 0, and ΥNG > 0.
H.3 Impact Effects of a Temporary Government Spending Shock
Evaluating (122) at time t = 0, inserting (133), and using the fact that dG(0)Y = g > 0 (see eq.
(128)), leads to the initial response of the relative price of non tradables:
Pˆ (0) =
{


















The second line of eq. (135) corresponds to eq. (35) in the main text. When the rise
in government spending, G(t), is split between tradables and non tradables, the relative price of
non tradables may appreciate or depreciate. For clarity purposes, let us consider two polar cases.
If the government spending shock is fully biased toward non tradables, i.e., ωGN = 1, then ωGT =
1−ωGN = 0 on the RHS of eq. (135). Due to inequality (134), i.e., 0 < ΨΥ
N
G
Γ (αLσL + ωCαCσC) < 1,
along with and 0 < r
?
ξ+r? < 1, a rise in G(t) unambiguously appreciates the relative price of
non tradables. Conversely, if the government spending shock is fully biased toward tradables, i.e.,
ωGT = 1, then the first term on the RHS of eq. (135) vanishes. Thus, the relative price of non
tradables depreciates. Intuitively, a rise in GT while keeping GN fixed, leads to a negative wealth
effect which lowers CN . As a result, an excess supply shows up in the non traded goods market which
leads to a depreciation in the relative price of non tradables. To conclude about the appreciation of
the relative price on impact, Pˆ (0), we first explore its relationship with the non tradable content of














where we used the fact that:




Since Pˆ (0) is monotonically increasing with ωGN , there is a critical value ω¯GN so that Pˆ (0) > 0 for
ωGN > ω¯GN .
Substituting the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth given by eq.
(133) into (121b), and multiplying both sides by αL leads to the initial reaction of non traded labor
from initial steady-state in total labor units:
αLLˆ
N (0) = αL [² (1− αL) + αLσL] Pˆ (0) + αLσLΨΥGΓ
r?
ξ + r?
g > 0, (137)
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where Pˆ (0) > 0 as long as ωGN > ω¯GN . According to (137), a government spending shock un-
ambiguously increases non traded labor (and thus non traded output). The change in non traded
labor is the result of two reinforcing effects. First, as shown by the first term on the RHS of (137),
a fiscal shock tends to increase hours worked in the non traded sector by raising the wage in this
sector (remind that WN = P ), and all the more so the greater the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non traded employment, ². Second, as can be seen in the second term on the RHS of
(137), which is positive, the negative wealth effect causes agents to supply more labor, which raises
LN in percent of total employment by an amount equal to αL.
Substituting the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth given by eq.
(133) into (125b) and multiplying both sides by 1− αL leads to the initial reaction of traded labor
from initial steady-state in total labor units:
(1− αL) LˆT (0) = − (1− αL)αL (²− σL) Pˆ (0) + (1− αL)σLΨΥGΓ
r?
ξ + r?
g ≶ 0. (138)
According to (138), as long as ² > σL, the initial reaction of traded labor to a fiscal shock is the
result of two opposite effects. More precisely, the first term on the RHS of (138) captures the
impact of increased non traded wages on LT . On the one hand, a higher WN causes a shift of labor
away from the traded sector proportional to ². On the other hand, the subsequent increase in the
aggregate wage provides an incentive to supply more labor, and all the more so the higher the value
of σL. When ² > σL, the former effect more than offsets the latter. Hence, as non traded wages
go up, LT falls. The second term on the RHS of (138) indicates that the negative wealth effect
increases total hours worked, the traded sector receiving a share equal to (1− αL). While the effect
of a government spending shock on LT is ambiguous, traded labor falls, in line with the evidence,
as long as the elasticity of labor supply, σL, is not too high.
We now investigate the impact of a government spending shock on sectoral output (or alterna-
tively labor since Y j = Lj) shares. To begin with, real GDP which we denote by YR is equal to the
sum of value added at constant prices, as described by eq. (118c). Using the fact that Y j(t) = Lj(t),
totally differentiating (118c) gives:
YˆR(t) = αLLˆN (t) + (1− αL) LˆT (t). (139)
Inserting (121b) and (125b) into (139), real GDP growth can be rewritten as follows:
YˆR(t) = σL ˆ¯λ+ αLσLPˆ . (140)
According to (140), a government spending shock impinges on real GDP through two channels; first,
by encouraging agents to supply more labor, the negative wealth effect pushes up real GDP; second,
since the relative price of non tradables appreciates, non traded firms are encouraged to produce and
thus to hire more; as workers’ incur mobility costs, non traded firms have to pay higher wages which
increase the aggregate wage, W , in proportion to the non tradable content of labor compensation,
αL; consequently, agents are encouraged to supply more hours worked which further increases real
GDP.
To compute the change in the sectoral output share calculated as the growth differential between








Yˆ T (t)− YˆR(t)
)
. (141)
The first and the second term on the RHS of eq. (141) corresponds to the response of output share
in the non traded and traded sector in total output units. More precisely, the change in the sectoral
output share is measured by the product of the growth differential between output of sector j and
real GDP and the share of sector j in GDP.
Left-multiplying (140) by αL and subtracting the resulting expression from (121b) gives the
response of the output share of non tradables:
αL
(
Yˆ N (t)− YˆR(t)
)
= αL (1− αL) ²Pˆ (t), (142)
where Pˆ (t) corresponds to the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables in percentage
deviation from trend (see eq. (122)). Evaluating (142) at time t = 0 and inserting (135) gives the
response of the share of non tradables in real GDP to a government spending shock:
αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
= αL (1− αL) ²Pˆ (0),
=
αL (1− αL) ²
Ψ
{







where ΥG = ΥNGωGN + ωGT > 0. The first line of eq. (143) corresponds to eq. (36) in the
main text. The response of the output share of non tradables to a government spending shock is
positive as long as the relative price of non tradables appreciates impact, i.e., if ωGN > ω¯GN .
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H.4 Output Share of Non Tradables and Labor Mobility across Sectors
Totally differentiating the response of output share of non tradables to a government spending shock
described by eq. (143) with respect to ² leads to:
∂αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
∂²









According to (144), the relationship between the positive response of output share of non tradables
and the degree of labor mobility across sectors is ambiguous. On the one hand, as shown by the first
term in brackets on the RHS of (144), a rise in the parameter ² amplifies the reallocation of labor
toward the non traded sector and thus amplifies the rise in the share of non tradables. On the other
hand, the rise in the degree of labor mobility also mitigates the rise in the output share as higher
mobility increases further the shadow value of wealth which amplifies the crowding out of private
consumption by public spending and thus moderates the excess demand in the non traded goods
market. Consequently, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a lower amount which
reduces the incentive to increase non traded output. While we address this ambiguity numerically
in the main text when we simulate the full model with physical capital accumulation subject to
adjustment costs, we provide a formal proof below that
∂αL(Yˆ N (0)−YˆR(0))
∂² > 0 in a model with labor
only.






To show that inequality (144) holds, we have to make assumptions. We are able to sign expressions
in two polar cases: ξ → ∞ and ξ → 0. The former and the latter case correspond to situations
where the government spending shock is weakly persistent (i.e., G increases initially and is restored
back toward its initial level) and highly persistent (i.e., the fiscal shock is permanent).
The impact response of the relative price of non tradables can be rewritten as follows:








where the first term on the RHS of eq. (146) corresponds to the initial response of the relative price
of non tradables when the government spending shock is fully biased toward non tradables, i.e., ωGN
is set to 1:
Pˆ (0) =
{



























[αLσL + ωCαCσC ]









Before investigating whether the elasticity −∂Pˆ (0)∂² ²Pˆ (0) is smaller than 1, we first focus on the first
term on the RHS of (148), i.e.,
(
−∂Pˆ (0)∂² ²Pˆ (0)
) ∣∣∣
ωGN=1
. We explore the magnitude of the elasticity of
(148) when ξ →∞ and when ξ → 0. The former and the latter case correspond to situations where
the government spending shock is weakly persistent (i.e., G increases initially and is restored back
toward its initial level) and highly persistent (i.e., the fiscal shock is permanent).
As will be useful later, we have to determine the relationship between ΨΥ
N
G






[(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ] + [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] ΥNG
. (149)








where Ψ is given by eq. (123). The term ΥNG can take negative values when ² is close to 0, is
increasing with ² and reaches its highest value of 1 when we let ² → ∞. Differentiating (149) with







∂² [(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ]{
[(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ] + [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] ΥNG
}2 > 0,
=











and lim²→∞Ψ = ∞, the initial reaction of the relative price to a government spending shock is

























A rise in ² mitigates the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables by amplifying the increase
in the supply of non tradables and by reducing the excess of demand for non tradables. First, in
countries where labor is more mobile across sectors, a government spending shock biased toward
non tradables leads to a larger increase in non traded output which mitigates the appreciation in the
relative price of non tradables. Second, as ² takes higher values, the wealth effect becomes larger so
that private consumption is crowded out by a larger amount which results in a lower excess demand
of non tradables.
Case ωGN = 1: A Weakly Persistent Fiscal Shock: ξ →∞













= −gαL (1− αL)
Ψ2
< 0. (154)
Combining (153) and (154), the elasticity (in absolute terms) of the impact response of the relative











αL (1− αL) ²
Ψ
< 1. (155)
Since Ψ > αL² (1− αL), the elasticity is strictly smaller than one and thus the RHS of eq. (144) is
unambiguously positive.
Case ωGN = 1: A Highly Persistent Fiscal Shock



















= −gαL (1− αL)
Ψ2
[
















∂² is given by eq. (151). Computing the following term:[






Ψ [(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ]
Γ
, (158)













= −gαL (1− αL) [(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ]
ΨΓ2
[




Calculating the elasticity in absolute terms of Pˆ (0) w.r.t. ² by combining (159) and (160), we have




















To show (161), it is useful to write down the following properties:
Ψ = αL (1− αL) (²− σL) + ωCαC (1− αC) (φ− σC) + αLσL + ωCαCσC , (162a)
ΥNGΨ = Ψ− (αLσL + ωCαCσC) , (162b)
Γ = Ψ (σL + ωCσC)− (αLσL + ωCαCσC)2 , (162c)
where we made use of (162b) to obtain (162c), i.e.,
Γ = Ψ
{
[(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ] + [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] ΥNG
}
,
= Ψ [(1− αL)σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ]
+ [αLσL + ωCαCσC ] [Ψ− (αLσL + ωCαCσC)] . (163)









= αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC)Γ < 1. (164)
Thus, making use of eq. (162c), the elasticity (164) is smaller than one if the following inequality
holds:
Γ > αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC) ,
Ψ(σL + ωCσC)− (αLσL + ωCαCσC)2 > αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC) ,
ωCσLσC (αL − αC)2 + (σL + ωCσC)ωCαC (1− αC)φ > 0. (165)
Since (165) holds for all range of values of parameters, we have shown that 0 <
(




1 is strictly smaller than one.
So far, we have been able to show that the elasticity −∂Pˆ (0)∂² ²Pˆ (0) is smaller than one in the case
where the government shock is fully biased toward non tradables (see the first term on the RHS of
first term on the RHS of eq. (148)). Below, we complete the proof of an elasticity smaller than one
in the general case where 0 < ωGN < 1.
Case 0 < ωGN < 1: A Weakly Persistent Fiscal Shock: ξ →∞











αL (1− αL) ²
Ψ
< 1. (166)
Thus, whether we assume that the government shock is fully biased toward non tradables or is split
between non tradables and tradables, the elasticity of the response of the relative price w.r.t the
degree of labor mobility across sectors is identical because the wealth effect vanishes and thus a rise
in GT has no effect on the relative price.
Case 0 < ωGN < 1: A Highly Persistent Fiscal Shock: ξ → 0





= αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC)Γ < 1, (167)










αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC)Γ ,
= αL (1− αL) ² (σL + ωCσC)Γ . (168)
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In sum, whether we assume ωGN = 1 or 0 < ωGN < 1, when ξ takes intermediate values, the







αL (1− αL) ²
Ψ
,









Finally, we show in the next section that αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
> (ωGN − αL) g > 0 because we need
analytical results when imposing perfect mobility of labor across sectors to demonstrate this result
when allowing for imperfect mobility of labor.
H.5 Good-Biased Government Spending Shock and Perfect Mobility of
Labor across Sectors























WT = 1, (170e)
WN (t) = P (t), (170f)
WN (t) =WT (t) =W (t), (170g)
L(t) = LT (t) + LN (t), (170h)
Y N (t) = CN (t) +GN (t), (170i)
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + Y T (t)− CT (t)−GT (t), (170j)
where Y N (t) = LN (t), Y T (t) = LT (t).
We now consider a rise in government spending split between non tradables and tradables in
the special case of perfect mobility of labor across sectors. We restrict our attention to the main
changes. Inserting (170c) into (170i) and differentiating, using the fact that P = 1, leads to:
αLLˆ




Inserting L = λ¯σL (since W = 1) into (170h), differentiating and using (171) leads to:




Inserting LT = L− LN together with LN = CN +GN and L = λ¯σL (since W = 1) into (170j),
the market clearing condition for the traded good can be written as follows:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + L− PCC −GT (t)− PGN (t),
= r?B(t) + λ¯σL − (1− αC)P 1−σCC λ¯−σC − PGN (t)−GT (t). (173)
Using the fact that both λ¯ and P are constant over time, linearizing (173) in the neighborhood of
the steady-state leads to:
B˙(t) = r?dB(t)− dG(t).
Substituting the law of motion of government spending (128) and solving leads to the general solution




























To determine the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth, we have to
differentiate the market clearing condition (170j) for the traded good evaluated at the steady-state
(i.e., B˙(t) = 0), using the fact that government spending reverts to its initial level in the long-run




+ (σL + ωCσC) ˆ¯λ = 0,







g > 0, (177)
where ξ > 0 and g > 0.
Totally differentiating the definition of real GDP (118c) and substituting both (171) and (172)
leads to:
YˆR = αLLˆN + (1− αL) LˆT ,
= σL ˆ¯λ > 0. (178)
Evaluating (171) at time t = 0, pre-multiplying (178) by αL and subtracting the latter expression





















g ≷ 0. (179)






the fact that lim²→∞ ΨΓ =
1
σL+ωCσC
since lim²→∞ΥNG = 1, and applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule leads to eq.
(179) since lim²→∞
αL(1−αL)²
Ψ = 1. Eq. (179) corresponds to eq. (37) in the main text.
Keeping the private demand components fixed, the response of the share of non tradables in
real GDP is given by αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
= (ωGN − αL) dG(t)Y , where αL refers to νY,N in the
empirical part. In a general equilibrium model, the private sector’ demand components respond
to a fiscal shock and thus the response of the share of non tradables in real GDP deviates from
(ωGN − αL) dG(t)Y . To calculate the extent of the discrepancy between the response of the share of
non tradables in real GDP described by eq. (179) and that when keeping private sector’s demand
components fixed as described by αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
= (ωGN − αL) dG(t)Y , we add and subtract
αL in the RHS of eq. (179):
αL
(

























The RHS of eq. (181) is unambiguously positive since αL ≥ αC and 0 < r?ξ+r? < 1. According
to (180), the share of non tradables in real GDP unambiguously rises as long as ωGN > αL. As
captured by the positive term (181), the share of non tradables in real GDP increases more in a
general equilibrium model where demand components adjust in response to a fiscal shock because
the rise in government spending triggers a fall in net exports on impact which further biases the
sectoral demand shock toward non tradables.
While αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
is larger than (ωGN − αL) g when ² → ∞ due to inequality (181),
we show now that αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
> (ωGN − αL) g > 0 holds as well with imperfect mobility























(αLσL + αCωCσC) ≤ αLσL + αCωCσC
σL + ωCσC
ωGN . (182)
Second, since lim²→∞ΥNG = 1 and
∂ΥNG














(αLσL + αCωCσC) ≤ αLσL + αCωCσC
σL + ωCσC
ωGT . (183)






[αLσL + αCωCσC ] ≤ αLσL + αCωCσC
σL + ωCσC






[αLσL + αCωCσC ] ≤ αLσL + αCωCσC
σL + ωCσC
, (184)
where we used the fact that ωGN + ωGT = 1. From inequalities (181) and (184), we thus have:
αL
(
Yˆ N (0)− YˆR(0)
)
> (ωGN − αL) g, (185)
whether ²→∞ or 0 < ² <∞.
I Calibration Procedure
In this section, we provide more details about the calibration to a representative OECD economy
and to data from 16 OECD countries. Sections A-B present the source and construction of data.
I.1 Initial Steady-State
Normalizing total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) for the non traded sector ZN to 1, the
calibration reduces to 19 parameters: r?, β, σC , σL, ², ϑ, φ, ϕ, φJ , ϕJ , κ, δK , θT , θN , ZT , ωG
(= GY ), ωGN (=
PGN
G ), ξ, χ, and initial conditions B0, K0.
Whilst in the main text, the aggregator function for investment inputs is assumed to take a Cobb-
Douglas form (see eq. (14)), in the calibration procedure we consider a more general aggregator
function. The investment good is (costlessly) produced using traded good and non traded good




















where 0 < ϕJ < 1 is the weight of the investment traded input and φJ corresponds to the elasticity
of substitution between traded good and non traded good inputs.
Since we focus on the long-run equilibrium, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.
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1− θT ) = PJ (r? + δK) , (187k)
ZT
(




















)1−θT − CT −GT − IT = 0, (187q)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
B −B0 = Ψ1 (K −K0) , (187r)
where we used the fact that at the steady-state Ij = Jj (with j = T,N), and we also have
GN = (ωGN /P )G, (188a)
GT = (1− ωGN )G, (188b)
PC =
[















+ (1− ϑ) (WN)²+1] 1²+1 , (188e)









Using (188), the system (187) jointly determines the following 18 variables C, L, CN , CT , LN , LT ,
IN , IT , I, G, kT , kN , WT , WN , K, P , B, λ¯.
Some of the values of parameters can be taken directly from data, but others need to be endoge-
nously calibrated to fit a set of an average OECD economy features. Among the 19 parameters,
4 parameters, i.e., ϕ, ϕJ , ϑ, δK together with initial conditions (B0, K0) must be set in order to
match key properties of a typical OECD economy. More precisely, the parameters ϕ, ϕJ , ϑ, δK
together with the set of initial conditions are set to target αC , αJ , αL, υNX , I/Y . We denote by
υGj = Gj/Y j and υJj = Jj/Y j the ratio of government spending and investment expenditure on
good j to output in sector j, respectively, and υB = r
?B
Y T
the ratio of interest receipts from traded
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bonds holding to traded output. The steady-state can be reduced to the following four equations:
Y T
Y N
(1 + υB − υJT − υGT )
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)²θT (1− θT )(1−θT )(1+²)]1/θT[
(θN )²θ
N
(1− θN )(1−θN )(1+²)
]1/θN . (190)
The system (189) consisting of four equations determine P , Y T /Y N , K/Y and υB . The four
equations (189a)-(189d) describe the goods market equilibrium, the labor market equilibrium, the
resource constraint for capital, and the intertemporal solvency condition.
Dividing the market clearing condition for the traded good (187q) by the market clearing con-
dition for the non traded good (187p) and equating the resulting expression with the demand of




φ, leads to the goods market equilibrium (189a). The derivation of the labor mar-
ket equilibrium requires more steps. As mentioned below, we assume that the aggregator function
for inputs of the investment good is Cobb-Douglas since data suggest that φJ = 1. In this case, the
investment price index simplifies, i.e., PJ = (P )











ZN (1− θN )
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] 1−θN
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Dividing (187f) by (187e) leads to the supply of hours worked in the traded sector relative to the non




−². Dividing (187n) by (187m) leads to the relative wage, i.e., Ω =
PZNθN(kN)1−θ
N
ZT θT (kT )1−θ
T . Inserting the latter expression into the former and using the production functions
for the traded sector and non traded sectors which imply LT = Y
T
ZT (kT )1−θ






















Inserting (191) into the above expression leads to the labor market equilibrium (189b) while
we set Π to eq. (190) in order to write the equation in compact form. To determine (189c), use
the fact that Kj = kjLj , multiply both sides of (187o) by RY where R = PJ (r
? + δK) is the capital














Using the fact that the capital income share RK
j
P jY j in sector j is equal to
(
1− θj) and remembering
that the investment price index reduces to PJ = (P )
1−ϕJ , one obtains the resource constraint
for capital described by eq. (189c). Finally, to get (189d), multiply both sides of (187r) by
r?
Y T




and the ratio of the initial capital stock to GDP by υK0 =
K0
Y leads to eq. (189d)
that describes the intertemporal solvency condition.
Because the ratios we wish to target are different from the macroeconomic aggregates, i.e., P ,
Y T /Y N , K/Y and υB , that are jointly determined by the system of equations (189), we have to
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relate the latter ratios to the former. First, the relative price of non tradables P determines the non
tradable content of consumption expenditure by setting ϕ:
αC =
(1− ϕ)P 1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ . (192)
The ratio K/Y along with the relative price of non tradables, P , determines the investment-to-GDP







The ratio of net interest receipts from traded bonds holding to traded output, i.e., υB , determines
the ratio of net exports to traded output, i.e. υNX = NXY T with NX = Y
T −CT −GT −JT ; dividing
both sides of the traded goods market clearing condition (187q) leads to:
υNX = −υB . (194)
Finally, we show that Y T /Y N (together with P ) determines LN/L by setting ϑ. To do so, using
the definition of the aggregate wage index (83c), the ratio of the aggregate wage to the non traded
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Since θj is the labor income share in sector j, the ratio of the traded wage to the non traded wage













Dividing (187f) by (187e) leads to a positive relationship between the supply of hours worked to the

























Additionally, since αL = W
NLN





, the share of hours worked in total hours















Inserting (197) into (195) and plugging the resulting expression into (198) gives us a relationship




























According to (199), given Y T /Y N and P , setting ϑ allows us to target the ratio LN/L found in the
data.
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I.2 Calibration to a Representative OECD Economy
To calibrate our model, we estimated a set of parameters so that the initial steady state is consistent
with the key empirical properties of a representative OECD economy. This section provides more
details about how we calibrate the model to match the key empirical properties of a representative
OECD economy. Because we consider an open economy setup with traded and non traded goods,
we calculate the non tradable content of GDP, employment, consumption, gross fixed capital forma-
tion, government spending, labor compensation and the productivity in tradables in terms of non
tradables, for all countries in our sample, as summarized in Table 4. To capture the key properties a
typical OECD economy which is chosen as the baseline scenario, we take unweighted average values
shown in the last line of Table 4. Columns 12-14 of Table 4 also report government spending and
investment as a share of GDP along with the aggregate labor income share.
We first describe the parameters that are taken directly from the data; we start with the pref-
erence parameters shown in panel A of Table 10:
• One period in the model is a year.
• The world interest rate, r?, equal to the subjective time discount rate, β, is set to 4%.
• We assume that utility for consumption is logarithmic and thus set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for consumption, σC , to 1.
• Next, we turn to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for labor supply σL to 0.4, in line with the evidence reported by Fiorito and
Zanella [2012], but conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.
• The elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², which captures the degree of labor mobility is
set to 0.75 in line with the average of our estimates shown in the last column of Table 4.73 Our
estimates display a wide dispersion across countries and we therefore conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to this parameter. Excluding estimates of ² for Denmark and Norway
which are not statistically significant at 10%, estimates of ² range from a low of 0.22 for the
Netherlands to a high of 1.39 for the United States and 1.64 for Spain. Hence, we allow for ²
to vary between 0.22 and 1.64 in the sensitivity analysis.
• Building on our panel data estimations (see section B.3), we set the elasticity of substitution
(in consumption) between traded and non traded goods to 0.77 in the baseline calibration, in
line with the unweighted average value shown in the last line of column 15 of Table 4.74
• We set the elasticity of substitution, φJ , in investment between traded and non traded inputs
to 1, in line with the empirical findings documented by Bems [2008] for OECD countries.
We also consider a more general specification for preferences which are assumed to be non
separable in consumption and labor. The functional form is taken from Shimer [2011]:
C1−σV (L)σ − 1
1− σ , if σ 6= 1, V (L) ≡
(







Setting σ = 1, preferences are separable in consumption and labor, as in (77). When investigating
the implications of non separability in preferences, we set σ = 2 while we keep other parameters
unchanged.
We pursue with the non-tradable content of consumption, investment and government expen-
diture, employment, along with sectoral labor income shares and relative productivity of tradables
shown in the last line of Table 4 that reports the average of our estimates while panel B of Table
10 displays the value of parameters we choose to calibrate the model:
• The weight of consumption in non tradables 1 − ϕ is set to 0.51 to target a non-tradable
content in total consumption expenditure (i.e. αC) of 53%.
• In order to target a non tradable content of labor of 67% which corresponds to the 16 OECD
countries’ unweighted average shown in the last line of Table 4, we set the weight of labor
supply to the traded sector in the labor index L(.), 1− ϑ, to 0.68.
73Section B.3 presents the empirical strategy and contains the details of derivation of the relationship we
explore empirically.
74We derive a testable equation by combining first-order conditions for relative demand and relative
supply for tradables in terms of non tradables. Details of derivation of the equation we explore empirically
can be found in section B.3. We explore empirically two variants of the testable equation, considering
alternatively the ratio of sectoral value added or the ratio of sectoral labor compensation. Estimates of φ
for Italy are negative for both variants while for Belgium, only the estimate of the elasticity of substitution
in consumption between tradables and non tradables when exploring empirically the second variant of the
testable equation is statistically significant (see Table 3). Excluding estimates of φ for Italy which are
negative and considering a value of 0.795 for Belgium, the elasticity of substitution φ averages to 0.77.
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• We choose a value for the weight of non traded inputs in the investment aggregator function
J(.), 1−ϕJ , of 0.64 which allows us to obtain a non tradable content of investment expenditure
of 64%.
• In accordance with our estimate shown in the last line of Table 4, we choose a non tradable
content of government spending, ωGN = PG
N
G , of 90%; by construction, we have a share of
government consumption on tradables in total government spending, ωGT = 1−ωGN , of 10%.
• Columns 9 and 10 of Table 4 give the labor income share of the traded and the non traded
sector for the sixteen OECD countries in our sample. Labor income shares θT and θN average
respectively to 0.60 and 0.67. Because average values suggest that the non traded sector is
relatively more labor intensive than the traded sector, in the baseline calibration, we choose
values for θT and θN so that θT < θN . The figures also show substantial dispersion across
countries as the labor income share in the traded sector varies from a low of 0.38 in Norway
to a high of 0.71 for Italy. Moreover, the labor income share in the traded sector, θT , is higher
than that in the non traded sector, θN , for two countries, namely France and Italy. Thus, we
also conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering a situation where the traded sector is more
labor intensive than the non traded sector. When excluding France and Italy, the values of
θT and θN average 0.58 and 0.67, respectively. In the baseline calibration, we set θT and θN
to 0.58 and 0.68 which correspond roughly to the average for countries with kT > kN and are
consistent with an aggregate labor income share of 64%, as shown in column 14 of Table 4.
Formally, the aggregate labor income share, denoted by θ, is a value-weighted average of the




Y . When we consider a traded sector that
is relatively more labor intensive than the non traded sector, i.e., kN > kT , we use reverse
but symmetric values and thus set θT = 0.68 and θN = 0.58.
• We assume that traded firms are 28 percent more productive than non traded firms in line
with our estimates; we thus normalize ZN to 1 and set ZT to 1.28.
We describe below the choice of parameters displayed in panel C of Table 10 characterizing
macroeconomic variables such as investment, government spending and the balance of trade of a
typical OECD economy:
• As shown in the last line of column 13 of Table 4, government spending as a percentage of
GDP averages 20% and thus we set ωG = GY to 0.2.
• In order to target an investment-to-GDP ratio, ωJ = PJIY , of 21% as shown in the last line of
column 12 of Table 4, we set the rate of physical capital depreciation, δK , to 6%.
• We choose the value of parameter κ so that the elasticity of I/K with respect to Tobin’s q,
i.e., Q/PJ , is equal to the value implied by estimates in Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [2008].
The resulting value of κ is equal to 17.75
• Finally, we choose initial values for B0 and K0 for the ratio of net exports to traded output
to be nil at the initial steady-state, i.e., υNX ' 0.
Investment- and government spending-to-GDP ratios along with balanced trade endogenously de-
termine the consumption-to-GDP ratio. More precisely, since GDP is equal to the sum if its demand
components, remembering that at the steady-state I = J , we thus have the following accounting
identity, Y = PCC + PJI +G+NX. Dividing both sides by Y and remembering that net exports











where ωJ = PJIY = 21%, ωG =
G
Y = 20%, and NX = 0.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the non tradable content of GDP is endogenously determined
by the non tradable content of consumption, αC , of investment, αJ , and of government expendi-
ture, ωGN , along with the consumption-to-GDP ratio, ωC , the investment-to-GDP ratio, ωJ , and
government spending as a share of GDP, ωG. More precisely, dividing the non traded good market
clearing condition (187p) by GDP, Y , leads to an expression that allows us to calculate the non
tradable content of GDP:
Y N
Y
= ωCαC + ωJαJ + ωGNωG = 63%, (202)
75Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [2008] run the regression I/K = α+ β . ln(q) and obtain a point estimate
for β of 0.06. In our model, the steady-state elasticity of I/K with respect to Tobin’s q is 1/κ. Equating
1/κ to 0.06 gives a value for κ of 17.
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where ωC = 59%, αC = 53%, ωJ = 21%, αJ = 64%, ωGN = 90%, and ωG = 20%. According to
(202), the values we target for the non tradable content of consumption, investment and government
spending along with the consumption-, investment-, and government spending-to-GDP ratios are
consistent with a non tradable content of GDP of 63% found in the data, as reported in the last
line of column 1 of Table 4.
In order to capture the dynamic adjustment of government consumption, we assume that the








e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt] , (203)
where g parametrizes the exogenous fiscal shock while ξ > 0 and χ > 0 parametrize the persistence
of the response of government consumption along with the pattern of its dynamic adjustment. We
present below the parameters related to the endogenous response of government spending to an
exogenous fiscal shock which are summarized in panel D of Table 10:
• We investigate the effects of a rise in government consumption by 1 percentage point of GDP
and thus set g to 0.01.
• We choose values of ξ and χ in order to account for the dynamic adjustment of government
consumption. Data indicate that the endogenous response of government spending to an







e−ξ − (1− g) e−χ] . (204)
Differentiating (203) w.r.t. time leads to:
G˙(t)
Y˜
= − [ξe−ξt − χ (1− g) e−χt] . (205)




= − [ξe−ξ − χ (1− g) e−χ] = 0 (206)
Using the fact that g = 0.01 and g′ = 0.01126548, the system consisting of eq. (204) and
eq. (206) jointly determine the values of ξ and χ which allow us to capture the endogenous
response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal shock by g × 100 percentage points
of GDP; we set ξ = 0.408675 and χ = 0.415722.
• While government purchases both non traded goods, GN , and traded goods, GT , our VAR
evidence suggest that the rise in government consumption is strongly biased toward non
traded goods as the relative size the non traded sector rises significantly. When we simulate
the model, we thus consider a rise in government consumption by 1 percentage point of GDP
which is split between non tradables and tradables in accordance with their respective share










where dG(t) = G(t)− G˜ and dGj(t) = Gj(t)− G˜j .
J More Numerical Results
In this section, we provide additional numerical results which are not included in the main text for
reason of space.
J.1 Contrasting Empirical and Theoretical Effects on GDP and Demand
Components
We begin with the aggregate effects of a government spending shock shown in panels A and B of Table
1. Contrasting the numerical results reported in columns 2 and 6 with the evidence shown in column
1, whether we assume imperfect or perfect mobility of labor, both models tend to understate the
responses of real GDP and hours worked. However, the model performance improves with imperfect












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mobility of labor as the rise in GDP by 0.19% lies within the confidence interval, as shown in
Figure 35(d). The reason is that with imperfect mobility of labor, the existence of workers’ costs of
switching sectors puts upward pressure on non traded wages and thus on the aggregate wage. This
then amplifies the positive response of hours worked which increases on impact by 0.30% instead
of 0.11% when the mobility cost is absent. Because agents supply more labor, real GDP rises by a
larger amount as long as there is a difficulty in reallocating labor. While the real consumption wage
is unaffected on impact when we let ² tend toward infinity, a government spending shock generates
a rise in the wage rate which more than offsets the increase in the consumption price index and thus
pushes up the real consumption wage by 0.07% in the baseline model where ² = 0.75.
Turning to the dynamic adjustment of investment and the current account displayed in Fig.
35(b) and 35(c), a model assuming perfect mobility and abstracting from capital installation costs
dramatically overstates the decline in investment and predicts a current account surplus in the short-
run, contrary to the evidence. Because capital-labor ratios are fixed, the return on domestic capital
remains unchanged as well. The substantial decline in private savings generates such a physical
capital decumulation that the current account moves into surplus. In contrast, as long as we relax
the assumption of perfect mobility of labor, the neoclassical model is able to produce the crowding
out of investment along with the current account deficit in the short-run, as shown in column 5 of
Table 1 where we abstract from capital installation costs to isolate the role of limited labor mobility.
Intuitively, as long as there is a difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors, the capital-labor ratio
falls in the traded sector as the workers’ mobility costs moderate the shift of labor. Thus, the
return on domestic capital increases, which in turn mitigates the fall in investment and produces a
current account deficit. However, the model tends to overstate the crowding-out of investment and
to understate the decline in the current account. In contrast, as shown in column 2, when we allow
for capital installation costs along with imperfect mobility of labor, the model predicts a current
account deficit of 0.34% of GDP, which accords well with our estimate, by further mitigating the
decline in investment. We then ask whether both capital adjustments costs and imperfect mobility
of labor are essential to account for the evidence. To answer this, column 7 considers a scenario
where we assume that physical capital accumulation is subject to installation costs while hours
worked are perfect substitutes across sectors. The model predicts a rise in investment instead of a
decline and considerably overstates the current account deficit found in the data: while the shadow
price of investment, Q, increases as in a model assuming imperfect mobility of labor, the rise in
the investment price index, PJ , is not large enough to drive down Tobin’s q. As will become clear
below, perfect mobility of labor implies that the relative price of non tradables merely appreciates,
thus hampering the increase in PJ .
Contrasting the model’s predictions with VAR evidence in Fig. 35, the simulated responses
lie within the confidence interval along the transitional adjustment, with the exception of the real
consumption wage. Although quite stylized, the model is able to account for the time-series evi-
dence on the aggregate effects of a government spending shock as long as we allow for both capital
installation costs and a difficulty in reallocating labor.
J.2 Numerical Results for a Representative OECD Economy
Table 11 reports impact effects following a rise in government consumption by 1 percentage point of
GDP. Column 1 of Tables 11 shows the effects of a government spending shock from our VAR model
for comparison purposes while columns 2-14 report simulated responses. We conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to a number of parameters, including the labor income share of sector j, θj , the
elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ², the parameter κ that governs the magnitude of adjustment
costs to capital accumulation, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, σL, and the parameter σ > 0 that
determines the substitutability between consumption and leisure. We provide more details below:
• In columns 2 and 3, we impose perfect mobility of labor across sectors, i.e., ²→∞. In column
2, we abstract from capital installation costs and thus set κ = 0 while in column 3, we consider
adjustment costs to physical capital accumulation and thus sect κ = 17.
• Column 4 reports results from our baseline model with imperfect mobility of labor across
sectors, setting ² to 0.75, while capital accumulation is assumed to be subject to adjustments
costs with κ = 17.
• In columns 5 and 6, we keep unchanged κ and investigate the effects of a government spending
shock when the degree of labor mobility across sectors is low, i.e., ² is set to 0.22, and when
the elasticity of labor supply across sectors is high, i.e., ² is set to 1.64.
• In column 7, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
which is raised from 0.4 to 1.
• Column 8 shows results when we allow for imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, setting
² to 0.75, while we abstract from adjustment costs to capital accumulation, and thus set κ to
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(f) Aggregate Real Wage
Figure 35: Dynamic Adjustment of Aggregate Variables to Unanticipated Government
Spending Shock. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR model with dotted blue lines indicating
90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline scenario with imperfect mobility
of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17) while the dotted black line shows predictions
of the model imposing perfect mobility of labor (²→∞) and abstracting from capital adjustment costs (κ = 0).
0.
• Column 9 reports results when we relax the assumption of separability in preferences between
consumption and labor, setting σ to 2.
• Columns 10 and 13 show results when we allow for imperfect mobility of both labor and
capital across sectors. Implications of imperfect mobility of capital are discussed in the next
section.
• While from column 2 to column 10, we assume that the non traded sector is relatively more
labor intensive than the traded sector, and thus set θN to 0.68 and θT to 0.58, from column
11 to column 13, we explore the case where the non traded sector is relatively more capital
intensive and thus choose reverse and symmetric values for the sectoral labor income shares,
i.e., we set θN to 0.58 and θT to 0.68.
• While column 12 reports our baseline model’s predictions when θT > θN , in column 11, we
set κ = 0 and let ² tend toward infinity, and in column 13 (IMK), we allow for both imperfect
mobility of labor and capital across sectors, and thus set η to 0.75.
In column 9, we relax the assumption of separability in preferences between consumption and
labor by considering a functional form which is taken from Shimer [2011]:
C1−σV (L)σ − 1
1− σ , if σ 6= 1, V (L) ≡
(







These preferences are characterized by two crucial parameters: σL is the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and σ > 0 determines the substitutability between consumption and leisure; if σ > 1, the
marginal utility of consumption increases in hours worked. In contrast, setting σ = 1 implies that
preferences are separable in consumption and labor, as in (11). When we investigate the implications
of non separability in preferences, we set σ = 2 while keeping other parameters unchanged.
Column 9 shows results when σ is set to 2. As can be seen in column 9, non separability in
preferences between consumption and labor amplifies the rise in the real consumption wage while
hours and real GDP increase less. Additionally, the open economy runs a larger current account
deficit. Intuitively, because non separability in preferences between consumption and labor increases
the disutility from working, agents are less willing to supply labor while demanding higher wages.
Because consumption increases with the aggregate wage, agents lower their expenditure less. Thus,
private savings decline further, which in turn amplifies the decline in the current account. As the
crowding out of private consumption is less, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a
larger amount, thus amplifying the responses of sectoral output shares. While the extension of the
baseline model to non separability in preferences somewhat improves its performance in reproducing
the responses of several sectoral variables, the extended model tends to substantially overstate the
contraction in the traded sector and to overpredict the rise in the relative wage. In contrast, all
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simulated impact responses from the baseline model assuming separability in preferences lie within
the confidence interval.
In the last three columns of Table 11, we investigate whether our conclusions hold if we assume
a non traded sector that is more capital intensive than the traded sector. While the predictions
of the model are very sensitive to sectoral labor income shares if we let ² tend toward infinity,
results are almost unaffected for the baseline model whether θT < θN or θT > θN . As shown in
column 11, the model imposing perfect mobility of labor fails to account for the evidence along a
number of dimensions. In particular, the simulated responses of sectoral output shares are more
than four times greater than those reported from the VAR model. The reason is that imposing
perfect mobility makes labor and thus sectoral output highly sensitive to a change in relative price.
Because investment is crowded in, the subsequent excess demand in the non traded goods market
causes the relative price of non tradables to appreciate, thus leading to dramatic changes in the
relative size of sectors. Since the model’s predictions reported in column 12 are similar to those
shown in column 4, they do not merit further comment.
Panels A and B of Table 11 show impact effects of a government spending shock for GDP,
investment and the current account along with labor market variables such as total hours worked
and the real consumption wage. Panels C and D of Table 11 summarize the theoretical responses
of sectoral variables for the labor and product markets. Because the results shown in column 10
when we allow for imperfect mobility of capital across sectors do not improve the performance of
the model with imperfect mobility of labor in replicating the evidence, or provide major additional
information on the fiscal transmission as the conclusions are similar whether we allow or not for
imperfect mobility of capital across sectors, to save space we do not present them in the main text
and relegate these results in the Technical Appendix.
J.3 No Capital Installation Costs vs. Perfect Mobility of Labor across
Sectors
In the main text, see section 5.2, we show that the model is successful in replicating both
aggregate and sectoral effects of a government spending shock as long as we allow for both
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, captured by ², along with adjustment costs to
capital accumulation, captured by the parameter κ. Table 1 contrasts impact effects in
the baseline scenario (column 2) with a number of alternative scenarios where we impose
perfect mobility of labor across sectors and abstract from capital installation costs (column
6), we consider capital installation costs along with perfect mobility of labor across sectors
(column 7), and we allow for imperfect mobility of labor across sectors but abstract from
capital installation costs (column 5). Figure 35 above and Figure 6 in the main text display
the model predictions for the aggregate and sectoral effects, respectively, of a government
spending shock under imperfect (solid black line with circles) and perfect mobility of labor
across sectors (dashed dotted black line) together with the respective VAR evidence (solid
blue line).
For reason of space, we do not contrast the dynamic adjustment of the baseline model
with that obtained from a model with perfect mobility of labor while assuming capital
installation costs or alternatively from a model assuming imperfect mobility of labor but
abstracting from adjustment costs to physical capital accumulation. We discuss below the
implications when one feature of the baseline model is shut down.
The solid black line in Figures 36 and 37 show the predictions of the baseline model while
the dotted black line displays the predictions of a model with a difficulty in reallocating labor
across sectors but abstracting from capital installation costs. As emphasized in the main
text, the conclusion that emerges is that the model without capital adjustment costs tend
to overstate the crowding out of investment in the short-run and to understate substantially
the current account deficit. Because investment declines more, excess demand in the non
traded goods market and thus the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables is
much smaller than that found in the data. Because the model without capital installation
costs underpredicts the short-run rise in P , it tends to understate the responses of sectoral
output shares. The solid black line in Figures 38 and 39 show the predictions of the
baseline model while the dotted black line displays the predictions of a model imposing
perfect mobility of labor across sectors while assuming that capital accumulation is subject
to installation costs. First, the model predicts a rise in investment instead of decline, in


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(e) Aggregate Real Wage








Figure 36: Dynamic Adjustment of Aggregate Variables to Unanticipated Government
Spending Shock: The Role of Capital Adjustment Costs. Notes: solid blue line display point estimate
of VAR with dotted blue lines indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in
the baseline scenario with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17)
while the dotted black line shows results when abstracting from capital adjustment costs (κ = 0).
to the sectoral effects, while assuming capital installation costs restore transitional dynamics
for the relative price of non tradables, the model imposing perfect mobility considerably
understates the appreciation in the relative price and cannot account for the rise in non
traded wages relative to traded wages as sectoral wages equalize. Moreover, while the
relative price of non tradables merely appreciates, because labor is extremely sensitive
to relative price changes, subsequent changes in sectoral output shares conflict with the
evidence since their magnitude are about twice what is estimated empirically,
J.4 Simulated Responses of Sectoral Output Shares across Countries
We denote by νY,ji (t) the value added (Y ) share of sector j, in country i at year t. In
terms of our model’s notation, the response of the output share of sector j to a government
spending shock is measured in total output units and thus is calculated as the product
between the growth differential between sectoral value added and GDP (both at constant
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Figure 37: Dynamic Adjustment of Sectoral Variables to Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock: The Role of Capital Adjustment Costs. Notes: Solid blue line display point estimate of
VAR with dotted blue lines indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the
baseline scenario with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17)
while the dotted black line shows results when abstracting from capital adjustment costs (κ = 0).
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Figure 38: Dynamic Adjustment of Aggregate Variables to Unanticipated Government
Spending Shock: The Role of Limited Mobility across Sectors. Notes: solid blue line display
point estimate of VAR with dotted blue lines indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model
predictions in the baseline scenario with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation
costs (κ = 17) while the dotted black line shows results when imposing perfect mobility of labor across sectors
(²→∞).
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Figure 39: Dynamic Adjustment of Sectoral Variables to Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock: The Role of Limited Labor Mobility across Sectors. Notes: Solid blue line display point
estimate of VAR with dotted blue lines indicating 90% confidence bounds;the solid black line displays model predic-
tions in the baseline scenario with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs
(κ = 17) while the dotted black line shows results when imposing perfect mobility of labor across sectors (²→∞).
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prices) and the share of value added in sector j in real GDP. Formally, the response at year







Yˆ jit − YˆR,it
)
.
To assess the ability of our model to account for our evidence, we calibrate the model to
the data of each country in our sample, except for the world interest rate, elasticity of
labor supply, and κ that governs the magnitude of capital adjustment costs which are kept
unchanged, i.e., r? = 4%, σL = 0.4, and κ = 17. When numerically computing dν
Y,j
i (0)
for each country i, we set φi and ²i in accordance with their empirical estimates shown the
two last columns of Table 4. When we calibrate the model to the whole sample (i.e., a
representative OECD economy), we set ² to 0.75 and φ to 0.77 which correspond to their
unweighted average values.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 12 report the simulated impact responses of the output share
of tradables, dνY,Ti (0), and non tradables, dν
Y,N
i (0), respectively, to an exogenous rise in
government consumption by 1 percentage point of GDP. Columns 3 and 5 report point
estimates from the VAR model for dνY,ji (0) for each country and the whole sample as well.
In line with our model’s predictions, an increase in government consumption gives rise to a
contraction in the traded sector and has an expansionary effect on the non traded sector,
except for Australia and Ireland. Because in these two economies, the traded sector expands
while the non traded sector shrinks, we consider a rise in government consumption by 1
percentage point of GDP triggered by an increase in public purchases on tradables while
keeping GN fixed.
Because the time horizon of the sample is small for each country due to the annual
frequency of data, the VAR estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. More precisely,
VAR estimates for dνY,ji (0) are significant at 10% for only five countries in our sample. As
shown in the last line of Table 12, our model predicts remarkably well the contraction in the
traded sector and the expansionary effect in the non traded sector. While our results tend
to understate the changes in output shares of both sectors, the predicted values lie within
the 90% confidence interval for most of the economies of our sample. More precisely, when
we restrict our attention to statistically significant estimates, the model’s predictions fall in
the range of empirical estimates except for Canada. While we find that the model tends to
understate the responses of sectoral output shares for most of the countries, in particular
for Japan, Sweden, and the USA, the correlation between predicted and observed series is
0.65 for tradables and 0.69 for non tradables, as shown in the last line of Table 12, which
suggests that the model can account reasonably well for cross-country differences in impact
responses of sectoral output shares to a government spending shock.
To investigate the relationship between the magnitude of the sectoral impact of a fiscal
shock and the degree of labor mobility across sectors, we regress the estimated sectoral
output share responses, dνY,ji (0), on the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ²i:
dνY,ji (0) = β0 + β1 .²i + εi. (209)
According to our estimates reported in Table 13, the regression coefficient, β1, is negative
for tradables and positive for non tradables which suggests that following a rise in govern-
ment consumption, the output share of tradables falls more while the output share of non
tradables rises by a larger amount in countries with a higher labor mobility across sectors.
Importantly, the regression coefficients from simulated and estimated values are roughly
similar.
K Four Variants of Our Baseline Open Economy Setup: Ro-
bustness Check Analysis
In this section, we investigate the extent of the robustness of our theoretical results pre-
sented in the main text by considering four variants of the baseline model. In the first
variant, we relax the assumption of a balanced government budget by introducing public
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Table 12: Comparison of Simulated with Estimated Values for Changes in Sectoral Output
Shares
Country Parameter Impact responses: sectoral output shares











AUS 0.635 0.09† 0.49 −0.09† −0.15
AUT 0.548 −0.32† −0.35 0.32† 0.22
BEL 0.326 −0.28† −0.12 0.28† 0.12
CAN 0.454 −0.37 −1.03 0.37 0.94
DNK - −0.31 −0.77 0.31∗ 0.68
ESP 1.642 −0.49† −0.19 0.49† 0.39
FIN 0.544 −0.34∗ −0.81 0.34∗ 0.90
FRA 1.287 −0.40† −0.36 0.40† 0.41
GBR 1.008 −0.42† −0.46 0.42† 0.55
IRL 0.264 0.05† 0.05 −0.05† −0.07
ITA 0.686 −0.38† −0.60 0.38† 0.50
JPN 0.993 −0.41† −0.96 0.41† 0.89
NLD 0.224 −0.26† −0.18 0.26† 0.22
NOR - −0.35† 0.03 0.35† 0.09
SWE 0.443 −0.35∗ −0.69 0.35∗ 0.59
USA 1.387 −0.40∗ −1.21 0.40∗ 0.77
Whole 0.746 −0.38∗ −0.45 0.38∗ 0.35
Corr. 0.63 0.67
Notes: Table provides simulated (simul) and estimated (estim) responses on impact for
dνY,ji (0) (with j = T,N); responses correspond to the change in sectoral value added at
constant prices relative to real GDP measured in total output units; when computing the
change in the share of valued added of sector j, we keep relative prices constant so that its
change is only triggered by variations in quantities; ² is the elasticity of labor supply across
sectors; because estimates of ² for Denmark and Norway are not statistically significant,
their values are left blank. Predicted values for Denmark are obtained when setting ² to its
value for the whole sample. We denote by superscripts ’simul’ and ’estim’ the numerically
computed values and VAR estimates, respectively; † and ∗ indicate that the predicted value
lies within the estimated confidence interval while ∗ indicates that the estimated value
is significant at 10%; we calculate 90% confidence intervals based on estimated standard
deviations of dνY,ji (0) obtained when the VAR model is estimated, for each country and
the whole sample as well; ’Corr.’ refers to the correlation coefficient between simulated and
estimated values.
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Table 13: Relationship between Impact Responses of Sectoral Output Shares to a Rise in
Government Consumption and the Degree of Labor Mobility across Sectors (OLS estimates)























Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels; t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
debt and distortionary labor taxation and explore the consequences of a deficit-financed
government spending shock. In the second variant, we explore the potential implications
of entrey/exit of firms by considering an imperfectly competitive non traded sector with
endogenous markup. In the third variant, we consider a model where both labor and cap-
ital are imperfectly mobile across sectors. In the fourth variant, we relax the assumption
of exogenous terms of trade by considering an open economy model which is large enough
on the world goods market to influence the price of its export goods. The variants of the
baseline model are laid out in section M, section N, and section O.
K.1 Balanced-Budget vs. Deficit-Financed Government Spending Shock
In the main text, we consider a budget-balanced government spending shock. If alterna-
tively the rise government spending is financed by an increase in public debt denoted by
D:
D˙ + T = r?D +G. (210)
the results are identical since the Ricardian equivalence holds as long as taxes are lump-
sum. Thus, whether the government budget is balanced or not affects our results neither
qualitatively nor quantitatively. Conversely, if we allow labor taxation to be distortionary,
a debt-financed increase in public spending requires an adjustment in the labor tax rate
for the solvency condition for the government to hold so that the Ricardian equivalence
no longer holds. If taxes are distorsionary, then the manner of financing higher spending
could influence our results. In section M, we lay out the model with public debt; we
allow for distortionary labor taxation and consider a rise in government spending which
is debt-financed. More specifically, denoting by D(t) the stock of (traded) bonds issued
by the government, the flow budget constraint reads as D˙(t) = r?D(t) +G(t) − T (t) with
T (t) = τ(t)W (t)L(t) where τ is the wage tax levied on households’ wage income.
To calibrate the model with public debt to a representative OECD economy, we estimate
a VAR model that includes public debt, D, in order to determine the dynamic response
of public debt to an exogenous government spending shock. More specifically, the VAR
specification includes government consumption, public debt, real GDP, hours worked, non-
residential investment, and the real consumption wage. Time series for public debt as a
percentage of GDP are taken from the OECD. As displayed in Figure 40(b), the endogenous
response of public to an exogenous government spending shock is hump-shaped and displays
high persistence. More precisely, public debt reaches a peak at time t = 6 and then is
restored back toward its initial level after 30 years. Before discussing the calibration of the
model, it is convenient to repeat the equations which govern the adjustment of government
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spending, public debt, and taxes we derive in section M (see eqs. (284), (287), (288)):
dG(t)
Y
= e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt, (211a)
dD(t)
Y









where τ is a distortive labor tax, and we impose D0 = D˜ in line with our VAR evidence,
i.e., public debt is restored to its initial level; Θi and Ωi (i = 1, 2, D) are terms which are
functions of parameters (see section M). To calibrate the model with public debt, we have
to choose values for three new parameters, φD, φG, δ. Since δ = φD − r?, it leaves us with
only two parameters. These two parameters are chosen so as to reproduce the hump-shaped
response of the public debt in percentage of GDP. Using the fact that public debt peaks at
tˆ = 6, we solve the system of equations below to determine the values for φD and φG:
D˙(tˆ) = −δΘDe−δtˆ + ξΘ1e−ξtˆ − χΘ2e−χtˆ = 0, (212a)
dD(tˆ)
Y
= ΘDe−δtˆ −Θ1e−ξtˆ +Θ2e−χtˆ. (212b)
Using the fact that at tˆ = 6, we have dD(tˆ)Y = 1.68738, solving yields φG = 0.485728 and
φD = 0.169004.
K.2 Perfect vs. Imperfect Mobility of Capital
A shortcut to generate imperfect capital mobility is to assume limited substitutability in
capital across sectors. Along the lines of Horvath [2000] who introduce limited substi-
tutability of hours worked, we assume that capital in the traded and the non traded sectors













η + (1− ζ)− 1η (KN) η+1η ] ηη+1 , (213)
where 0 < ζ < 1 is the weight of capital supply to the traded sector in the aggregate capital
index K(.) and η measures the ease with which capital in the traded and the non traded
sector can be substituted for each other and thereby captures the degree of capital mobility
across sectors. The case of perfect capital mobility is nested under the assumption that η
tends towards infinity; in this case, (213) reduces to K = KT + KN which implies that
capital is perfectly substitutable across sectors. When η <∞, sectoral capital goods are no
longer perfect substitutes. More specifically, as η becomes smaller, capital mobility across
sectors becomes lower as investors perceive a higher cost of shifting capital and therefore
become more reluctant to reallocate capital across sectors.
To calibrate the model, we keep unchanged ² = 0.75, σL = 0.4, σ = 1, κ = 17 and we
allow for imperfect mobility of capital across sectors, setting the elasticity of capital supply
across sectors, η, to 0.75, and the weight 1− ζ of capital supply to the non traded sector in
the aggregate capital index K(.) to 0.68 in order to target a non tradable content of capital
income of 58%, in line with our estimates.
K.3 Fixed vs. Endogenous Markup
The baseline setup laid out in the main text considers perfectly competitive firms in both
sectors. This assumption could be viewed as restrictive for the non traded sector which is
sheltered from international competition. However, assuming an imperfectly competitive
non traded sector would leave the results unchanged as long as markups are fixed. Con-
versely, the results could be affected if markups were endogenous. Intuitively, by creating
profit opportunities and thus encouraging firm entry, a rise in GN produces a fall in the
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(f) Real Consumption Wage
Figure 40: Dynamic Adjustment to an Unanticipated Deficit-Financed Government Spend-
ing Shock. Notes: The solid blue line displays point estimates of the VAR model with public debt, with dotted blue
lines indicating the 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline scenario
with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17).
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markup that could potentially modify quantitatively the size of the change in the share of
non tradables in real GDP. To deal with this issue, in section N, we develop an extension
of the open economy model with imperfect mobility of labor by considering an imperfectly
competitive non traded sector with endogenous markups.
Taking into account the fact that output of one (non traded) variety does not affect the
price of final non-traded output, but influences the (non traded) price level of the industry
in which the firm operates, in a symmetric equilibrium, the resulting price elasticity of
demand is:
e (N) = ρ− (ρ− η)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (214)
Assuming that ρ > η, the price elasticity of demand faced by one single firm is an increasing




decreases as the number of competitors increases, i.e. µN < 0.
Since we consider an imperfect competitive non traded sector, we have to choose values
for the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced non traded industries,
η, and the value for the elasticity of substitution between varieties within one non traded
industry, ρ. Setting ρ to 4 and η to 1 yields a markup µ charged by the non-traded sector
of 1.35, which is close to OECD countries’ unweighted average (1970-2004) documented by
Cardi and Restout [2015] for 13 OECD countries that includes all countries in our sample
except for Australia, Canada, Finland. We choose a value of fixed costs ψ so that the
number of competitors is 20 within each non traded industry which is consistent with our
assumption according to which the number of firms is large enough so that we can ignore
the strategic effects but not so large that the effect of entry on the firm’s demand curve is
minuscule.
K.4 Exogenous vs. Endogenous Terms of Trade
Whilst in the paper, we assume exogenous terms of trade, we extend the baseline framework
to endogenous terms of trade in section O. To allow for endogenous terms of trade, we
assume that the open economy is large enough on world goods market to influence the






where φX is the elasticity of exports with respect to the terms of trade, PH , which are
defined as the ratio of the price of home-produced traded goods to the price of foreign-
produced traded goods. Like in the main text, households supply labor, L, and must
decide on the allocation of total hours worked between the traded sector, LH , and the non
traded sector, LN . They consume both traded, CT , and non traded goods, CN . Traded
goods are now a composite of home traded goods, CH , and foreign imported goods, CF .
Households also choose investment which is produced using inputs of the traded, JT , and
the non traded good, JN . As for consumption, input of the traded good is a composite of
home traded goods, JH , and foreign imported goods, JF . For simplicity purposes, we set
GF = 0. The role of the price of home-produced goods in terms of foreign-produced goods
or the terms of trade is to clear the home-produced traded goods market:
Y H = CH +GH + JH +XH , (217)
The above market clearing condition along with that for non traded goods implies that net
exports become price-elastic, i.e.,
B˙ = r?B + PHXH −MF , (218)
where XH = Y H − CH − GH − JH are exports of home goods and we denote by MF
consumption and investment goods imports from abroad:
MF = CF + JF . (219)
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Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1994], we set the elasticity of substitution, ρ, in
consumption between home- and foreign-produced traded goods (inputs) to 1.5. The weight
of consumption in home-produced traded goods ϕH is set to 0.83 to target a home content in
consumption expenditure in tradables (i.e. αH) of 78%, in line with our estimates. Following
Pakko [2003], we set the elasticity of substitution, ρJ , in investment between home- and
foreign-produced traded inputs to 1.5. The weight of home-produced traded investment ιH
is set to 0.49 to target a home content in investment expenditure in tradables (i.e. αHJ ) of
42%, in line with our estimates. To obtain estimates of αH and αHJ , we use the Comtrade
database from the United Nations [2017]. Building on structural estimates of the price
elasticities of aggregate exports documented by Imbs and Mejean [2015], we set the export
price elasticity, φX , to 1.7 in the baseline calibration. Since we set initial conditions so that
the economy starts with balanced trade, export as a share of GDP, ωX , is endogenously
determined by the import content of consumption, 1 − αH , and investment expenditure,
1− αHJ , along with the consumption-to-GDP ratio, ωC , and the investment-to-GDP ratio,
ωJ . More precisely, dividing the zero current account equation by GDP, Y , leads to an
expression that allows us to calculate the GDP share of exports of final goods and services





1− αH)+ ωJαJ (1− αHJ ) = 10.3%, (220)
where ωC = 59%, 1 − αH = 22%, ωJ = 21%, 1 − αHJ = 58%. An export to GDP ratio
of 10.3% corresponds exactly to the ratio found in the data over 1995-2007 (note that we
consider exports of final goods and services while trade on intermediate inputs are excluded
from our calculation).
K.5 Robustness Check: Contrasting IRF from the Baseline Model with
IRF from Four Variants of the Baseline Setup
In this subsection, we contrast theoretical responses with empirical responses following
an unanticipated government spending shock by 1 ppt of GDP and compares theoretical
IRF from the baseline model shown in the main text with those obtained by considering
extensions of the benchmark setup. We consider four variants of the baseline model with
imperfect mobility of labor and capital adjustment costs. Aggregate effects are displayed
in Figure 41 whilst selected sectoral effects are shown in Figure 42.
First, we consider an extension of the baseline model to endogenous markups shown
in the dashed dotted red line with circles. The conclusion which emerges is that entry of
firms in the non traded sector does not affect our results as the theoretical responses for
the baseline model with fixed markups (shown in solid black lines) cannot be distinguished
from those obtained with endogenous markups. The reason is that firm entry is small so
that the markup merely declines following a rise in government spending.
Second, while in the main text we investigate the effects of balanced-budget government
spending shock, we alternatively explore the dynamics effects of a deficit-financed govern-
ment spending shock which are shown in the dashed dotted black line. As we allow for
distortionary labor taxation and since the labor tax rate must increase for the intertempo-
ral solvency condition for the government to hold, the positive response of hours worked
along with the size of the aggregate fiscal multiplier are greatly mitigated compared with
the baseline. Turning to the sectoral effects of a deficit-financed spending shock, as ex-
pected, hours worked and output increase less in the non traded sector while they decline
more in the traded sector as a result of the muted response of aggregate labor supply.
Whilst sectoral multipliers for output and labor are substantially reduced by the increase
in the labor tax, the latter merely influences the response of relative sector size along with
appreciation in the relative price and the relative wage.
Third, cyan solid line with squares displays model’s predictions when we allow for
imperfect mobility of both capital and labor. As can be seen in Figure 42, adding imperfect
mobility of capital moderates substantially changes in relative sector size, whether measured
in employment or GDP units, as the difficulty in reallocating capital further mitigates
the reallocation of resources toward the non traded sector. As a result, fiscal multipliers
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for labor and output in the non traded sector are less while those in the traded sector
increases (i.e., turn out to be less negative). One can notice that the relative price of non
tradables appreciates more since the excess demand in the non traded goods market is more
pronounced as non traded output increases less.
Finally, in the fourth variant of the model displayed in dotted black line, we allow for
endogenous terms of trade. While the discrepancy in estimated effects with the baseline
setup is moderate, we can notice some differences though. These differences can be more
easily understood by bearing in mind that a government spending shock split between
tradables and non tradables produces an excess demand in both goods markets and thus
improves the terms of trade (i.e., the price of home-produced traded goods in terms of
imported goods) along with an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables. The
increase in the relative price of tradables exerts a positive impact on the marginal revenue
product of capital and labor in the traded sector and thus mitigates the shift of inputs
toward the non traded sector. As a result, changes in relative sector size are less when
terms of trade are endogenous.
Sectoral effects are shown in Figure 42. Whilst we can notice some differences between
baseline model’s predictions and its four variants, the discrepancy in the estimated effects
is rather moderate across all scenarios. We can thus conclude that the results obtained in
the main text are robust to the introduction of public debt, imperfect mobility of capital,
endogenous terms of trade and endogenous markup.
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(f) Aggregate Real Wage
Figure 41: Contrasting Aggregate Effects to Unanticipated Government Spending Shock
across Variants of the Baseline Model. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR with shaded
areas indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline scenario with
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17). The dotted black
line shows results for endogenous terms of trade. The dashed dotted black line displays model’s predictions for a
deficit-financed government spending shocks. The dashed dotted red line with circles shows results when we allow for
endogenous markups in the non traded sector. The cyan solid line with squares displays model’s predictions when we
allow for imperfect mobility of both capital and labor.
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Figure 42: Contrasting Sectoral Effects of Unanticipated Government Spending Shock
across Variants of the Baseline Model. Notes: The solid blue line displays the point estimate of VAR
with shaded areas indicating 90% confidence bounds; the solid black line displays model predictions in the baseline
scenario with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (² = 0.75) and capital installation costs (κ = 17). The dotted
black line shows results for endogenous terms of trade. The dashed dotted black line displays the model’s predictions
for a deficit-financed government spending shock. The dashed dotted red line with circles shows the results when
we allow for endogenous markups in the non traded sector. The cyan solid line with squares displays the model’s
predictions when we allow for imperfect mobility of both capital and labor.
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IMPERFECT MOBILITY OF LABOR
ACROSS SECTORS
AND FISCAL TRANSMISSION
Technical Appendix - Not Meant for Publication
Olivier CARDI, Romain RESTOUT, and Peter CLAEYS
• Section L considers a more general form for preferences by relaxing the assumption
of separability in preferences in consumption and leisure.
• Appendix M introduces public debt in the setup.
• Appendix N lays out the same model as in the main text except that we allow the
non traded sector to be imperfectly competitive and assume endogenous markups.
• Appendix O develops a semi-small open economy model where the terms of trade are
endogenous.
1
L Introducing Non-Separability between Consumption and
Labor
In this section, we consider a more general form for preferences taken from Shimer [2011].
Since such preferences do not affect the first-order conditions from profit maximization (see
section G for further details), we do not repeat them and indicate major changes when
solving the model.
In the baseline model, we assume that preferences are separable in consumption and
leisure. We relax this assumption which implies that consumption and leisure can be
substitutes. In particular, this more general specification implies that consumption can be
affected by the wage rate while labor supply can be influenced by the change in the relative
price of non tradables. As previously, the household’s period utility function is increasing
in its consumption C and decreasing in its labor supply L, with functional form:
C1−σV (L)σ − 1
1− σ , if σ 6= 1, V (L) ≡
(












σL , if σ = 1. (222)
These preferences are characterized by two pivotal parameters: σL which is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, and σ > 0 that determines the substitutability between consump-
tion and leisure; it is worth noticing that if σ > 1, the marginal utility of consumption is
increasing in hours worked.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility (77) subject to the flow bud-
get constraint (78) and the accumulation of physical capital (79). Denoting the co-state
variables associated with (78) and (79) by λ and Q′, respectively, the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C−σV (L)σ = PCλ, (223a)
C1−σσγL1/σLV (L)σ−1 =Wλ, (223b)
along with (81c)-(81e) and transversality conditions.











To derive the partial derivatives, we take logarithm and totally differentiate the system









































































W = (1− αL) and ∂W∂WN W
N










= (1− αL)σL > 0, (228a)
Lˆ
WˆN
= σLαL > 0. (228b)
Inserting first the short-run static solution for consumption given by (224) into CN =
P ′CC and C
T = [PC − PP ′C ]C, one can solve for CT and CN as follows:
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P,W T ,WN
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P,W T ,WN
)
, (229)



















































L, allows us to solve for LT and LN :
LT = LT
(
λ¯,W T ,WN , P
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯,W T ,WN , P
)
, (231)


















L.1 Solving the Model
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN given by (231) into the resource
constraint for capital (87), the system of four equations which comprises (86a)-(86c) and
(87) can be solved for sectoral wages and sectoral capital-labor ratios. Taking logarithm
and differentiating (86a)-(86c) and (87) yields in matrix form:
−θT θN 0 0(
1− θT ) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1












Kˆ −Ψλ¯ ˆ¯λ−ΨP Pˆ
 , (233)
3
where ξ ≡ kNLNK and
ΨWT =
(
























1− ξN)σL + ξNσL = σL, (234d)
along with







= −αC (σ − 1)σL
σ
< 0. (235)
Only the partial derivatives w.r.t. P are modified when preferences are non separable
in consumption and leisure. Hence, we thus restrict attention to these partial derivatives.
Short-run static solutions for sectoral wages are:























1− θT )ΨWT − (1− θT ) ξ − θT (1− θN)ΨP}
G
> 0, (237b)
and sectoral capital-labor ratios:


























To solve the model, insert first short-run static solutions for sectoral wages (236) into
sectoral labor (231), then substitute the resulting solutions for sectoral labor and capital-
labor ratios (239), production functions can be solved for sectoral outputs. Then we solve
for temporary fiscal shocks by adopting the procedure detailed in subsection G.3.
M Solving the Model with Public Debt
This section extends the two-sector model with imperfect mobility of labor to public debt.
In order to avoid confusion, we denote by:
• K is the stock of physical capital;
• QK is the shadow value of the stock of physical capital;
• D is the stock of (traded) bonds issued by the government;
• B is the stock of traded bonds;
• N = B −D is the net foreign asset position;
• A = QK+N is the national non human wealth equal to the shadow value of the stock
of physical capital plus the net foreign asset position which gives national savings A˙;




The government issues traded bonds, D, in order to finance the excess of interest payments,
r?D, government spending, and transfers, Z(t), over taxes, T (t):
D˙(t) = r?D(t) +G(t) + Z(t)− T (t) (240)
where we assume that the government raises taxes on labor:
T (t) = τ(t)W (t)L(t). (241)
with τ the wage tax levied on households’ wage income.
M.2 Households
At each instant of time, the representative household consumes traded and non traded goods









φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (242)
where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non traded goods.
As in De Cordoba and Kehoe [2000], the investment good is produced using inputs of
the traded good and the non traded good according to a constant-returns-to-scale function
which is assumed to take a CES form:




where ϕJ is the weight of the investment traded input (0 < ϕJ < 1) and φJ corresponds to
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in investment between traded and non traded
inputs.
Following Horvath [2000], we assume that hours worked in the traded and the non







² + (1− ϑ)−1/² (LN) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (244)
and 0 < ϑ < 1 is the weight of labor supply to the traded sector in the labor index L(.)
and ² measures the ease with which hours worked can be substituted for each other and
thereby captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors.
The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and invest-
















subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t)+R(t)K(t)+W (t) (1− τ)L(t)+Z(t)−PC (P (t))C(t)−PJ (P (t))J(t), (246)
and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (247)
where I is investment and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. The first term on the
RHS of (246) r?B(t)+R(t)K(t)+W (t) (1− τ)L(t)+Z(t) is the representative household’s
real disposable income while the second term on the RHS PC (P (t))C(t) + PJ (P (t))J(t)
corresponds to consumption and investment expenditure including capital installation costs.
5
More specifically, we assume that capital accumulation is subject to increasing and convex
cost of net investment:









Denoting the co-state variables associated with (246) and (247) by λ andQ′, respectively,
the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = (PC(t)λ)
−σC , (249a)










λ˙(t) = λ (β − r?) , (249d)















and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞Q(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive (249c) and (249e), we used the fact that Q(t) = Q′(t)/λ(t).

















Once households decided on aggregate consumption, they decide on the allocation of
expenditure between traded and non traded goods:












where the consumption price index is:
PC =
[




As will be useful later, the percentage change in the consumption price index is proportional
to the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables:
PˆC = αC Pˆ , (253)
where αC is the non tradable content of consumption expenditure.
Once households decided on aggregate investment expenditure, they decide on the al-
location between traded and non traded inputs:












where the investment price index is:
PJ =
[
ϕJ + (1− ϕJ)P 1−φJ
] 1
1−φJ . (255)
As will be useful later, the percentage change in the investment price index is proportional
to the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables:
PˆJ = αJ Pˆ , (256)
6
where αJ is the non tradable content of investment expenditure.
Once households decided on aggregate labor supply, they allocate hours worked to the
traded and the non traded sector



















+ (1− ϑ) (WN)²+1] 1²+1 . (258)
As will be useful later, the percentage change in the aggregate wage index is a weighted
average of percentage changes in sectoral wages:
Wˆ = αLWˆN + (1− αL) Wˆ T , (259)
where αL is the non tradable content of aggregate labor compensation.
M.3 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, Kj , and labor, Lj , according




which are assumed to
take a Cobb-Douglas form:







where θj is the labor income share in sector j and Zj corresponds to the total factor
productivity index which is introduced for calibration purposes. Both sectors face two cost
components: a capital rental cost equal to R, and a labor cost equal to the wage rate, i.e.,
W T in the traded sector and WN in the non traded sector.
Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital and labor






P jY j −W jLj −RKj} . (261)
Since capital can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products in












)1−θN ≡WN , (262c)
where kj ≡ Kj/Lj denotes the capital-labor ratio for sector j = T,N .
The resource constraint for capital is:
KT +KN = K. (263)
M.4 Solving the Model
Before linearizing, we have to determine short-run static solutions. First-order conditions
(249a) and (249b) can be solved for consumption and aggregate labor supply which of





, L = L
(




with partial derivatives given by
Cˆ = −σC ˆ¯λ− σCαC Pˆ , (265a)
Lˆ = σL ˆ¯λ+ σLαLWˆN + σL (1− αL) Wˆ T − σL dτ1− τ . (265b)











with partial derivatives given by
CˆN = − [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] Pˆ − σC ˆ¯λ, (267a)
CˆN = αC (φ− σC) Pˆ − σC ˆ¯λ. (267b)
Inserting first the solution for labor (266) into (257) allows us to solve for LT and LN :
LT = LT
(
λ¯,W T ,WN , τ
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯,W T ,WN , τ
)
, (268)
with partial derivatives given by:
LˆT = [²αL + σL (1− αL)] Wˆ T + αL (σL − ²) WˆN + σL ˆ¯λ− σL dτ1− τ , (269a)
LˆN = [² (1− αL) + σLαL] WˆN + (1− αL) (σL − ²) Wˆ T + σL ˆ¯λ− σL dτ1− τ . (269b)
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN given by (268) into the resource
constraint for capital (265), the system of four equations consisting of (262a)-(262c) together
with (265) can be solved for sectoral wagesW j and sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . Keeping
TFPs unchanged, denoting by ξN ≡ KN/K the share of non traded capital in the aggregate
stock of physical capital and log-differentiating (262a)-(262c) together with (265) yields in
matrix form: 
−θT θN 0 0(
1− θT ) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1(










































1− ξN)σL + ξNσL = σL. (271d)
The short-run static solutions for sectoral wages and capital-labor ratios are:









Inserting first sectoral wages (272), sectoral employment (268) can be solved as functions







Finally, plugging solutions for sectoral labor (273) and sector capital-labor ratios (272), the
production functions (260) can be solved for sectoral output:





The Return on Domestic Capital, R
The return on domestic capital is:
R = ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT . (275)
Inserting first the short-run static solution for the capital-labor ratio kT given by (272), eq.






The Relative Price of Non Tradables, P
Finally, we have to solve for the relative price of non tradables by using the non traded
goods market clearing condition:
Y N = CN +GN + JN . (277)
Remembering that the non traded input JN used to produce investment goods is equal to
P ′JJ , inserting solutions for C
N and Y N given by (266) and (274), respectively, the non









+GN + P ′JK
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−KvP [1 + κv(.)] > 0. (281)
M.5 Formal Solutions for public debt D(t)
Like Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valle`s [2007], we assume a fiscal policy rule of the (linearized)
form:
dT (t) = φDdD(t) + φGdG(t), (282)
where dT (t) = T (t) − T˜ , dD(t) = D(t) − D˜, and dG(t) = G(t) − G˜. Linearizing first

























Inserting the dynamic equation for dG(t)Y given by eq. (97) into (283) and solving the











 e−δt − [Θ1e−ξt −Θ2e−χt] , (284)
where we set
ΘD = (1− φG)
[
1
ξ + r? − φD −
(1− g)





ξ + r? − φD , (285b)
Θ2 =
(1− φG) (1− g)
χ+ r? − φD , (285c)
δ = r? − φD. (285d)
We assume that initial public debt is nil, i.e., D0 = 0. Since public debt is restored back
toward its initial level in the long-run following a temporary rise in government spending,
we have D˜ = 0 as well. Inserting (284) into (282) along with the dynamic equation for















[φDΘ1 − φG] e−δt − [φDΘ2 − φG (1− g)] e−χt
}
. (286)




Because the aggregate labor income share is a weighted average of sectoral labor income
shares, i.e., θL =





T , θL varies over time. In order to avoid unnecessary
complications, we assume that θL is fixed, i.e., θL(t) = θL, and thus the adjustment in tax
receipts is achieved through changes in the labor tax rate only. Linearizing first (287) and






















φDΘ2 − φG (1− g)
θL
. (289c)
M.6 Formal Solutions for K(t) and Q(t)
Remembering that the non traded input JN used to produce the capital good is equal to
P ′JJ , using the fact that J
N = Y N − CN − GN and inserting I = K˙ + δK , the capital
accumulation equation can be rewritten as follows:
K˙ =
Y N − CN −GN
P ′J














, inserting short-run static solutions for non traded output
(274), consumption in non tradables (266), and optimal investment decision (250) into the
physical capital accumulation equation (282) and the dynamic equation for the shadow
value (249e), the dynamic system is:




)− CN (λ¯, P (.))−GN








Q˙ ≡ Σ(K,P,Q,G, τ) = (r? + δK)Q−
[
R (K,P (.)) + PJ
κ
2
v(.) (v(.) + 2δK)
]
.(291b)






















where the coefficients of the Jacobian matrix are given by

















a12 = ΥQ =
[(









a21 = ΣK = −RK − (RP + PJκvP δK)PK > 0, (293c)
a22 = ΣQ = r? − (RP + PJκvP δK)PQ > 0, (293d)
and the direct effects of changes in government consumption captured by the terms εGK and
εGQ are described by:
εK =
{[(














εQ = − (RP + PJκvP δK) PGNωGN
P˜
, (294b)





ετQ = −Rτ +ΣPPτ , (295b)
where ΥP = ΥP
(
K˜, Q˜, G˜, τ˜
)
and ΣP = ΣP
(
K˜, Q˜, G˜, τ˜
)
.
Denoting the negative eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general
solutions for K and Q can be written as follows:
K(t)− K˜ = X1(t) +X2(t), Q(t)− Q˜ = ω12X1(t) + ω22X2(t). (296)
where X1(t) and X2(t) characterize the trajectory of physical capital and the shadow value
of capital. To express these terms in compact form, we set:
Φl1 =
[









where l = G, τ , along with
ΓGi = −
ΦGi Y˜
(ν1 − ν2) (νi + ξ) , (298a)






(ν1 − ν2) (νi + δ) , (298c)
Γτi = −
ΦτiΩ1









where i = 1, 2.




























X1(0) = K0 − K˜ −X2(0). (300)
M.7 Formal Solutions for the Net Foreign Asset Position N(t)
To determine the dynamic equation for the net foreign asset position, N(t), we differentiate
N(t) = B(t)−D(t) w.r.t. time and substitute the dynamic equations for the stock of traded
bonds (246) and for the public debt (240):
N˙(t) = B˙(t)− D˙(t),
= r?N(t) +R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− PC(P (t))C(t)− PJ(P (t))J(t)−G(t).(301)
Inserting the market clearing condition for non tradables (277) and remembering that JT =
(1− αJ)PJJ , the current account equation is given by:
N˙ ≡ Ξ (N,K,Q,G) ,
= r?N + Y T − CT −GT − (1− αJ)PJJ,







Y N − CN −GN) , (302)
where we used the fact that P ′JJ = Y
N − CN −GN .
Linearizing first the current account equation (302) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state and substitute the solutions for K(t) and Q(t) leads to:
N˙(t) = r?dN(t) +N1X1(t) +N2X2(t) + ΞGdG(t) + Ξτdτ(t), (303)















Ξτ reads as follows:





P˜ Y Nτ , (304)
with ΞP =
(
Y TP − CTP
)− (1−αJαJ ) P˜ (Y NP − CNP )− φJ (1−αJαJ ) I˜N < 0.
Substituting X1(t) given by eq. (299a ) and X2(t) given by eq. (299a) into (299b) leads
to:





















e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt
)



















)− ΓD1 + Γτ1 (1−Θτ2) ]. (306)











































































































































Invoking the transversality condition, one obtains the ’stable’ solution for the stock of
net foreign assets so that N(t) converges toward its steady-state value N˜ :
N(t)− N˜ = ω
1
N

































































where ω1N is given by (306) and we set
ωGN = ΞGY˜
(
1−ΘG,′)+N1ΓG1 (1−ΘG,′1 )−N2ΓG2 (1−ΘG,′2 ) , (311a)
ωDN = ΞτΩD −N1ΓD1 +N2ΓD2 , (311b)
ωτN = −ΞτΩ1
(
1−Θτ,′)−N1Γτ1 (1−Θτ,′1 )+N2Γτ2 (1−Θτ,′2 ) . (311c)
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Differentiating (309) w.r.t. time gives the trajectory for the current account along the
transitional path when government spending follows the temporal path given by eq. (97)
and the labor tax rate is governed by the dynamic equation (288)
N˙(t) = ν1
ω1N













































ξe−ξt − χΘτ,′2 e−χt
)
. (312)
M.8 Formal Solution for the Stock of Non Human Wealth, A(t)
Remembering that the stock of national non human wealth A(t) is equal to N(t)+Q(t)K(t),
differentiating w.r.t. time, i.e., A˙(t) = B˙(t) − D˙(t) + Q˙(t)K(t) + Q(t)K˙(t), plugging the
dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital (249e), inserting the accumulation equa-
tions for physical capital (247), traded bonds (246), traded bonds issued by the government
(240) and using the specification of capita adjustment costs (248) along with the first order
condition (249d) yields the accumulation equation for the stock of national non human
wealth or the dynamic equation for national savings:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (t)L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t)−G(t). (313)
We first determine short-run static solutions for aggregate labor supply and aggregate wage
index. Inserting solutions for sectoral wages (272) into the solution for aggregate labor




























Substituting solutions for sectoral wages (272) into the aggregate wage indexW ≡W (W T ,WN),





































Inserting solutions for aggregate labor supply (314), plugging the solutions for aggregate
wage index (316) and for consumption (266) into the accumulation equation of financial
wealth (313), linearizing around the steady-state leads to:
A˙(t) = r?dA(t) + ΛKdK(t) + ΛQdQ(t) + ΛGdG(t) + Λτdτ(t), (318)
14





















= Wτ L˜+ W˜Lτ . (319d)
Substituting the solutions for K(t) and Q(t) into (318) leads to:
A˙(t) = r?dA(t) +M1X1(t) +M2X2(t) + ΛGdG(t) + Λτdτ(t), (320)
where Mi = ΛK + ΛQωi2 (with i = 1, 2).
Substituting the equation that governs the endogenous response of government con-
sumption to an exogenous fiscal shock (97) along with the equation that governs the en-
dogenous response of the labor tax rate (288) into (320) and solving yields the general















































































































)− ΓD1 + Γτ1 (1−Θτ1)] . (322)
Invoking the transversality condition, one obtains the ’stable’ solution for the stock of
national non human wealth so that A(t) converges toward its steady-state value A˜:
A(t)− A˜ = ω
1
A

































































where ω1A is given by (322) and we set
ωGA = ΛGY˜
(
1−ΘG,′)+M1ΓG1 (1−ΘG,′1 )−M2ΓG2 (1−ΘG,′2 ) , (325a)
ωDA = ΛτΩD −M1ΓD1 +M2ΓD2 , (325b)
ωτA = −ΛτΩ1
(
1−Θτ,′)−M1Γτ1 (1−Θτ,′1 )+M2Γτ2 (1−Θτ,′2 ) . (325c)
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Differentiating (323) w.r.t. time gives the trajectory for the national non human wealth
along the transitional path when government spending follows the temporal path given by
eq. (97) and the labor tax rate is governed by the dynamic equation (288)
A˙(t) = ν1
ω1A













































ξe−ξt − χΘτ,′2 e−χt
)
. (326)
N Solving the Model with Endogenous Markups
This section extends the two-sector model with imperfect mobility of labor to an imperfectly
competitive non traded sector with endogenous markups. We maintain the assumption of
capital installation costs. There are two sectors. A traded sector produced a good that can
be consumed by the private, CT , and the public sector, GT , invested, JT , or exported. A
non traded sector produces a good for domestic absorption only. The non traded good can
be consumed by the private, CN , and the public sector, GN , or invested, JN . The final
non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector with constant-returns-to-
scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non-traded goods.
We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral non traded goods
by η > 0. In each industry, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties within an industry is denoted by ρ > 0, and we assume that this is higher than
the elasticity of substitution across non traded industries, i.e. ρ > η (see Jaimovich and
Floetotto [2008]). The number of firms is large enough so that we can ignore the strategic
effects but not so large that the effect of entry on the firm’s demand curve is minuscule.
Consequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm is no longer constant
and equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a function
of the number of firms N . We further assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the
producers make zero profits. Since the household’s maximization problem is identical to
that described in section 2, we restrict our attention to the firms’ maximization problem.
More technical details can be found in the working paper version of the paper by Cardi and
Restout [2014], [2015].
N.1 Introducing Endogenous Markups
Within each industry, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety
is a price setter. Output Xi,j of firm i in industry j is produced using capital and labor,
i.e. Xi,j = H (Ki,j ,Li,j). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equating markup-adjusted
marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. PHK/µ = R, and PHL/µ = WN ,
where µ is the markup over the marginal costs. At a symmetric equilibrium, non-traded
output is equal to Y N = NX = H (KN , LN) where LN = NLN and KN = NKN .
Taking into account the fact that output of one variety does not affect the price of final
non-traded output, but influences the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium, the
resulting price elasticity of demand is:
e (N) = ρ− (ρ− η)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (327)
Assuming that ρ > η, the price elasticity of demand faced by one single firm is an increasing







where the positive sign of the partial derivative follows from the assumption ρ > η. Hence-





decreases as the number of competitors increases, i.e. µN < 0.
We assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the zero-profit condition holds at
each instant of time:
piN = H












where we denote fixed costs by ψ; we used the fact that Pµ
∂X







∂KNKN + ∂X∂LN LN = X . The zero-profit condition piN = 0 can be solved for the number of
firms.
Since capital can move freely between the two sectors while the shift of labor across


















)1−θN ≡WN , (331c)
where the capital-labor ratio for sector j = T,N is denoted by kj ≡ Kj/Lj . These static
efficiency conditions state that the value of the marginal product of labor in sector j is
equal to the labor cost W j while the value of the marginal product of capital in the traded
and the non traded sector must be equal to the capital rental cost, R.
Aggregating over the two sectors gives us the resource constraint for capital:
KT +KN = K. (332)
N.2 Solving the Model with Endogenous Markups
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN (see section G) into the resource
constraint for capital (332), the system of four equations consisting of (331a)-(331c) together
with (332) can be solved for the sectoral wage rates W j and sectoral capital-labor ratios
kj . Keeping TFPs unchanged, and differentiating (331a)-(331c) together with (332) yields










































The short-run static for sectoral wages and sectoral capital-labor ratios are:















worked can be solved as functions of the shadow value of wealth, the capital stock, the






We repeat production functions for convenience:




, j = T,N. (337)
Inserting first short-run static solutions for sectoral capital-labor ratios (335) and sectoral
labor (336) into the production functions yields:





It is worth noticing that a rise in the markup µ produces opposite effects to those induced
by an appreciation in P .
The Return on Domestic Capital, R
The return on domestic capital is:
R = ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT . (339)
Inserting first the short-run static solution for the capital-labor ratio kT given by (335), eq.






Optimal Investment Decision, I/K



















The Number of Firms within each Non Traded Industry, N
Substituting the short-run solution for non traded output (338) and using the fact that
µ = µ (N) (see (327)-(329)), the zero-profit condition (330) can be rewritten as:
Y N
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∂µ < 0 is not too large.
This implies that an input inflow in the non-traded sector that raises Y N and thereby leads
to profit opportunities results in firm entry (i.e, N increases) which lowers the markup, µ.
Solutions for Sectoral Production Variables
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Since sectoral wages, sectoral capital labor-ratios, sectoral labor and sectoral output
depend on the markup and thus on the number of firms, we have to plug back (344) into
(335), (336), and (338) in order get the solutions for sectoral wages, sectoral capital labor-
ratios, sectoral labor and sectoral output:
W j =W j
{
λ¯,K, P, µ [N(.)]
} ≡W j (λ¯,K, P ) , (347a)
kj = kj
{
λ¯,K, P, µ [N(.)]
} ≡W j (λ¯,K, P ) , (347b)
Lj = Lj
{
λ¯,K, P, µ [N(.)]
} ≡W j (λ¯,K, P ) , (347c)
Y j = Y j
{
λ¯,K, P, µ [N(.)]
} ≡W j (λ¯,K, P ) , (347d)




∂µ µNNX with X = λ¯,K, P . The same logic applies to W
j , kj , Lj .
Sectoral Government Spending, Gj
Making use of (5), the budget constraint can be solved for government expenditure in
good j = T,N can be solved for overall government consumption as follows:








∂G = ωGT with ωGj corresponding to the share of expenditure on
good j in total government spending.
The Relative Price of Non Tradables, P
Finally, we have to solve for the relative price of non tradables by using the non traded
goods market clearing condition:
Y N = CN +GN + JN . (349)
Remembering that the non traded input JN used to produce investment goods is equal to
P ′JJ , inserting short-run static solutions for C
N and Y N , substituting J = K
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+GN + P ′JK
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−KvP [1 + κv(.)] > 0. (353)
with µN < 0 and NP > 0.
N.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Remembering that the non traded input JN used to produce the capital good is equal to
P ′JJ , using the fact that J
N = Y N − CN − GN and inserting I = K˙ + δKK, the capital
accumulation equation can be rewritten as follows:
K˙ =
Y N
µ − CN −GN
P ′J








Inserting short-run solutions for non traded output (347d), consumption in non tradables,
optimal investment decision (342), and the number of firms (344) into the physical capital
accumulation equation (354), and inserting the solution for the return on domestic capital
(340) into the dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital stock (81e), the dynamic
system reads as follows:
K˙ ≡ Υ(K,P,Q,G) =













Q˙ ≡ Σ(K,P,Q,G) = (r? + δK)Q−
[
R (K,P (.)) + PJ
κ
2
v(.) (v(.) + 2δK)
]
.(355b)
where we have inserted the solution for the number of firms (344) into (340) in order to solve
for the domestic return of physical capital, i.e., R = R
{
λ¯,K, P, µ [N(.)]
} ≡ R (λ¯,K, P ).
As will be useful, let us denote by ΥK , ΥQ, and ΥP the partial derivatives evaluated
at the steady-state of the capital accumulation equation w.r.t. K and Q (for given P ),























































Remembering that JT = (1− αJ)PJJ , the current account equation is given by:
B˙ ≡ Ξ (B,K,Q,G) = r?B + Y T − CT −GT − (1− αJ)PJJ,












where we used the fact that P ′JJ = Y
N −CN −GN . As will be useful, let us denote by ΞK
and ΞP the partial derivatives of the accumulation equation for traded bonds w.r.t. K (for

















































I˜N < 0, (358b)
















and at the steady-state,
we have J˜N = I˜N since capital installation costs are absent in the long run. The steps for
the derivation of solutions for a temporary government shock are identical to those detailed
in section G.3.
O Semi-Small Open Economy Model
This section puts forward an open economy version of the neoclassical model with tradables
and non tradables, imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, capital adjustment costs and
endogenous terms of trade. This section illustrates in detail the steps we follow in solving
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this model. Households supply labor, L, and must decide on the allocation of total hours
worked between the traded sector, LH , and the non traded sector, LN . They consume both
traded, CT , and non traded goods, CN . Traded goods are a composite of home traded
goods, CH , and foreign imported goods, CF . Households also choose investment which is
produced using inputs of the traded, JT , and the non traded good, JN . As for consumption,
input of the traded good is a composite of home traded goods, JH , and foreign imported
goods, JF . The numeraire is the foreign good whose price, PF , is thus normalized to one.
O.1 Households
At each instant of time, the representative household consumes traded and non traded goods









φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (359)
where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non traded goods.
The index CT is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced traded goods, CH , and



















where 0 < ϕH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded good in the overall consump-
tion bundle and ρ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between home-produced
traded goods goods and foreign produced traded goods.
As in De Cordoba and Kehoe [2000], the investment good is produced using inputs of
the traded good and the non traded good according to a constant-returns-to-scale function
which is assumed to take a CES form:
J ≡ J (JT , JN) = [ι 1φJ (JT )φJ−1φJ + (1− ι) 1φJ (JN)φJ−1φJ ] φJφJ−1 , (361)
where ι is the weight of the investment traded input (0 < ι < 1) and φJ corresponds to
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in investment between traded and non traded
inputs. The index JT is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced traded inputs, JH ,



















where 0 < ιH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded good in the overall consump-
tion bundle and ρJ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between home-produced
traded inputs and foreign-produced traded inputs.
Following Horvath [2000], we assume that hours worked in the traded and the non







² + (1− ϑ)−1/² (LN) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (363)
where 0 < ϑ < 1 is the weight of labor supply to the traded sector in the labor index L(.)
and ² measures the ease with which hours worked can be substituted for each other and
thereby captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors.
The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and invest-

















subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t)+R(t)K(t)+W (t)L(t)−T (t)−PC
(








and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (366)
where I is investment and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. The first term on
the RHS of (365) r?B(t) + R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t) − T (t) is the representative household’s
real disposable income while the second term on the RHS, i.e., PC
(





P TJ (t), P
N (t)
)
J(t), corresponds to consumption and investment expenditure including
capital installation costs. More specifically, we assume that capital accumulation is subject
to increasing and convex cost of net investment, I(t)− δKK(t):
J(t) = I(t) + Ψ (I(t),K(t))K(t), (367)
where Ψ (.) is increasing (i.e., Ψ′(.) > 0), convex (i.e., Ψ′′(.) > 0), is equal to zero at δK (i.e.,
Ψ(δK) = 0), and has first partial derivative equal to zero as well at δK (i.e., Ψ′(δK) = 0).










Using (368), partial derivatives of total investment expenditure are:
∂J(t)
∂I(t)





















Denoting the co-state variables associated with (365) and (366) by λ andQ′, respectively,
the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = (PC(t)λ)
−σC , (370a)










λ˙(t) = λ (β − r?) , (370d)















and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞Q(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive (370c) and (370e), we used the fact that Q(t) = Q′(t)/λ(t).
Given the above consumption indices, we can derive appropriate price indices. With








+ (1− ϕ) (PN)1−φ] 11−φ , (371)











Given the consumption-based price index (371), the representative household has the














Given the price indices (371) and (372), the representative household has the following























As will be useful later, the percentage change in the consumption price index is a
weighted average of percentage changes in the price of traded and non traded goods in
terms of foreign goods:
PˆC = (1− αC) Pˆ T + αC PˆN , (375a)
Pˆ T = αH PˆH , (375b)
where αC is the non tradable content of overall consumption expenditure and αH is the
home-produced goods content of consumption expenditure on traded goods:
























Given the CES aggregator functions above, we can derive the appropriate price indices
for investment. With respect to the general investment index, we obtain the investment-






)1−φJ + (1− ι) (PN)1−φJ ] 11−φJ , (377)






)1−ρJ + (1− ιH)] 11−ρJ . (378)
Given the investment-based price index (377), we can derive the demand for inputs of













Given the price indices (377) and (378), we can derive the demand for inputs of home-





















As will be useful later, the percentage change in the investment price index is a weighted
average of percentage changes in the price of traded and non traded inputs in terms of
foreign inputs:
PˆJ = (1− αJ) Pˆ TJ + αJ PˆN , (381a)





where αJ is the non tradable content of overall investment expenditure and αHJ is the
home-produced goods content of investment expenditure on traded goods:

































+ (1− ϑ) (WN)²+1] 1²+1 , (383)
where WH and WN are wages paid in the traded and the non traded sectors, respectively.
Given the aggregate wage index, we can derive the allocation of aggregate labor supply













As will be useful later, the percentage change in the aggregate wage index is a weighted
average of percentage changes in sectoral wages:
Wˆ = (1− αL) WˆH + αLWˆN , (385)
where αL is the non tradable content of aggregate labor compensation:













Both the home traded and non traded sectors use physical capital, Kj , and labor, Lj ,





assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form:






, j = H,N (387)
where θj is the labor income share in sector j and Zj corresponds to the total factor
productivity index which is introduced for calibration purposes. Both sectors face two cost
components: a capital rental cost equal to R, and a labor cost equal to the wage rate, i.e.,
WH in the traded sector and WN in the non traded sector.
Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital and labor






P jY j −W jLj −RKj} . (388)
Since capital can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products in













)1−θN ≡WN , (389c)
where kj ≡ Kj/Lj denotes the capital-labor ratio for sector j = H,N .
The resource constraint for capital is:
KH +KN = K. (390)
O.3 Short-Run Solutions
Consumption and Labor
Before linearizing, we have to determine short-run solutions. First-order conditions
(370a) and (370b) can be solved for consumption and aggregate labor supply which of
course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ¯, PN , PH
)





with partial derivatives given by
Cˆ = −σC ˆ¯λ− σC (1− αC)αH PˆH − σCαC PˆN , (392a)
Lˆ = σL ˆ¯λ+ σLαLWˆN + σL (1− αL) WˆH , (392b)
where we used (385) and (375).
Inserting first the solution for consumption (391) into (373a)-(374b) allows us to solve
for CN , CH , and CF :
CN = CN
(
λ¯, PN , PH
)
, CH = CH
(
λ¯, PN , PH
)
, CF = CF
(
λ¯, PN , PH
)
, (393)
with partial derivatives given by
CˆN = −φPˆN + (φ− σC) PˆC − σC ˆ¯λ,
= − [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] PˆN + (φ− σC) (1− αC)αH PˆH − σC ˆ¯λ, (394a)
CˆH = − [ρ (1− αH)+ φαCαH + σC (1− αC)αH] PˆH + αC (φ− σC) PˆN − σC ˆ¯λ,(394b)
CˆF = αH [ρ− φαC − σC (1− αC)] PˆH + αC (φ− σC) PˆN − σC ˆ¯λ. (394c)











with partial derivatives given by:
LˆH = [²αL + σL (1− αL)] WˆH − αL (²− σL) WˆN + σL ˆ¯λ, (396a)
LˆN = [² (1− αL) + σLαL] WˆN − (1− αL) (²− σL) WˆH + σL ˆ¯λ. (396b)
Sectoral Wages and Capital-Labor Ratios
Plugging the short-run solutions for LH and LN given by (395) into the resource con-
straint for capital (390), the system of four equations consisting of (389a)-(389c) together
with (390) can be solved for sectoral wages W j and sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . De-
noting by ξN ≡ KN/K the share of non traded capital in the aggregate stock of physical
capital and log-differentiating (389a)-(389c) together with (390) yields in matrix form:
−θH θN 0 0(
1− θH) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1(

































1− ξN)σL + ξNσL = σL. (398c)
The short-run solutions for sectoral wages and capital-labor ratios are:
W j =W j
(
λ¯,K, PN , PH
)
, kj = kj
(
λ¯,K, PN , PH
)
. (399)
Inserting first sectoral wages (399), sectoral employment (395) can be solved as functions
of the shadow value of wealth, the capital stock, the price of non traded goods in terms of
foreign goods, PN , and the terms of trade:
Lj = Lj
(
λ¯,K, PN , PH
)
. (400)
Finally, plugging solutions for sectoral labor (400) and sector capital-labor ratios (399), the
production functions (387) can be solved for sectoral output:
Y j = Y j
(


















where X = λ¯,K, PN , PH .
The Return on Domestic Capital, R
The return on domestic capital is:
R = PHZH
(
1− θH) (kH)−θH . (403)
Inserting first the short-run static solution for the capital-labor ratio kH given by (399),
eq. (403) can be solved for the return on domestic capital:
R = R
(
λ¯,K, PN , PH
)
, (404)









where X = λ¯,K, PN , PH .
Optimal Investment Decision, I/K






PI (P T , PN )
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= κvX (1 + κv(.)) > 0, (411b)
with X = Q,PH , PN .
Substituting (411) into (379b), (380a), and (380b) allows us to solve for the demand of















with partial derivatives given by






















PˆH + Kˆ, (413a)





























JˆF = αHJ (ρJ − φJαJ) PˆH + φJαJ PˆN + Jˆ ,
= αHJ
{



















where use has been made of (411), i.e.,

















O.4 Market Clearing Conditions
Finally, we have to solve for the relative price of non traded goods and the terms of trade.
Market Clearing Condition for Non Tradables
The role of the price of non tradables in terms of foreign goods is to clear the non traded
goods market:
Y N = CN +GN + JN . (414)
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Inserting solutions for CN , JN , Y N given by (393), (410), (401), respectively, the non
traded goods market clearing condition (414) can be rewritten as follows:
Y N
(




λ¯, PN , PH
)
+GN + JN (415)
Eq. (415) can be solved for the relative price of non tradables:
PN = ΨN
(
K,Q,PH , GN , λ¯
)
, (416)









































Y NPN − CNPN − JNPN
)
> 0. (418)
Market Clearing Condition for Home-Produced Traded Goods
The role of the price of home-produced goods in terms of foreign-produced goods or the
terms of trade is to clear the home-produced traded goods market:
Y H = CH +GH + JH +XH , (419)






where φX is the elasticity of exports with respect to the terms of trade.
Inserting solutions for CH , JH , Y H given by (393), (410), (401), respectively, the traded
goods market clearing condition (419) can be rewritten as follows:
Y H
(




λ¯, PN , PH
)





Eq. (421) can be solved for the terms of trade:
PH = ΨH
(
K,Q,PN , GH , λ¯
)
, (422)



















































O.5 Solving the Model
In our model, there is one state variable, namely K, and one control variable, Q. To solve
the model, we have to express all variables in terms of state and control variables. Plugging
first eq. (422) into (416) allows us to solve for the relative price of non tradables:
PN = PN
(
K,Q,GH , GN , λ¯
)
, (425)














with PNK < 0, P
N






Plugging first eq. (425) into (422) allows us to solve for the terms of trade:
PH = PH
(
K,Q,ZH , ZN , λ¯
)
, (427)









with PHK < 0, P
H






Substituting solutions for the relative price of non tradables (425) and the terms of trade
(427) into solutions for consumption (393), sectoral output (401), the return on domestic
capital (404), and the optimal investment decision (406) yields:
Cj = Cj
(
K,Q,GH , GN , λ¯
)
, (429a)
Y j = Y j
(










K,Q,GH , GN , λ¯
)
. (429d)
To keep things simple, we assume GF = 0. Thus GN = ωGNG and GH = ωGTG. Using












> 0, we can express all variables in






where D = Cj , J j , Lj ,W j , P j , Y j , kj , R, v, P,XH ,MF with P = PN/PH .











K, using the fact that
JN = Y N − CN −GN and inserting I = K˙ + δK , the capital accumulation equation reads
as follows:
K˙ =












Inserting short-run solutions for non traded output (429b) and for consumption in non
tradables (430), substituting optimal investment decision (429d) into the physical capital
accumulation equation (431), and plugging the short-run solution for the return on domestic
capital (429c) into the dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital stock (370e), the
dynamic system reads as follows:77
K˙ ≡ Υ(K,Q,G) = Y


















PH (.) , PN (.)
] κ
2
v(.) (v(.) + 2δK)
]
, (432b)
77We omit the shadow value of wealth from short-run solutions for clarity purposes as λ remains constant
over time.
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where PN (.) and PH (.) are given by (425) and (427).
To facilitate the linearization, it is useful to break down the capital accumulation into
two components:













)−φJ and log-linearizing gives:
Jˆ = JˆN + φJ (1− αJ) PˆN − φJ (1− αJ)αHJ PˆH (434)
where we used the fact that PˆJ = (1− αJ)αHJ PˆH + αJ PˆN . Using (433) and the fact that





dY N (t)− dCN (t)]+ φJ J
PN
(1− αJ) dPN (t)
− φJ J
PH
(1− αJ)αHJ dPH(t)− δKdK(t), (435)
where J = I = δKK in the long-run.
As will be useful, let us denote by ΥK , ΥQ, and ΥG the partial derivatives evaluated
at the steady-state of the capital accumulation equation w.r.t. K, Q, and G, respectively.




















































where J = δKK in the long run.
Let us denote by ΣK , ΣQ, and ΣG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state
of the dynamic equation for the marginal value of an additional unit of capital w.r.t. K,
Q, and G, respectively:
ΣK ≡ ∂Q˙
∂K
= −RK − PJκvKδK > 0, (437a)
ΣQ ≡ ∂Q˙
∂Q
= (r? + δK)− PJκvQδK = r? > 0, (437b)
ΣG ≡ ∂Q˙
∂G
= −RG − PJκvGδK . (437c)
Assuming that the saddle-path stability condition is fulfilled, and denoting the negative
eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general solutions for K and Q are:
K(t)− K˜ = D1eν1t +D2eν2t, Q(t)− Q˜ = ω12D1eν1t + ω22D2eν2t, (438)
whereK0 is the initial capital stock and
(
1, ωi2






Because ν1 < 0, ΥK > 0 and ΥQ > 0, we have ω12 < 0, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities, which implies that the shadow value of investment and the stock physical capital
move in opposite direction along a stable path (i.e., D2 = 0).
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O.6 Current Account Equation and Intertemporal Solvency Condition
To determine the current account equation, we use the following identities and properties:
PCC = PHCH + CF + PNCN , (440a)
PJJ = PHJH + JF + PNJN , (440b)









= PHY H + PNY N , (440d)
where (440d) follows from Euler theorem. Using (440d), inserting (440a)-(440c) into (365)
and invoking market clearing conditions for non traded goods (414) and home-produced
traded goods (419) yields:
B˙ = r?B + PH
(
Y H − CH −GH − JH)− (CF + JF +GF ) ,
= r?B + PHXH −MF , (441)
where XH = Y H − CH − GH − JH stands for exports of home goods and we denote by
MF imports of foreign consumption and investment goods:
MF = CF +GF + JF . (442)
Substituting first solutions for PN and PH given by (425) and (427), respectively, into
(412) and (420) allows us to express the demand for input of foreign-produced traded goods,











Inserting (443a)-(443b) into(441) allows us to write the current account equation as follows:
B˙ ≡ r?B + Ξ(K,Q,G) ,
= r?B + PH (K,Q,G)XH (K,Q,G)−MF (K,Q,G) . (444)
Let us denote by ΞK , ΞQ, and ΞG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state of
the dynamic equation for the current account w.r.t. K, Q, and G, respectively:
ΞK ≡ ∂B˙
∂K
= (1− φX)XHPHK −MFK , (445a)
ΞQ ≡ ∂B˙
∂Q
= (1− φX)XHPHQ −MFQ , (445b)
ΞG ≡ ∂B˙
∂G
= (1− φX)XHPHG −MFG . (445c)
where we used the fact that PHXH = ϕX
(
PH
)1−φX (see eq. (420)).
Linearizing (444) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, making use of (445a) and
(445b), inserting solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (438) and solving yields the general
solution for the net foreign asset position:







?t +Ψ1D1eν1t +Ψ2D2eν2t, (446)
where B0 is the initial stock of traded bonds and we set
Ni = ΞK + ΞQωi2, (447a)
Ψi =
Ni
νi − r? . (447b)
Invoking the transversality condition leads to the linearized version of the nations’s
intertemporal solvency condition:





where K0 is the initial stock of physical capital.
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O.7 Derivation of the Accumulation Equation of Non Human Wealth
Remembering that the stock of financial wealth A(t) is equal to B(t)+Q(t)K(t), differenti-
ating w.r.t. time, i.e., A˙(t) = B˙(t) + Q˙(t)K(t) +Q(t)K˙(t), plugging the dynamic equation
for the marginal value of capital (370e), inserting the accumulation equations for physical
capital (366) and traded bonds (365), yields the accumulation equation for the stock of
financial wealth or the dynamic equation for private savings:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (t)L(t)− T (t)− PC(t)C(t). (449)
where we assume that the government levies lump-sum taxes, T , to finance purchases of
foreign-produced, home-produced and non traded goods, i.e., T = G =
(
GF + PH(.)GH + PN (.)GN
)
.
We first determine short-run solutions for aggregate labor supply and aggregate wage
index. Inserting first short-run solutions for the relative price of non tradables (425) and the





Then inserting sectoral wages into (383) and (391) allows us to solve for aggregate wage,
















Inserting (450a)-(450c) into (441) allows us to write the current account equation as
follows:
A˙ ≡ r?A+ Λ(K,Q,G) ,
= r?A+W (K,Q,G)L (K,Q,G)−G− PC
[
PH (.) , PN (.)
]
C (K,Q,G) , (451)
where PN and PH are given by (425) and (427), respectively.
Let us denote by ΛK , ΛQ, and ΛG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state




























Linearizing (451) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, making use of (452a) and
(452b), inserting solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (438) and solving yields the general








?t +∆1D1eν1t +∆2D2eν2t, (453)
where A0 is the initial stock of financial wealth and we set
Mi = AK +AQωi2, (454a)
∆i =
Mi
νi − r? . (454b)







where A0 is the initial stock of non human wealth.
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O.8 The Steady-State
Below, we characterize the whole steady-state and use tilde to denote long-run values.
Setting K˙ = Q˙ = B˙ = 0 into (366), (370e) and (441), and inserting short-run static
solutions for kN , Y N and Y H , CN , JN , CH , JH , MF derived above, the steady-state can
be summarized by five equations:
ZH
(
1− θH) [kH (K˜, P˜H , P˜N , G, λ¯)]−θH = PJ (P˜H , P˜N) (r? + δK) , (456a)
Y N
(




































K˜, P˜H , P˜N , λ¯
)
(456d)





These five equations jointly determine P˜N , P˜H , K˜, B˜ and λ¯.
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